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ABSTRACT 

An abstract of the dissertation ofRichard William Hunter for the Doctor ofPhilosophy 
in Social Work and Social Research presented February 10, 1999. 
Title: Voices of Our Past: The Rank and File Movement in Social Work, 1931-1950 
During the period of the late 1920s through the late 1940s, a most remarkable 
event in the history of American social work emerged: the development of a vital 
radical trade union organizing effort known as the ''rank and file movement." Born 
within the growing economic crisis of the 1920s and maturing in the national 
economic collapse and social upheaval heralded by the Great Depression, the rank and 
file movement would attract the support and membership of thousands ofprofessional 
social workers and uncredentialed relief workers in efforts to organize social service 
workers along the lines of industrial unionism. Within its relatively short life span, the 
rank and file movement would grow in sufficient number and influence to challenge 
both the prevailing definitions of social work as a profession - its form and identity ­
and the essence of its function - its practice. 
It is the thesis of this study that an understanding of the rank and file 
movement is central to a modem understanding ofour profession. The origin, 
development and demise of the rank and file movement reflects more than the 
historical curiosity of a momentary tendency in the evolution of a profession; rather, it 
reveals the enduring legacy of individuals, organizations and collective intellectual 
1 

discourse in common struggle for the possibilities of a more just and democratic social 
order. And, perhaps unlike any other profession, the domain of social work is 
historically one uniquely born of this struggle, encompassing the self-imposed 
imperatives and paradoxes ofmorality, socially purposive service and scientific 
rationality. 
Consequently, this study seeks to inform the terms of this enduring legacy 
within the dynamic world of social work. It does so by: 1) locating the history of the 
rank and file movement within the context of an evolving profession; 2) analyzing this 
specific history of a profession within the context ofbroader social and political forces 
that defined both the limits and potentials ofthat evolution; and 3) assessing the 
implications of this history for social work in terms of its past, present and future. 
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FOREWORD: 

THE PAST AS PRESENT, THE PRESENT AS PAST 

April 14, 1966 
Mr. B. 1. Zukas 
East Northport Junior High School 
East Northport, New York 
Dear Mr. Zukas: 
I have been reading with interest a book entitled, Three Kids in a Cart by Allen Drury 
which was secured from the East Northport Public Library. On papers 5, 6 and 7, I note 
the interrogation of a witness named Bronislaus Joseph Zukas. Are you the witness to 
whom reference is made? If so, and since the book is undoubtedly being widely read in the 
community, there may be questions raised by the readers. At least, I would anticipate this 
might occur. 
In order to be prepared for such an eventuality, and if, in fact, you are the witness to 
whom reference is made, I would appreciate your reaction to the case as presented in the 
book, the general nature of the investigation, the outcome, and your particular role. 
Sincerely, 
John G. Benfer 
Assistant for Curriculum 
April 28, 1966 
Dear Mr. Zukas: 
This letter is to acknowledge receipt ofyour brief letter to me and your letter to Dr. 
Schneider ... in which you submitted your resignation. In my letter ofApril 14, 1966 to you 
I indicated that I wished: 
a. To know if, indeed, you were the witness to whom reference was made. 
b. Your reaction to the case in point as presented by the author. 
c. The general nature of the investigation. 
d. An explanation ofyour role. 
At our conference ofApril 21 the foregoing points were discussed verbally. At the 
conclusion of our conference I asked that you respond in writing to the questions raised in 
my letter ofApril 14. This you agreed to do but I assume from your letter of April 26 that 
you decided otherwise. Again, I would request that you respond in writing to the questions 
I raised in the letter ofApril 14. I would expect such an explanation on or before May 5, 
1966, if you choose to comply. 
Sincerely, 
John G. Benfer1 
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Bronislaus Zukas' involvement in'social work's rank: and file movement was 
a short but well publicized one.2 Like many others who would form the backbone of 
the movement, Zukas was a public relief worker. Trained as a teacher, Zukas 
graduated from college and, in the face of the Great Depression, held out few 
prospects in 1935 for obtaining employment as a teacher in New York City. Instead, 
Zukas, like thousands ofother unemployed white and blue-collar workers, accepted a 
position as a public relief worker. Like Zukas, most of these new public relief 
workers did not have the benefit of social work training or a professional degree in 
social work. Rather, they were thrust into the role of caseworker by virtue of their 
unemployment and the opportunity for work created by the Roosevelt 
administration's funding ofpublic relief programs such as the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA).3 
Zukas worked as a caseworker in the New York Home Relief Bureau, and 
quickly joined the Association of Workers in Public Relief Agencies (A WPRA). 
Organized initially in 1933 as the Emergency Home Relief Bureau Association, 
A WPRA was one of the first, and most militant, of the early rank and file public 
worker unions. Through contacts in the union, Zukas joined the Communist Party 
and, like many of the communist group in the union, became a part-time labor 
organizer. 
Following the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
and the subsequent affiliation ofmost social work unions into the CIO, Zukas was 
employed as a CIO organizer and was transferred to California. In California, the 
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State, County and Municipal Workers ofAmerica, CIO (SCMWA) was engaged in a 
massive and largely successful effort to organize public sector workers. After 
leading a campaign to organize hospital workers in Los Angeles, Zukas went to work 
as a caseworker in Visalia at the Tulare County office of the State Relief 
Administration (SRA). There, Zukas assumed union leadership as financial 
secretary for the SCMW A local. 
Tulare County, like many other areas ofCalifornia, was highly dependent on 
agriculture for its economic base. Over the years, a strong coalition ofproducers, 
canneries and distributors had waged a bitter war with migrant workers and efforts of 
the CIO to organize farm and cannery workers. Like many CIO activists and their 
unions, Zukas and his SCMW A local openly assisted the organizing efforts of the 
CIO's United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers ofAmerica 
(UCAP A WA) in Tulare County and the greater Central Valley. However, the 
growing statewide success of the UCAPAWA did not go unchallenged by agri­
business interests and their allies in the California legislature, who charged that the 
Communist Party controlled the union.4 
As alarm over the successes ofthe UCAP A W A and its alleged communist 
connections increased in the state legislature, so did charges that the State Relief 
Administration was riddled with communists. These allegations were directly tied to 
charges that SCMW A was engaged in such subversive activities as providing relief 
to striking farm workers and supporting efforts of the Communist-led organization of 
the unemployed, the Workers Alliance. Citing previous conclusions of legislative 
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investigative committees that " ... the SRA is being used for the development of the 
Communist program," the legislature's Assembly Relief Investigating Committee, 
chaired by Samuel Yorty, launched a series of investigatory hearings in 1940 
throughout the state targeting the State Relief Agency and its SCMW A represented 
employees.5 
On March 21 and 22, 1940, the committee held hearings in Visalia on alleged 
communist infiltration of the Tulare County SRA office. As members of the Ku 
Klux Klan demonstrated outside the hearings, Zukas responded to a subpoena to 
appear before the committee. In a hearing packed with spectators and reporters, 
Zukas sparred with investigators, refusing to answer questions about union activities 
or to tum over demanded lists ofunion officers and members: 
For my 'good deeds' as a CIO organizer, I was the first victim of 
the witch-hunters' Yorty State Committee on Un-American 
Activities here ...! remember the yahoos gloated as they 
mispronounced [my name] with the suggestion that no native born 
patriot would ever bear such a foreign label. .. 6 
Cited for contempt, Zukas was arrested and jailed following the conclusion of the 
hearing. While Zukas' subsequent conviction for contempt was overturned on 
appeal (along with convictions of 19 other witnesses who refused to cooperate with 
the Yorty committee), his career as a relief worker was over. The publicity ofhis 
trial and conviction, coupled with an informal blacklist that circulated among relief 
agency administrators, effectively barred Zukas from obtaining employment in 
public welfare agencies. After a ten year period of temporary jobs and self-described 
" ... vegetation and near emotional breakdown," Zukas eventually returned to public 
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life, this time as a teacher in Long Island and an activist within the American 
Federation ofTeachers.7 
Zukas relished his renewed career as a junior high school teacher, until a 
twist of fate pennanently ended his professional ambitions: 
Even Allan Drury remembered [me] in his pot-boiler memoirs, 
Three Kids in a Carl ... Believe it or not he was a cub reporter in the 
San Joaquin Valley in 1940 when the Un-Americans attacked me 
and mine. This was published about 1965 and my school 
employers called me in to inquire could I be the Bronislaus J. 
Zukas described therein because the local Birchers were very 
concerned about such a wild-eyed subversive in their midst as a 
junior high school master! Ofcourse I admitted to this notoriety 
and assured them that I was resigning ... 8 
With two careers now destroyed, Zukas returned to California, settling in Berkeley. 
Despite his experiences with the hysteria of anti-Communism, Zukas continued his 
activism into the 1980s, participating in the nuclear disannament movement, protests 
against the Vietnam war and community organizing efforts among poor people in the 
Bay area. Reflecting back on his time in the rank and file movement, Zukas recalls, 
Because ofour industrial union approach, we were able to capture 
the spirit ofmilitancy that social workers were looking for. In 
California, as elsewhere, we concentrated on public and private 
social worker agencies and institutions ... the union survived 
because the national organization was relatively strong in 
comparison because few other areas were subjected to such an 
attack. The rank and file were a very mobile type accustomed to 
temporary lay-offs and dismissals ... In the long run you could say 
we didn't do a good job ofunderstanding how powerful our 
enemies were, or what they could do to us, but we were still right. .. 
Generally, the so-called liberal M.S.W. 's were relieved to be rid of 
subjective and subversive staff malcontents. The ones who headed 
the relief agencies both here and in the east used to mock our puny 
'mock worker' tactics and programs. Just like the AASW 
5 
[American Association ofSocial Workers], they feared they too 
would suffer the fate of the genuine radicals who strove to pursue 
the search for truth and progress ... 9 
********** 
Mr. Travenner: Will you tell the committee, please, whether or not in 1954 there 
was a group organized in Hartford known as the Connecticut 
Volunteers for Civil Rights? 
Verne Weed: 	 Given the nature of this hearing, that is the kind of question I want 
to claim the fifth amendment. 
Mr. Travenner: Well, you speak in a very general way about it. 
Verne Weed: 	 I have done what I could for peace. That specific question I would 
claim the fifth amendment on ... 
Mr. Travenner: Actually, you were the local head ofthat chapter or organization, 
were you not, known as the Connecticut Volunteers for Civil 
Rights? 
Verne Weed: 	 Well, I will repeat again, I did what I could for peace. In terms of 
that particular question, given the kind ofhearing this is, I claim 
fifth amendment privilege. 
Rep. Kearney: What do you mean "the kind ofhearing this is"? 
Verne Weed: 	 You want to know my opinion? I was subpoenaed here. I was 
brought here. 
Rep. Kearney: 	 That is right. You are here under subpoena. 
Verne Weed: 	 And I consider it an undemocratic committee inquiring into the area 
ofopinions, ideas ... 
Rep. Kearney: 	 I have heard that line before ...you are bordering on contempt. .. 10 
Between 1945 and 1957, the U.S. House ofRepresentative's Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) crisscrossed the country, holding hearings on the 
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alleged infiltration ofcommunism and the Communist Party into almost all aspects 
ofAmerican life and institutions. During this period, the Committee would hold 
over 230 public hearings and call some 3,000 people before them to testify. I I While 
the press and public would be most enthralled by the Committee's investigation of 
subversion in Hollywood and alleged Soviet spies in the federal government, the 
bulk of the Committee's activities focused on the less sensational aspects ofalleged 
communist subversion. For every Dalton Trumbo or Alger Hiss that was called 
before the Committee, hundreds ofordinary working Americans faced the juggernaut 
of anti-communism aptly described by National Guardian editor Cedric Belfrage as 
"The American Inquisition.,,12 Most of the witnesses subpoenaed by the Committee 
did not star in the movies or hold high positions ofgovernment; rather, they led 
ordinary lives and worked in ordinary jobs. They were social workers, teachers, 
machinists, miners and secretaries. Some were members or former members of the 
Communist Party, most were not. Many had at one time in their past belonged to 
liberal or left-progressive organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, 
the American Student Union, the Consumer's League, or the American Labor Party 
- deemed by the Committee as Communist fronts. Many more were union members 
or officers of~ons, particularly within the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
condemned by the Committee as Communist-dominated. 
For many of those called before the HUAC, it presaged public humiliation 
and suspicion, community hostility and censure, termination ofemployment and the 
ruin ofchosen careers. Blacklists, both formal and informal, would follow witnesses 
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and their supporters for years. For some who refused to cooperate, indictments of 
contempt would lead to prison sentences or long years of expensive legal battles. 
While the final toll of ruined careers and lives left in the wake of the Committee is 
unknown, many social workers, such as Verne Weed, faced the Committee and 
suffered from the culture of fear it helped to create. 
In 1956, Verne Weed was the assistant executive supervisor of Children's 
Services of Connecticut. A graduate of the New York School of Social Work, Weed 
had started working with Children's Services in 1940 as a supervisor. Well 
respected by her colleagues and agency administration, she had moved up the ladder 
of agency leadership and was now responsible for the statewide coordination of 
foster care and adoption services. 
However, it was not the consistently excellent performance evaluations she 
received that brought Weed to the attention of the U.S. government, but rather, her 
political activities as a private citizen. A vocal proponent ofboth the union and 
peace movements, Weed was well known in Connecticut progressive circles as an 
activist; and that activism would become the focus of the HUAC in 1956. Named by 
a cooperative HUAC witness as a member of the Communist Party and as an 
organizer of Communist front organizations raising funds for the Smith Act 
defendants, Weed recalls that local newspapers pilloried her as proof ofhow the 
" ... red menace in Connecticut was infiltrating social services and preying on 
vulnerable children.,,13 In the face of lurid publicity, Weed resigned from her 
position, entered the doctoral program at the New York School of Social Work, and 
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began preparing for her stonny appearance before the Committee in February, 
Years later, Weed would recall the impact ofthe HUAC investigation on her 
career and the response ofher profession: 
Yes, I was a Communist with a big 'C.' I was a Communist and a 
social worker, a bad combination back then. Actually, I'm not sure 
which was worse! Social workers have always been associated 
with progressive thinking -look at Jane Addams and how she was 
red-baited after World War I - but now we were part of a global 
conspiracy subsidized by Moscow. I never saw any of that gold 
and I don't know what the conspiracy was supposed to be about, 
unless it was for world peace and social justice. That was what we 
progressive social workers fought for in our unions and our 
communities - that was my crime ... 
I couldn't get ajob in Connecticut. It was years before I began to 
recover professionally, I never did [in tenns of] income and 
professional recognition. Being called a Communist and hauled 
before the Committee in the middle ofmy doctoral studies didn't 
exactly endear me to the professors or other students. Sure, some 
people understood the fuller implications ofwhat was happening to 
me and thousands ofothers, but most were just plain scared ... The 
profession? They were scared shitless - what were a few red 
social workers to them? 15 
Despite public attacks made upon her by HUAC, and less public attacks 
made upon her by some members of the social work profession, Weed continued to 
act upon her political commitment throughout the rest ofher life as both an anti-war 
activist and community organizer. As a member ofthe Radical Alliance of Social 
Service Workers in New York City during the 1970s and early 1980s, Weed became 
an important link between the Old Left and the activism ofa new generation of 
radical social workers. 
9 

********** 
Somewhere a door blew shut. I came back to New York in the fall of 
1941~ expecting to be as busy as ever, and there was no work ... 
In the fall of 1942, there was no doubt that I was unemployed. At 
first, I had thought it was the effect ofwar ...When, however, a letter I 
sent to the Red Cross, which was begging for qualified supervisors, 
brought no reply, I realized that there might be, in the background, a 
boycott ofmy ideas. 16 
Within the course of two decades, the career ofBertha Capen Reynolds 
careened from the heights ofprofessional prestige to the depths ofprofessional 
rejection and blacklists. During the 1920s and early 1930s, Reynolds was one of the 
rising stars in social work. A faculty member at Smith College, Reynolds was 
widely published in the professional journals of the day and a frequent speaker at 
social work conferences. An early enthusiast for the integration ofpsychoanalytic 
theory into social casework, Reynolds was well regarded in the inner circle of the 
growing field ofpsychiatric social work. Despite her relative renown in the 
psychiatric community, Reynolds' embrace ofpsychoanalytic theory subtly differed 
from the approach ofothers. Unlike many ofher contemporaries, who priVileged a 
narrow intrapsychic orientation towards diagnosis and treatment, Reynolds struggled 
to articulate a holistic form of social casework that incorporated psychoanalytic 
principles within an understanding of the environmental context of individual 
troubles. 17 
As the extent of social and economic wreckage brought by the Great 
Depression continued to expand, Reynolds' dissatisfaction with what she considered 
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the seeming disconnect between social work theory and the environmental realities 
ofhuman suffering also grew: 
It is certain that a procedure called 'passivity' was in vogue in 
casework ... Theories justifying leaving the initiative and 
responsibility to the client were carried to such amazing lengths 
that in a few years revolt came, and the 'passive approach' was 
changed to 'dynamic passivity,' and that was defined and applied 
according to the needs ofcaseworkers as variously as 'passivity' 
had been. IS 
Reynolds' growing discontent with the profession's response to the national 
economic crisis would soon lead her to embrace both the program of industrial 
unionization promoted by the emerging rank and file movement in social work and 
the Marxist philosophy that many in the movement espoused: 
During the seven years from 1934 to the outbreak ofwar at the end 
of 1941, I was growing slowly, but fortunately .. .in company with a 
vital young generation ofsocial workers. The simple principles 
that the so-called rank-and-file workers of the Depression years 
were putting into practice were not new to social work. It was only 
a new thing to take them seriously ... 
The rethinking ofour professional theory and practice may 
seem ... to have had two roots: its own professional development in 
a time ofdepression which forced new formulations under new 
conditions; and the Marxist science of society which guided the 
thinking of some of the leaders ofthe 'rank-and-file' 
movement. ..Our profession could not develop otherwise than in 
conformity with the laws ofmotion ofhuman society in 
general ...Fortunately for social work, in this critical period, [came] 
practitioners with Marxist vision and scientific understanding.19 
Following her introduction to the rank and file movement, Reynolds rapidly 
became one of its most outspoken proponents within the profession. Reynolds 
became a frequent contributor to Social Work Today, the journal of the rank and file, 
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as well as serving on its editorial board and leading fundraising efforts to ease its 
chronic financial troubles. Travelling throughout the country, Reynolds forcefully 
supported the program of the rank and file movement, industrial unionism, civil 
rights and other progressive movements and causes. As Reynolds' commitment to 
revolutionary socialism deepened, she sought to more fully incorporate her 
adherence to the principles ofMarxism and Freudianism into a theory of social work 
practice in a series ofpublished and unpublished works.2o 
However, Reynolds' conversion to Marxism, and her public support for the 
more radical wing of the rank and file movement, would rapidly engender reaction 
from the profession and its liberal leadership. Increasingly, social work leaders such 
as Grace Marcus, Linton Swift, and Dorothy Kahn pointedly and publicly distanced 
themselves from Reynolds, attacking her adherence to radical ideology and causes. 
By 1938, the deep rift between Reynolds and the mainstream profession 
encompassed her work as Associate Director at the Smith College ofSocial Work. 
Sharp conflict arose between Reynolds and Director Everett Kimball, leading to 
Kimball's termination ofan experimental teaching program developed by Reynolds. 
Faced with the withdrawal ofKimball's support, Reynolds resigned under pressure 
from Smith. In 1958, Reynolds would reflect upon her de facto dismissal from 
Smith: 
I know EK [Everett Kimball] was in terror of 'union action,' and 
tried to cover himself at every point, so that no one would say I 
had been fired ... a movement got started among alumnae to urge 
Smith to award me an honorary degree. I stopped it with this 
appraisal: One of two things is true. Either I'm being fired, in 
12 
which case Smith would do no such thing, or I am resigning 
because I disapprove of the conduct of the School, in which case I 
would not accept an honor from it.21 
Reynolds' departure from Smith would mark the beginning of a long journey 
that, while endearing her to the rank and file and the radical left, permanently 
estranged her from the mainstream profession. As an informal blacklist within the 
profession enveloped Reynolds, her career over the next three years was reduced to 
one of itinerant consultation. By 1941, Reynolds' open association with the 
Communist Party virtually ended any official role or recognition that remained for 
her within the profession. Finding employment in social work schools or agencies 
impossible to obtain, in 1943 Reynolds joined the Personnel Department of the left-
led National Maritime Union (NMU). Here, in the midst of a politically progressive 
union, she could more freely experiment with her new vision of a radicalized social 
work. But with the end ofWorld War II, as anti-Communist purges wracked the 
NMU and other CIa unions, Reynolds once again found herself isolated and 
unemployed.22 
As the repressive politics of the Cold War and McCarthyism gripped the 
nation, Reynolds recognized that her career as a professional social worker was now 
at an end. Retiring to her family home in Massachusetts, Reynolds remained an 
activist in progressive political movements and causes and continued her writings on 
the merits of social work unionization and the integration ofMarxism into social 
work theory. While remaining true to her radical ideology, Reynolds also 
understood that, to the profession, she had become a virtual pariah: "I knew that 
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discussion groups with me have been banned because of fear. Some group 
invitations I may have to refuse because I know that attending them would subject 
some people to loss ofjobs, or worse. ,,23 Reynolds' open association with 
progressive organizations was noted with alarm not only by the profession but by 
state and federal subversive activities investigators as well. Indeed, meticulous 
records were kept on Reynolds' associations with alleged subversive organizations, 
resulting in some forty citations by HUAC for membership in and association with 
those organizations.24 
Ostracized by the profession, and her loyalty under question by the 
government, Reynolds essentially passed into professional obscurity. Yet in the face 
ofdisavowal by her one time colleagues, Reynolds remained loyal to her "beloved 
profession" and her vision of its role in a restructured society: 
Our profession has worked where it could and, in a world often 
hostile to its ideals, has sometimes suffered loss of its relatedness 
to the progressive movements of the life of its time. It has not 
willingly, however, accepted a role exploitive of its clients, or a 
police function to keep people quite while they starve slowly ... 
Suppose social work will become a reaching down to individuals 
on the part of a healthy society, concerned that minor adjustments 
shall be well made when planning for thousands cannot be exactly 
right for every single person. Can we not rejoice to be that helping 
hand? If groups functioning healthily help each other along as 
naturally as do parents and children, friends and neighbors, must 
we be exclusive about the privilege ofhelping?25 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
We social workers often delude ourselves into a beliefthat we are 
important factors in the remaking ofsociety ... our work is essentially 
for the existing social order- not against it. We are either case 
workers patching up the evils and the miseries ofthe industrial 
system; orpropagandists for reform legislation; educators; collectors 
offacts andftgures,' or neighborhood and community workers. In all 
these activities we work with and tacitly sanction the existing political 
and industrial system. We do not challenge, nor do we oppose, the 
underlying bases ofthat system, as do all radicals. Our work is 
undemocratic at heart ... 1 (Roger Baldwin, 1918) 
During the period of the blte 1920s through the late 1940s, a most remarkable 
event in the history ofAmerican social work emerged: the development of a vital 
radical trade union organizing effort known as the "rank and file movement."2 Born 
within the growing economic crisis of the 1920s and maturing in the national 
economic collapse and social upheaval heralded by the Great Depression, the rank 
and file movement would attract the support and membership of thousands of 
professional social workers and uncredentialed relief workers in efforts to organize 
social service workers along the lines of industrial unionism. Within its relatively 
short life span, the rank and file movement would grow in sufficient number and 
influence to challenge both the prevailing definitions of social work as a profession ­
its form and identity - and the essence of its function - its practice. 
Such challenges would not go unnoticed or unanswered by the profession's 
mainstream leadership or, more importantly, by state and federal authorities. To 
many of the profession'S leaders the rank and file movement would come to 
represent the antithesis ofprofessionalism: over-identification with clients; the 
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advocacy of strikes and other militant, unprofessional forms ofprotest and political 
action; a seeming disdain for prevailing professional standards of education and 
training; and an unnatural curiosity regarding left-wing political ideology. 
For civil authorities, the movement provided further evidence of the alleged 
infiltration of the Communist Party and communist ideology into the labor 
movement and, perhaps most alarming, white-collar professions. Such evidence 
would come to include the rank and file's early criticism ofNew Deal policies and 
programs (as well as state and local relief administration and practice) as politically 
reactionary and insufficient in scope, their seeming obedience to the shifting policies 
of the Communist Party and pronouncements of the Communist Intemationae and 
their unabashed willingness to embrace the potentials of foreign economic and 
political theories. Equally damning, social work unions and their leadership were 
too often at the forefront ofpolitical causes deemed by authorities as subversive and 
too prominently represented as members and supporters oforganizations labeled as 
fronts for the Communist Party. 
While such perceived professional and political heresies would quickly form 
the obj ective basis for the eventual unraveling of the movement, these perceptions 
neither accurately describe nor fully explain the history and meaning of the rank and 
file movement in the profession and within the greater context of its times. Rather, 
they represent, perhaps more tellingly, the paradox ofhistorical inquiry and the 
needs ofboth historical actors and the tellers ofhistorical stories to provide definitive 
reasons for the causes and courses ofhuman events and social movements. Indeed, 
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definitive reasons provide history and historical actors the supposed truths ofboth 
culpability and absolution; they provide simplified and contained explanation to the 
meaning of facts. In this regard, C. Wright Mills has noted that, 
...we must accept the point that we must often study history in 
order to get rid of it. By this I mean that what are often taken as 
historical explanations would better be taken as part ofthe 
statement of that which is to be explained.4 
The story of the rank and file movement in social work highlights Mills' 
observation that many explanations ofhistorical events or movements often serve to 
obscure rather than illuminate both the deeper meaning of these events and their 
ongoing influence upon contemporary thought and process. Indeed, contemporary 
historical accounts of the rank and file movement in social work, while few in 
nUlnber, have well represented this tendency to confuse historical explanation with 
historical subject and to separate the past from the present. This study attempts to 
bridge this rupture by more fully examining both the subject of the rank and file 
movement and its ongoing meaning and place in the profession'S development than 
has previously been rendered. Indeed, it is the thesis of this study that the social and 
economic circumstances in which the rank and file movement arose within social 
work (and the forces which led to its demise) are central to an understanding of the 
profession'S emerging character and subsequent evolution. The rise and fall of the 
rank and file movement did not occur just within the isolated context of social work 
as a profession; it embodied expressions ofbroader social and political 
contradictions that characterize a society in crisis and transformation. As such, the 
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history of the rank and file movement is not one ofjust a particular tendency within a 
particular profession in a particular time; rather, it demonstrates how the forces that 
give rise to such a social movement transcend these particulars and are inextricably 
woven into the greater social fabric of a nation's history. In the case of the rank and 
file movement in social work, uncovering the ongoing dynamics of this history must 
necessarily cross traditional boundaries ofhistorical inquiry. For the history and 
meaning of the rank and file movement in social work is not just of the field's 
understanding ofprofessionalism, its experiences in the process ofprofessionlization 
or its development of a body of expertise. The story of the rank and file also 
embodies a broader history of the struggles oforganized labor, the relationship 
between liberal social reform movements and revolutionary movements, and the 
politics of communism and anti-communism in the American experience. This 
broader interpretation is, in sum, a significant element of the history that constitutes 
the social basis ofAmerican social work. 
On the Historical Record 
The case of the rank and file movement and its place in social work history is 
a curious one. Standard texts concerning social work and social welfare history 
have, at worst, ignored the movement completely; at best, they have granted it a 
momentary but essentially nebulous impact. For example, Clark Chambers' 
Seedtime ofReform makes no direct reference to the early stirrings of the movement 
in his history of the profession'S development in the period following World War I 
through the early years of the New Deal.s Similarly, Chambers' Paul U. Kellogg 
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and the Survey has only one passing reference to the movement devoid of 
explanation or context. 6 The rank and file movement is totally ignored in June 
Axinn and Herman Levine's Social welfare: A history ofthe American response to 
need.7 Remarkably, even Harry Lurie, an early and influential leader of the rank and 
file movement, makes no mention ofthe movement at all in his history of the Jewish 
Federation Movement, A heritage affirmed. 8 Another recognized social welfare 
historian, Walter Trattner, briefly mentions the rank and file movement as a group 
"unhappy" with the Roosevelt administration and its New Deal policies, and he cites 
its major accomplishment as " ... forging some ties between social work and organized 
labor.,,9 Bruce Jansson devotes one paragraph to the movement in his text, noting its 
development ofunions and support of "sweeping social reforms,,,l0 and Barbara 
Simon sparingly describes the movement as " ... a vociferous and determined 
minority," curiously attributing its demise to the passage ofthe Social Security Act 
and the lack of attention given to social work demands by the Democratic and 
Republican parties.11 
Other less prominently used texts concerned with social work's development 
have paid greater attention to the importance of the rank and file movement but have 
fallen well short of either a balanced or comprehensive account. John Ehrenreich 
devotes several pages to the movement in The Altruistic Imagination. 12 Most 
significantly, Ehrenreich credits the rank and file movement with providing the 
profession its "most direct challenge" to its preoccupation with the process of 
professionalization.13 Ehrenreich also credits the rank and file movement with 
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unionizing a "significant" segment of the profession and pushing it " ... toward a more 
critical and aggressive stance with respect to public policy issues." 14 However, not 
unlike Simon, Ehrenreich confines the movement's meaning to a static period in the 
profession's history, declaring that its failure to articulate a clear alternative practice 
theory quickly rendered it irrelevant. 
W enocur and Reisch devote a chapter to the rank and file movement in their 
history, From Charity to Enterprise. IS Framing their analysis of social work's 
development as a case study ofhow the dynamics of capitalism institutionalize 
professions for the purposes ofoccupational control (and thus define the process of 
professionalization), Wenocur and Reisch position the rank and file movement as a 
" ... progressive counterforce to the profession's attempts to control the emerging 
national social welfare industry.,,16 While providing students of social work history 
a much needed description of the movement, Wenocur and Reisch's account suffers 
both from its sketchiness and limited conclusions regarding the impact and meaning 
of the movement. 17 
More focused studies of the rank and file movement described below, while 
few in number, have moved beyond the meager generalities of the movement's role 
as expressed in standard social welfare texts. Indeed, these studies have girded their 
analyses around four general (and intertwined) topics ofparticular interest to the 
profession: (1) the instructive value of the rank and file movement in relation to the 
process ofprofessionalization and the meaning ofprofessionalism; (2) the place and 
meaning of the movement in terms of social work's purported dualism regarding 
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social reform and individual treatment; (3) the relative compatibility or 
incompatibility ofprofessionalism and union organization in social work; and (4) the 
role of the Communist Party and communist ideology in leading and/or misguiding 
the movement, thus hastening its destruction and subsequently marginalizing its 
relevance to social work theory and practice. 
Professionalism, Social Reform and Unionization 
Within these four overlapping areas of inquiry, the meaning of the rank and 
file movement in relation to social work's development of a professional identity, its 
relation to unionization and the issues of the profession's dualism have garnered the 
most attention. Indeed, the history of social work's development as a profession has 
been particularly marked by its constant struggle to locate and claim its domains of 
authority and practice. Since the early emergence of social work as a formal 
profession, social workers and their historians have debated social work's purpose in 
society in somewhat stark and dichotomous terms: is social work a profession whose 
major task is to develop, refine and provide direct psycho-social services, or is it a 
profession that should be dedicated to serving larger movements for social reform, 
social justice and resulting social action? Throughout the profession's history, while 
the language and historical contexts of the debate have changed, the tenns ofthis 
bitter ideological debate have remained relatively stable.18 In this regard, historical 
examinations of the rank and file movement have both further informed and 
confused this debate, reflecting the tendency of selective history to reap selective 
interpretations and claims of truth. 
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In a brief history and analysis of the rank and file movement, Leighninger 
and Knickmeyer claim that the movement informs the profession in areas ofboth 
theory and practice.19 First, the authors argue that the brief life of the rank and file 
movement and its rapid demise demonstrate that the nature and process of 
professionalism is, at its base, inimical to radical ideology and fundamental social 
reform. In this regard, Leighninger and Knickmeyer additionally posit that the 
experiences of the rank and file movement highlight the importance of the 
profession's sponsorship by conservative economic and political structures and 
agencies; that is, such sponsorship privileges social control functions and allies the 
profession with the interests of a ruling elite. Reflecting this dynamic within the 
history of the rank and file movement, the authors assert this is a partial explanation 
of social work's " .. .long-standing fear that somehow professionalism and a reform or 
radical ideology [cannot] exist.,,2o Finally, Leighninger and Knickmeyer claim that 
the history of the rank and file movement demonstrates the need for social work 
practitioners to individually and organizationally connect themselves to consumer 
movements in order to effectively engage in social change efforts: 
Knowledge of the rank and file experience illuminates three major 
themes. The social work profession today needs to understand and 
come to grips with 1) the rise of the consumer movement, 2) the 
phenomenon ofpowerlessness shared by a nwnber of groups in our 
society, and 3) the need for professional support groups in dealing 
with the inequities in social welfare ... In order to do this with any 
success, it will be necessary to rediscover the rank and file wisdom 
of finding support for such efforts towards change in organized 
social work groups and broader social movements, both within 
agencies and on a nationalleve1.21 
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Alexander and Lichtenberg credit members and supporters of the rank and 
file movement with advancing the profession's understanding of the link between 
social reform and individual treatment. 22 In an analysis ofpractice related articles 
("The Case Work Notebook") published in the movement'sjoumal, Social Work 
Today, the authors note that the theory and practice of the rank and file movement 
simultaneously advanced the profession's understanding of and commitment to: 1) 
professional development and improved services to clients; 2) the legitimate need of 
the profession to address broad social issues; and 3) the improvement of the working 
conditions of social workers as an integral factor in providing effective service to 
clients. The authors claim that the writings ofrank and file practitioners, while 
predominantly progressive in intent and act, contained both radical and conservative 
elements. While crediting rank and file practitioners with promoting more radical 
concepts ofdemocratic authority and worker-client equality, Alexander and 
Lichtenberg argue that these same practitioners continued to reflect more traditional 
and conservative impulses ofprofessionalism by privileging social workers' ability 
to perform social and political analysis over the same capability of those they served: 
What was true for the authors of the 'Case Work Notebook' is true 
ofmany social workers today too: they are also attached to the 
status quo and yet eager to bring a new system into existence. The 
ambivalence in these writings is paralleled by the ambivalence in 
the field today .. .!t is possible for young social workers to know and 
to build upon the positive contributions from these vital 
professional unionists. It is also possible that new times permit the 
rectification of the omissions, compromises and false directions 
that undermined their promise ofachievement.23 
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Wagner echoes Alexander and Lichtenberg's critique of the rank and file's 
limited influence on professional theory and practice, framing this critique as an 
exemplar ofthe inherent politically constraining dynamics ofprofessionalism.24 
Arguing that the historic process ofprofessionalization within social work has 
required an alliance (however uneasy) with economic and political elites in order to 
obtain legitimacy as a profession, Wagner claims that the radicalism of the rank and 
file movement inexorably dissipated within this process. Linking this dissipation to 
both the movement's adherence to the Popular Front policy of the Communist Party 
and the movement's own desires for a distinctive and professionally recognized form 
of social casework, Wagner claims that the movement's vision of a "proletarianized" 
social work was converted to " ... the viewpoint that good casework was good 
politics.,,25,26 
Other analysts have echoed the importance ofunderstanding the rank and file 
movement in relation to social work's process ofprofess iona liz at ion and that of 
social reform. Phillips and Lehman cite the history of the rank and file movement in 
their examination into the conflicts and compromises that faced the profession during 
the New Deal years as the federal government increasingly supplanted private 
charities as the primary sponsor of social welfare activities.27 Contrasting the rank 
and file movement's opposition to the mainstream profession's alliance with 
conservative business leaders and social welfare administrators with the need for 
profession's to preserve its occupational interests and markets, Phillips and Lehman 
make the following observations: 
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The quest for [professional] sanction and power, which ultimately 
derives from a profession's connections with government, 
precludes persistent and serious challenges to government 
policies ... 
Conflict arises for a profession-occupation which, insofar as it is a 
profession, is responsible to act in the interest of clients, including 
political action, and insofar as it is an occupation, needs to protect 
occupational self interests, including advancement of status.28 
In a similar vein, Leighninger contrasts the social agenda of the rank and file 
movement with that of the mainstream profession in her history of social work's 
development.29 Leighninger notes that with the onset ofthe Great Depression, the 
profession split into two distinct trends: the radical program of the rank and file, 
emphasizing unionism, public policies promoting redistribution ofwealth and a 
fundamental transformation of social and economic institutions; and the more 
moderate program ofreform embodied with the mainstream organization of the 
profession, the American Association of Social Workers (AASW). Leighninger 
posits that these two trends, protest and reconstruction versus moderation and 
amelioration, exemplify long and unresolved tensions framing social work's 
consolidation as a profession: 1) a focus on profession-building versus public 
service; 2) the proper relationship between the profession and a public welfare 
system; 3) the acceptable professional boundaries ofpolitical activity; and 4) the 
relative breadth that the profession's intellectual and practice base should 
encompass.30 While eschewing any definitive conclusions regarding the ultimate 
implications of the rank and file's full role in the profession'S quest for identity 
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within these tensions, Leighninger addresses (if somewhat obliquely) the terms of 
the debate forced upon the profession in the 1930s: 
Social workers had temporarily broadened their concerns and 
moved toward collective political action during the 1930s ... The 
internal debate was affected by outside forces - agency constraints, 
changing economic conditions and political climate, and shifts in 
social work's influence within administration circles. Agency and 
political pressures, and an image of 'true' professionals as 
nonpartisan and objective, encouraged social workers to choose the 
expert role over that ofpolitical activist. By the end of the decade, 
the AASW had returned to the more comfortable position of a 
professional group concerned with professional standards and 
practice. Outside forces and internal questions about political 
involvement had combined to limit social work's chances to 
influence broader social planning.31 
Spano has examined the rank and file movement in terms of its contributions 
toward the"... development of an alternative conceptualization of social work as a 
profession based primarily on a commitment to social reform rather than 
individualized treatment.,,32 Claiming that the movement's social activism was 
guided by a Marxist ideology, Spano credits the rank and file with providing social 
workers of the 1930s a credible challenge to psychiatric theories of adjustment. 
Spano also argues that the movement's emphasis on the status of social workers as 
employees temporarily legitimized the use of labor tactics and unionization among 
public relief and private charity workers. Despite the apparent importance of these 
contributions, Spano concludes that the movement ultimately "came and went," 
exerting little noticeable influence on the profession. 33 
Olson, in an unpublished dissertation, considers the rank and file movement 
in his examination of the broad relationship between social work and liberal social 
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refonn causes during and immediately following World War 11.34 Olson argues that 
social work's obsession with the need to obtain professional status and recognition, 
coupled with its allegiance to liberal ideology, seriously vitiated its potential for 
fundamental social refonn in post-war America: 
Professionalism, elitism, and the growth of a social work 
subculture were in part to blame. Social work was never able to 
transcend its casework, individualized approach or marshal its 
skills against society's larger social problems ... 
Social work's own elitism, its claim to special knowledge, 

moreover, made it unlikely social workers could effectively 

cooperate with other 'progressive' forces in society.35 

Unlike other analysts, Olson characterizes the political and trade union agenda of the 
rank and file movement as neither fundamentally antagonistic to, nor radically 
different from, the mainstream of the profession. Ra:ther, Olson argues that rank and 
file conceptions of social action were in keeping with those ofmost of the profession 
and that the politics of the rank and file reflected more a difference ofkind with the 
mainstream profession than any fundamental challenge. In fact, Olson dismisses any 
meaningful variance between the rank and file movement and the mainstream of the 
profession, claiming "Despite differences, however, no serious cleavages erupted 
within social work in the Depression decade. What differences there were were 
largely ofdegree.,,36 
Several social work historians have examined the rank and file movement in 
tenns of insights it may yield regarding the historic ambivalence that has existed 
within the profession in relation to union organization. Karger notes this 
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ambivalence has several sources, including perceptions that unions are 
unprofessional, concern that union emphases on employee bread and butter issues 
may conflict with client interests, and a perceived contradiction between professional 
notions of self-sacrifice and union insistence on self-protection.37 Karger, a strong 
proponent of social work's affiliation with the labor movement, credits the rank and 
file movement with legitimizing the compatibility ofunionism with social work as a 
profession. In a briefdiscussion of the movement, Karger reflects on its legacy: 
Through their activities -literature, speeches, and direct action 
tactics - the rank and file movement exposed large numbers of 
social workers to the powerful concept of'organization' ... the 
experience that social workers received in arbitrating grievances, 
making demands, organizing meetings and rallies, and walking a 
strike line were valuable skills that could be used in the organized 
labor movement, as well as in the later civil rights and antiwar 
movements ... In short, the significance of the rank-and-file 
movement lay in its spadework - the breaking of fgound to allow 
the seeds of social work unionization to take root. 8 
Straussner and Phillips also examine the ambivalence of social work as a 
profession to organized labor.39 Arguing that the prevailing practice of the early 
Charity Organization Societies, with their emphasis on efficiency, rationality, and 
morally-based conceptions ofpoverty, depended on both the material and political 
support ofbusiness leaders, the authors contend this ideological dependence created 
an early rupture with organized labor. However, the authors further contend that 
with the onset of the Great Depression, social work adopted a more focused concern 
on the economic aspects ofneed and, consequently, a more sympathetic view of 
unionization in terms of the profession's own economic security issues. 
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Interestingly, Straussner and Phillips bifurcate social work unionization from the 
rank and file movement. While declaring that the unionization process that occurred 
among social workers in the 1930s helped to bridge the gap between the profession 
and organized labor, the authors separate the rank and file movement as "another 
example" of the profession's growing support for unionization.4o 
Leslie Alexander's study of the rank and file movement's organizing efforts 
in the voluntary sector provides a more detailed examination of the rank and file's 
legacy to the unionization debate.41 Alexander asserts that the movement played a 
significant role in prodding the professional associations of the time, particularly the 
AASW, to at least grudgingly accept unionization as a professionally-sanctioned 
activity. However, Alexander notes that following a period ofgenerally favorable 
response by the mainstream profession regarding unionization in the voluntary 
sector, this support rapidly dissipated after 1939 as charges of communist 
domination ofthe unions mounted. While noting the influence of these charges upon 
the shifting attitude of the mainstream profession, Alexander claims that the 
underlying basis for this turn from unionization had less to do with ideology than 
with the dynamics ofprofessionalization: 
It seemed that the AASW would only tolerate the union as long as 
it was weak. As soon as it became more successful in collective 
bargaining and, in fact, threatened to expand the scope of 
collective bargaining, the profession began to raise the question of 
whether or not unions were compatible with professions. The 
answer seemed a conditional yes; on the condition that the union 
did not get too powerfu1.42 
33 
To date, the most in-depth history of the rank. and file movement has come 
from one of its early leaders, Jacob Fisher.43 As an editor of the movement's journal, 
Social Work Today, and a social work union leader in the 1930s, Fisher's first-hand 
account of the early years of the rank. and file movement and the greater profession's 
development during the years of the Depression is an invaluable source to any 
researcher seeking to develop a fuller history of the movement. Framing the history 
of the rank. and file movement within the greater context of the internal shock and 
disillusionment faced by a profession unprepared in theory or practice to respond to 
the Depression, Fisher characterizes the movement as the political manifestation of 
that disillusionment. In this regard, Fisher emphasizes the role of the rank and file in 
providing a dissenting voice within the profession through unionization, articulating 
a vision of social reform reminiscent of the ethos of an early Progressivism. While 
providing a rich-first person perspective, Fisher's account still falls short of 
completing the historical record. Despite his leading role in the initial development 
of the rank and file movement, Fisher left the field in the late 1930s, and his history 
of the movement substantively concludes at this point. And, not unlike any personal 
recollection, Fisher's account suffers from both a degree of self censorship and 
reification, particularly in regard to the question of communism and the rank and file 
movement - an area of inquiry critical to the movement's history and discussed in 
more detail below.44 Finally, not unlike other assessments of the movement, Fisher 
also relegates the meaning of the rank. and file to a static (and largely hidden) place 
in the profession's history: 
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It left no lasting legacy, but at least it contributed to a heightened 
awareness among social workers of the need for a broad ... social 
welfare and social insurance system ... a guaranteed minimum 
income ... government work and retraining programs for the 
unemployed ... and of the need for health insurance ... 
Perhaps to see these thumbprints of the future in the not fully 
articulated causes supported by the Rank-and-File Movement is to 
exaggerate its contemporary significance.45 
Have You Ever Been? The Communist Question 
The Rank-and-File movement tried to establish 'protective 
associations,' that is, unions ... These protective associations of the 
Rank-and-File ... became the social-service unions of the Union of 
Office and Professional Workers ofAmerica ... This organization 
may have contained a higher proportion of Communists than any 
other existing legitimate trade union. It was able to follow the 
Communist line in detail, and with relatively weak opposition from 
within the union.46 (Nathan Glazer, 1961) 
... politics emerges as the decisive element in the history of the 
Rank and File movement. The particular tactical stance the Rank 
and Filers took toward national politics was dictated by the 
Communists and their allies in the movement. This stance ... killed 
the movement as a social work reform movement. And the social 
worker unions themselves were destroyed ... when the strong 
presence of Communists resulted in debilitating factionalism, 
expulsion from the labor movement, and the loss ofunion 
contracts and recognition.47 
(John Earl Haynes, 1975) 
The role of the Communist Party and communist ideology in the 
development and conduct of the rank and file movement has perhaps been the most 
uncomfortable and contentious of issues for the profession's historians. Indeed, 
allegations ofCommunist Party domination of the rank and file movement have 
uniformly vexed such historical accounts and may be key in understanding the 
relative marginalization of the movement's history in mainstream accounts of the 
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profession. These allegations (and a reluctance to examine them) may be key for the 
reason that the very act of invoking the specter of communism or Communist Party 
involvement in social work, whether real or alleged, creates discomfort for both 
investigators and consumers of that history. In this regard, the contemporary 
invocation of communism or communist influence in American political discourse 
often results in seeming visceral reactions, both in civil and scholarly quarters. Anti­
Communist crusades in American history, particularly as embodied in the Red Scare 
following World War I, the early years of the Cold War, and the subsequent era of 
McCarthyism have wrought long-term and often devastating effects upon both civic 
and intellectual discourse. The immediate climates of fear and paranoia that 
permeated these periods, while muted since the end of the Cold War, continue to 
reverberate. 
The tools ofhysteria and political repression embodied within anti­
Communist movements in the United States have affected to greater or lesser extents 
nearly all aspects of social institutions and political culture. Investigations into the 
subversive nature of communism were pervasive in scope and content, reaching not 
only into the personal lives ofcitizens but into the halls ofacademia, the arts and 
sciences, labor unions and the world ofprofessions. Indeed, investigations, 
blacklists, and the politics of fear they engendered victimized not only individuals 
but profoundly shaped the nature, development and conduct ofmany professions, 
including social work. In this regard, Schrecker argues that the period of 
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McCarthyism had a deep impact on social work ideology and practice, most notably 
a nearly wholesale abandonment of advocacy on behalfof clients: 
Social workers at every level had abandoned the reform impulse 
and active political engagement that had once been an important 
component of their profession. As a result, when the issue of 
welfare returned to the nation's agenda, social workers did not 
enter the debate on behalfof their clients and counter the hostile 
stereotyping ofwelfare recipients. The McCarthy era purges had 
silenced those voices that might have raised the issues ofpoverty 
and unemployment without blaming the victim.48 
Andrews and Reisch echo Schrecker's observations, concluding that McCarthyism 
served to suppress dissenting voices in both the profession as a whole and in schools 
of social work and further supplanted the profession's commitment to social justice 
with an intensified focus on the development of treatment technologies: 
[One] impact ofMcCarthy ism on social work can be found in the 
growing emphasis on the acquisition of expertise as the primary 
goal ofsocial work education and practice and the concomitant 
omission ofdiscussions of the ideological bases ofpractice ... This 
apolitical legacy persisted well into the 1970s, despite the growing 
ideological turmoil of the intervening period ... By ignoring the 
impact of anti-communism and McCarthyism and their underlying 
political and ideological messages, social work's educators 
contributed to the growing dissonance between the profession's 
stated goals and the conditions practitioners experienced in their 
day-to-day work.49 
Maurice Isserman, an historian ofAmerican communism, has astutely noted 
that " ... the history ofcommunism in America is bitterly contested terrain. The 
passions aroused by the debate over differing interpretations of that history are 
seldom far removed from contemporary concerns."so Isserman's observations are 
particularly salient to this study, as there is a striking absence of substantive 
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examination regarding the relationship ofcommunism to the rank and file movement 
(and social work as a whole) by the profession's historians. This curious state of 
historical void is even more noticeable (and perhaps understandable) in light of the 
pronouncements ofhistoriographers specializing in the American Communist 
movement regarding its influence in the social work profession (as represented by 
Glazer and Haynes above). Much ofthis work has reflected a particular academic 
school of communist studies forged in the Cold War years of the 1950s and funded 
by conservative foundations, notably the Fund for the Republic.51 More noted for its 
overt anti-Communist ideology than its methodology, this school of study has, until 
only recently, generally defined public and academic perceptions ofAmerican 
communism as a foreign, conspiratorial ideology and movement imposed upon and 
directed from the outside. These interpretations have created an often distorted 
subtext of analysis that precludes the possibility that American communists, or those 
outside of the party who may have associated with an activity linked to (or supported 
by) the party, were guided by any significant independence of thought, individual 
wisdom or popular support. Within this school of thought, the very language of 
analysis is ideological: movements and organizations are identified as "fronts," or 
are "dominated" by the Communist Party rather than cooperating or agreeing with 
particular aspects of the party or its program; individual indications ofphilosophical 
agreement are evidence ofone being a "fellow traveler;" and the communist 
movement as a whole, including individuals and organizations even tangentially 
associated with it, are "Stalinist" in character and intent. 52 It is perhaps not 
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surprising, then, that the association made between communism and social work 
(most particularly the rank and file movement) by outside historians has gone largely 
unanswered and unexamined by the profession's own historians. In the absence of 
direct evidence, one can only speculate whether the fait accompli statements of 
social work's once dangerous alliance with communism made by influential scholars 
dominating the field of communist studies have served to discourage such inquiry by 
the profession itself. S3 
Indeed, the discourse of anti-communism that dominated scholarly inquiry in 
the post-war period was not seriously questioned until the 1980s, encompassing the 
period in which the most in-depth examinations of the rank and file movement were 
published by social work historians. Since that time, an impressive number of so­
called revisionist analyses ofAmerican communism have been published, providing 
more balanced studies concerning the role ofAmerican communism in the labor 
movement, academics, the arts and the professions. S4 However, this re-examination 
has yet to find its way in any significant form into social work. Rather, studies ofthe 
rank and file movement to date have, for the most part, skirted this central issue, 
concentrating inquiry on the early development ofthe movement, omitting the 
critical period after in which charges of Communist Party domination beset the labor 
unions representing social workers, culminating in their final destruction in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. 
The contentious issues surrounding the question ofcommunist influence in 
the rank and file movement are also inextricably tied to the phenomenon of 
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unionization among white collar workers. During the critical period of the 1930s 
and 1940s, the identification ofprofessionals with the causes of the industrial union 
movement - job security, workplace democracy and politically informed class 
consciousness - drew them in unprecedented numbers into the organizations of that 
movement. Social workers were no exception to this historical alliance. With the 
possible exception of teachers, perhaps no profession was as prominent in the union 
movement as were social workers. Particularly concentrated in unions such as the 
United Public Workers ofAmerica (UPW) and the United Office and Professional 
Workers of America (UOPW A) that most explicitly allied themselves with the 
progressive politics of the times (e.g., civil rights and anti-fascist movements) and 
which were most identified with the Communist Party, rank and file social workers 
would find their leaders and their unions among the first victims of the anti-
Communist backlash. In this regard, the important explication of this phenomenon 
has not only been noticeably ignored by the profession's historians, but by labor 
historians as well. As Steve Rosswurm notes in his research on unions expelled for 
alleged communist domination by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO): 
What remains on the research agenda? Virtually everything, since 
we [labor historians] know so little about these [left-led] 
unions ... We especially need studies of the UPW and the UOPWA, 
two unions that organized large numbers ofwomen and white­
collar workers ... Most labor historians of the CIO period 
concentrate on the industrial proletariat. ..to the exclusion of the 
majority ofworking people in this country ... perhaps the greatest 
tragedy of the expUlsions was the role they played in the CIO's 
missed opportunity, produced by a conjuncture of the ideological 
and the material, to organize those who performed mentallabor ... 55 
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TOWARDS A REVISIONIST HISTORY 
In examining the historical narrative of social work to date, relatively little 
substantive analysis has been conducted concerning the rise and fall of the rank and 
file movement and the fuller meaning and contribution of that movement to the 
profession. The paucity of this analysis is striking given the dramatic social, 
economic and social crises within the profession and the nation that gave rise to its 
development, maturation and subsequent destruction. It is the thesis of this study 
that, in fact, an understanding of the rank and file movement is central to a modem 
understanding ofour profession. For the existence of the movement both materially 
and symbolically embodies the complex and contradictory nexus of the dynamics of 
change engendered by political and social crises. The origin, development and 
demise of the rank and file movement reflects more than the historical curiosity of a 
momentary tendency in the evolution of a profession; rather, it reveals the enduring 
legacy of individuals, organizations and collective intellectual discourse in common 
struggle for the possibilities of a more just and democratic social order. And, 
perhaps unlike any other profession, the domain of social work is historically one 
uniquely born of this struggle, encompassing the self-imposed imperatives and 
paradoxes ofmorality, socially purposive service and scientific rationality. 
Consequently, this study seeks to inform the terms of this enduring legacy 
within the dynamic world of social work. It shall attempt to do so by: 1) locating the 
history of the rank and file movement within the context of an evolving profession; 
2) analyzing this specific history of a profession within the context ofbroader social 
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and political forces that defined both the limits and potentials ofthat evolution; and 
3) assessing the implications of this history for social work in terms of its past, 
present and future. 
Such an examination does not occur in the abstract - history is composed not 
ofthe disembodied laws ofa transcendent nature or a theoretical science but in the 
material experiences and actions ofhuman beings seeking a collective sense of social 
responsibility. For both the actors ofhistory and the narrators ofhistory, the 
meaning of these individual and collective experiences is essentially, one of 
opportunity, choice and interpretation. In this respect, the observations ofBertha 
Reynolds are most apropos: 
Inevitably our choices are conditioned not only by the time and 
location ofour birth but by our position in organized society. How 
we get on in the struggle for survival tends to channel our choice 
of relationships to people in the same general situation. Life looks 
different from the windows of a palace or the doorway of a field 
laborer's shack, from one or the other side of a color line, or a 
collective-bargaining table. Obvious as that seems, it is 
nonetheless true that many people do no know that they stand in 
any particular place in society, and so they judge their viewpoint to 
be the only one possible for anybody. I believe it is indispensable 
to a sound relatedness to others to know where one is to start with, 
for what biases and blind spots to make allowance, and to know 
that there exist other and quite different viewpoints. 56 
In this regard, three primary sources of information were analyzed to 
reconstruct this history of the rank and file movement: 1) primary documents, 
consisting ofunion records and publications, books and articles published during the 
period under study, personal papers retained by key participants in the movement, 
and published autobiographical accounts of individuals active in the movement; 2) 
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personal reminiscences of the movement obtained by the author through 
correspondence and interviews with movement participants; and 3) review and 
incorporation ofsecondary sources, including previous studies and books pertaining 
to the subject and the period under examination. While all three of these methods 
serve to provide a sound basis for the triangulation ofdata sources in order to 
increase confidence in the accuracy ofrepresentation, they also share unavoidable 
weaknesses. 
These weaknesses are most notable in the inability to fully document the 
period and movement under study. Documentary records of the rarlk and file unions 
are fragmentary at best. Complete official records of the early unions of the rank and 
file are non-existent. Such documentation that is available consists of fragmentary 
records and publications retained by individuals or in collections ofarchives and 
libraries. Records of the later CIO unions that represented social workers are also 
fragmentary. Most of these records were purged by the AFL-CIO following the 
expulsions of these unions in 1948, and only partial records ofunion proceedings 
and publications are available in various libraries or collections ofpersonal papers. 
This author attempted to review or gather all such documents that could be 
identified, supplementing these documents with related publications of the period 
and personal recollections ofparticipants in the rank and file and its unions. 
Not unlike published records, the recollections ofparticipants who were 
active in the rank and file movement and its unions are also subject to their 
fragmentary nature. The elusive and sometimes distorted nature ofhuman memory 
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always poses issues of accuracy. In this regard, specific statements of fact or 
historical event were triangulated with other data sources to provide verification. 
The actual selection ofparticipants for interviews was limited by the number of 
persons still alive, in reasonable enough health to participate in interviews and who 
granted permission for the author to interview and cite them. In respect to selection, 
the author employed a snowball process in which persons located by the author 
suggested other persons that could be interviewed. This process was continued until 
all suggestions had been exhausted. Obviously, the vagaries of time, mortality and 
the selection process employed also compromise representativeness. However, the 
author was able to locate a surprising number ofkey actors in the rank and file 
movement and its unions, thus providing a strong case for the inclusion of their 
remembrances in this study to provide both context and substantive information. 
Further detail on the methods employed in this study is located in the Appendix. 
In sum, the history presented in this study, like any other, reflects the 
inevitable convergence ofdiffering choices, viewpoints and interpretations. As such, 
the contradictory terms of such convergence cannot be overlooked, and this author 
takes full responsibility for the ultimate choices and interpretations employed in this 
narrative. 
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CHAPTER 2: 

BEFORE THE STORM 
In 1929 there was every reason to believe that our young profession 
was going to move forward to an honored place in the national life. 
Professional education was no longer seriously in question, skills for 
helping people in trouble had been demonstrated, new psychological 
techniques contributed by another profession had begun to be sought 
eagerly by hospitals and clinics, courts, and counseling agencies. 
Social casework would come into its own, not solely to aid society's 
misfits, but to make sure that children would grow up to be mentally 
healthy and talented people would be freed to make their contribution 
to the common life. We were climbing to the top ofthe world in 
1929.1 (Bertha Reynolds) 
As the decade of the 1920s was coming to a close, the young profession of 
social work was in the final stages of a process of fundamental transformation. The 
reform ethos of the Progressive Era, best romanticized in the settlement house 
movement, had been rapidly crumbling. In its place a new fascination with 
psychiatric casework technique had begun to take hold. In the illusory economic 
prosperity of the 1920s it is perhaps not surprising that the potentials ofhuman 
adjustment to be found in the mental world of the individual were more alluring to 
social workers than the vagaries of social reform efforts or the familiar, more 
routinized functions called for in charity work. Furthermore, social casework 
" ... from the psychiatric point ofview" seemed more in keeping with the definition 
of a profession than the unscientific moral do-gooder image that had dogged social 
work from its inception.2 
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By 1929, the professionalization ofsocial work had, in the eyes of its leaders, 
finally shed the do-gooder image, replacing in its stead a new representation of 
rational thought, scientifically-based technique, and a more circumspect sense of 
moral inspiration. The apparent triumph ofprofessional form and function was 
celebrated that year in San Francisco at the annual National Conference of Social 
Work (NCSW). Porter Lee, president of the NCSW and director of the New York 
School of Social Work, greeted delegates in his presidential address with the 
pronouncement of this long awaited fait accompli. Social work, Lee declared, had 
largely rid itself from the burdens of social reform leadership and the unscientific 
zealotry that accompanied reform. According to Lee, social work had accomplished 
the necessary shift from leading the cause of social reform to providing a 
professional/unction, the efficient management and administration of social 
programs: 
In the last analysis I am not sure that the greatest service of social 
work as a cause is contributed through those whose genius is to 
light and hand on the torch. I am inclined to think that in the 
capacity of the social worker, whatever his rank, to administer a 
routine functional responsibility in the spirit of the servant in a 
cause lies the explanation ofthe great service of social work. This 
capacity is perhaps a higher qualification for leadership than the 
ability to sway groups ofmen. 3 
For Lee and a new generation of social workers seeking to overcome the shibboleths 
ofmoral crusading represented by earlier social reformers, the new language of 
professional social work included "efficiency," "qualified personnel," and 
"measurement of results.,,4 
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The new rhetoric ofthe emergent profession had, indeed, considerable 
substance undergirding it. In the same year that Lee elevated function over cause, 
the U.S. Census Bureau announced that in its upcoming national census, social work 
would at last be listed as a professional occupation. Official government recognition 
as a profession was a long-awaited sign of social work's growing power and public 
legitimacy.s Indeed, while still relatively small in comparison to other professions, 
the ranks of social work were growing. By mid-decade, one survey estimated that 
some 25,000 women and men, primarily located in urban centers ofthe east and 
midwest, were employed in paid social work. By the 1930 census, the total number 
ofpaid social workers was estimated at over 31,000, with an additional 15,000 in 
related fields ofcharity and correctional institutions.6 
Recognition by the Census Bureau also reflected the development within the 
field of specialized training programs and the granting ofadvanced credentials now 
becoming requisite for professional standing. From the founding in 1898 of the first 
professional social work training program, the New York School ofSocial 
Philanthropy, over 40 professional schools had been established throughout the 
country. Of these, the majority had been organized after 1915 and were members of 
the American Association ofSchools ofSocial Work (AASSW). While not yet a 
formal accreditation body in the modem sense, the AASSW would help spur the 
professionalization of social work through its requirements that members schools be 
affiliated with universities. Despite the initial lack of standardized criteria from the 
AASSW regarding specific coursework and degree requirements, most schools 
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placed a heavy emphasis on the development of casework technique coupled with 
field experience. 7 
Within the profession, a new organization, the American Association of 
Social Workers (AASW), was fonned in 1921 with the pronounced intention of 
establishing national standards ofprofessional training and practice. While the 
profession had an embarrassment ofriches in its number of specialized 
organizations, the AASW was intended to be an overarching national professional 
association.8 A central focus ofthe AASW's initial organizing efforts was the 
establishment ofminimum membership criteria regarding experience and education. 
In 1922, the AASW required a minimum of four years experience in social welfare 
service and some educational training vaguely defined as indicative of success in 
social work. In July 1929, the AASW adopted new standards for merrlbership to 
take effect in 1933. The new standards established a heightened expectation of 
professional training and experience in social work. Membership requirements now 
called for a minimum of two years of college and five years of social work 
experience and/or other educational and training experiences. Significantly, the new 
standards clearly privileged training obtained in professional schools of social work. 
The stiffened membership requirements and the emphasis on advanced training from 
approved schools ofsocial work, while bulwarking the field's evidence of 
professionalism, would soon prove to be a major source ofcontention between the 
mainstream profession and the bulk ofuncredentialed relief workers that came to 
fonn the nucleus of the rank and file movement.9 
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The hegemony of function over the cause of social refonn would further 
express itself in the declarations ofthe 1929 Milford Conference.)O Established in 
1923, the conference met annually, bringing together leading social workers in a 
contentious process ofdefining social casework. The task of the conference was 
critical to the consolidation ofa core professional identity and definition. The 
proliferation ofspecialized fields ofpractice and accompanying distinct bases of 
knowledge and skills seriously threatened a unified sense of a profession and the 
fruition of the AASW's attempts to forge a national, overarching professional 
association. In addition, the pervasive influence ofpsychiatric social work technique 
had heightened old rivalries and insecurities in the specialized fields - would one 
form of social casework predominate? If so, would it be psychiatric casework? 
Bertha Reynolds, a prominent adherent of the psychiatric viewpoint in the 
1920s, recalls in her memoirs the essence of the debate: 
Did psychiatric social work add just another specialty to the list? 
Did it introduce further division among social workers who were 
just beginning to find themselves in relation to each other? The 
answers are yes and no. 
Psychiatric social work did introduce a division ofwhich I had 
begun to be conscious when I joined the staff of the Smith College 
School- a division which neither the School nor I considered 
desirable. However, the very rapidity of the spread of 'the 
psychiatric point ofview' among social workers made it possible 
to say by 1927 ... that even ifpsychiatric social work was 
considered a specialty .. jt was, nevertheless, in the content of its 
knowledge the common property of all fonns ofgood social 
casework. 11 
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The final report of the Milford Conference reflected the masterful 
compromises necessarily made by social work's leaders to forge a common 
theoretical ground and justification for the profession's unified knowledge base. 
While deftly avoiding a specific definition of social casework, the report established 
the existence of a generic social case work which cut across social work's practice 
specialties, including psychiatric casework. The report affirmed that this generic 
approach was based, although admittedly unevenly, on scientific principles befitting 
a profession. As such, the differences observed within specialized fields ofpractice 
became incidental to the common theory base and techniques of a generic social 
casework used by all social workers. Perhaps most significant, the Milford 
Conference report affirmed the primary function of social work in the context of 
facilitating individual adjustment to the realities of the social world. The concept of 
social reform as a social work function was severely circumscribed, now redefined 
within the domain of the individual client's adjustment and the social worker's 
abilities to use their knowledge of the environment to bring available resources to 
bear upon the client's singular misery. As the conference report declared, "In . 
conclusion, we find the significant movement in the decade of 1920 - 1930, to be the 
emergence of a common casework field in which the individual, his adjustment and 
development, is accepted as the essential problem.,,12 
Social Work and the Liberal Tradition 
The seeming rejection ofsocial reform by the profession was, in essence, 
much less abandonment than a measured turning of the cheek. As a whole, social 
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work has always been inextricably bound within the ideological tenets ofAmerican 
liberalism, and the development of the profession in the 1920s faithfully reflected 
this allegiance. The notions of scientific rationality and efficiency embraced by the 
profession (and its concomitant disillusionment with the primacy of social reform) in 
fact mirrored the evolution of liberal thought before and just after World War I. 
After all, the reform movements of the Progressive Era arose not from a rejection of 
capitalism but from a zeal and idealism seeking to tame its more savage features. 
The anti-monopoly and civic reform movements that characterized Progressivism 
and the reform wing of social work railed against the excesses ofcapitalism, not its 
basic nature. To the intellectual barons of liberalism, such as Herbert Croly, John 
Dewey, Edmund Wilson and Malcolm Cowley, unbridled American capitalism 
represented outdated and distorted characteristics of individualism and competition 
that bred unnecessary class and social conflict, threatening a new emerging social 
order. 13 This new order called for a capitalism reinvigorated with a more humane 
and disciplined character - a character which recognized and nurtured the collective 
mutuality of interest between worker and industrialist, farmer and manufacturer and 
citizen and government. In sum, the tremendous changes in industry, technology, 
labor-capital relations and urban life wrought by nineteenth century capitalism 
required new processes of social planning and control based on efficiency, expertism 
and an altruistic community ofcitizenship. Planned progress marked by virtue and 
evolutionary optimism, not revolution or unregulated corporate monopoly, would be 
the new hallmark of the twentieth century America. 
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The ethos ofProgressivism was a rich nutrient for the emerging discipline of 
social work and deeply influenced the philosophies and practice ofboth the 
established charity organization societies (COS) and the growing settlement house 
movement. While both wings of social work shared adherence to a liberal ideology, 
the expressions of their commitment would diverge in some distinctive ways - and 
each would shape the character of a post-war social work. The pre-war spirit of 
reform was best symbolized in the public eye by the work of the settlement houses 
and the nearly canonized status ofJane Addams. Social workers, particularly those 
identified with the settlement movement, were prominent leaders in the progressive 
crusades for mother's pensions, child labor laws, public sanitation regulation, and 
wage and hour labor reform. Unlike the more professionally distant caseworkers of 
the charity societies, settlement workers appeared to be of the community they 
served. Primarily based within the neighborhoods ofurban poverty, settlement 
workers articulated the need for not only the spiritual and cultural adjustment of the 
individual to society but for institutionally based reforms which would alter 
environmental contributions to individual dysfunction. But the vast majority of the 
leadership in the settlement movement were not products of the communities they 
served. While temporarily sharing a common geography, they were profoundly 
separated from their clients by virtue ofclass, educational attainment and social 
priVilege. As a group, the reformists within the settlement house movement sought to 
ameliorate social and class conflict, and did not seek to fundamentally alter class 
structure. 14 
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Just as the settlement house movement expressed the outward reform 
impulses of liberalism, the charity organization societies better exemplified 
liberalism's inner faith in rational scientific thought and expertise in administration. 
While not eschewing social reform, the leaders of the charity organizations 
privileged the virtues ofbureaucratic efficiency and a scientifically-based method. 
For Mary Richmond, leading spokesperson of the COS movement, the ascendancy of 
a distinct knowledge base and technique was critical to the development of the 
profession in order to distinguish it from the unbridled passion of reformers apt to be 
"...bowled over by the first labor leader, or anarchist, or socialist, or whatever he 
happens to be in that neighborhood.,,15 Richmond briefly came to represent the 
predominant tendency within social work seeking to focus the profession's attention 
on the science of individual adjustment and the means to that adjustment: social 
diagnosis via the technique of social casework. 
The final dominance of theories of individual adjustment over the politics of 
reform that would shape the character of the young profession in the ensuing decade 
found its fruition in the aftermath of the first World War. The optimism inherent in 
American liberalism was severely shaken by World War I, and the reverberations of 
disillusionment that followed dampened the zeal of its reformist wing. The 
Wilsonian ideals ofdemocracy that led liberals into the war seemed irrevocably 
stained in the carnage that ensued and the moral blight that characterized the 
Versailles Treaty. Coupled with the reemergence of a seemingly unified corporate 
monopoly and a government sponsored campaign to destroy alleged alien-inspired 
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radicalism, the resulting sense ofbetrayal and confusion unraveled the progressive 
coalition. While reform efforts would not totally collapse in the war's aftermath, 
Progressivism as a potent political movement had ceased to exist.16 
The general splintering ofprogressive thought and movement was echoed in 
the reformist wing of social work. The tentative connections that had been made 
before the war with organized labor and the Socialist Party, always a source of 
contention with the profession's financial benefactors, now seemed ill advised. As a 
red scare swept the nation, reformist social workers found their patriotism and 
legitimacy as public servants severely questioned. Prominent social workers such as 
Jane Addams, Roger Baldwin and Vida Scudder found themselves under attack from 
both within and outside the profession. Addams, Baldwin and Scudder had been 
opponents ofAmerican involvement in World War I and, unlike most social 
workers, continued to express their pacifist sentiments during and after the war. 17 In 
addition to her pacifism, Scudder had exhibited the temerity to openly endorse the 
more radical wings of labor, including the Industrial Workers of the World's 1912 
textile strike in Lawrence, Kansas. Jane Addams' heresy ofpacifism was nearly 
eclipsed by her denouncement ofthe Palmer Raids and outspoken support for the 
rights of aliens. 18 
Pacifism and suspect associations with unions, anarchists and Socialists 
earned many social work reformists, particularly within the settlement house 
movement, the focused attention of the press and government anti-radical 
investigations. The most sensational attacks would come in New York state, where 
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the legislature's Lusk Committee included the settlements in their far-flung net 
investigating sedition. During a year long investigation that included social welfare 
agencies, unions, foreign language associations and reform organizations, the 
committee found the specter of subversion in nearly every liberal and radical 
organization or cause it examined. From so-called "revolutionary" unions such as 
the International Ladies' Garment Worker's Union and the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers to the "subversive propaganda" spread by the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the Lusk Committee catalogued the threat ofBolshevist propaganda and 
subversion. 19 Settlement houses, determined the Lusk Committee, had placed 
" ... radical and revolutionary ideas on a parity with the ideals of American 
Government.,,20 The reactionary tide, while most pronounced in the activities of the 
Lusk Committee, was not isolated to New York. The allegedly subversive activities 
of settlement workers would also come under scrutiny by the press and ambitious 
politicians in Boston, Pittsburgh, Chicago and other cities.21 Addams' Hull House, 
the syrrlbolic home of the settlement movement, would gamer special attention. As 
late as 1925 it would be described as a "branch of the Soviet Government" during 
legislative hearings on child labor laws in Illinois.22 The enmity of virulent anti­
Communists towards Addams and the causes she espoused would remain unabated 
into the 1930s. As late as 1934, Elizabeth Dilling's classic who's who of radicalism, 
The Red Network, would devote nearly two full pages to Addams, considerably more 
space than any of the other 1,300 individuals listed would merit - an even more 
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remarkable feat given that Earl Browder, leader ofthe American Connnunist Party in 
1934, was granted a mere paragraph of exposure.23 
Chastened by the malaise of liberalism and the resurgence of a conservative 
political zeitgeist, ideological and practical differences between the settlements and 
the COS began to dissipate in the 1920s. The ensuing consolidation of the 
profession would now be based less on the ideals of reform than the more 
professional, and politically safe, road of technique and individual adjustment. The 
flirtations of some in the profession with reform, particularly its more radical fringe 
alliances with progressive elements of labor and the political left, had temporarily 
threatened to disrupt not only the canons ofprofessionalism but a longstanding 
reliance on class-conscious financial benefactors.24 Indeed, following the war, the 
more pronounced reform tendencies in the settlement houses increasingly gave way 
to an emphasis on the familiar and less politically fractious activities ofcommunity 
recreation and education (now the basis for a more professional field ofpractice 
called social group work). Thus, the moral character-building business ofthe 
settlement movement's class origins retained its primacy. While the spirit of social 
reform would maintain a hallowed place in social work canon, cause would be 
secondary to function, judiciously circumscribed and tamed in practice.25 
The ascendance of social casework over reform efforts in the wake of World 
War I also heralded the transformation of social casework itself. Despite the 
declarations ofthe Milford Conference that the presence of a generic casework was 
more significant than any specialty of technique, the psychiatric point of view would 
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largely come to characterize the profession in the 1920s. The broad strokes of a 
scientifically-based casework investigation outlined in Mary Richmond's Social 
Diagnosis in 1917 were being replaced in the mid-twenties by a more refined model 
ofpsychiatric casework. Findings its origins in the crude pre-Freudian psychiatry of 
the mental hygiene movement, this new model centered upon rapidly advancing 
principles and techniques ofpsychiatry, particularly as embodied within the 
psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud.26 
As the psychiatric model came to dominate the literature, so did it enter the 
professional training schools. Seminars and courses focused on this new science of 
the mind proliferated in schools ofsocial work, and students were urged to practice 
this new method in their agency placements. As one student of the time recalls, 
Gone were the days when persons in need applied for assistance, 
had the legitimacy of their need verified by a call to a former 
employer ifunemployed, or to the dispensary if too ill to work, and 
confirmed by a visit to the home ... We were taught to use a detailed 
case history outline: circumstances surrounding birth, early 
childhood diseases, adjustment to other children, school 
adjustment, and so on up through adolescence and adulthood and 
into the sex life of the married adults in the family. We 
encountered resistance. Clients, as we called our interviewees, 
often failed to see the relevance ofour questions.27 
The embrace of this new psychiatric viewpoint served a dual purpose for the 
incipient profession. On the one hand, the therapeutic uses ofpsychiatry provided 
for a scientifically-based method and role that differentiated the professional social 
worker from the unprofessional stigma ofcharity workers doling out relief. The 
psychiatric method relied on specialized theory and techniques far more 
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sophisticated than the concrete tasks of investigation and relief giving, and hence 
worthy ofmuch higher professional status. At the same time, the ability to focus on 
the inner world of the individual allowed social workers to avoid both the political 
and professional dangers of environmental change efforts that lacked a coherent and 
professional theory base. Psychoanalytic theory provided the avenue by which 
social work could claim a distinct body ofknowledge and skill, long so elusive to an 
occupation almost singularly insecure in its identification as a profession. Treatment 
based on a scientific understanding ofthe complexity ofthe human mind not only 
offered new insights and answers for human problems, but it could demonstrate real 
contributions to healthy adjustment. This decidedly scientific approach, however, 
would concomitantly influence social workers to turn the focus of their attentions 
from one of environmental dysfunction to that ofpersonal maladjustment. 28 
The privileging of a psychological focus over social refonn would also serve 
to not only expand the profession's base of expertise but its potential clientele. 
Unlike class-based social problems ofpoverty and inadequate housing, problems of 
personality were universal, and the rise of a middle class offered social work a 
particularly potent new market. Entree into the burgeoning middle class better suited 
social work's claim to professional authority and status. While the skills of relief 
giving were less relevant for this potential market, skills that could be employed to 
shore up disorganized families and resolve intrapsychic conflict were extremely 
appealing. Equally important, the funding necessary to implement (and legitimize) 
this new emphasis was forthcoming from the traditional financial benefactors of 
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whom social work had historically relied upon. In the case ofpsychiatric social 
work, funding would come not only from traditional philanthropic foundations such 
as the Commonwealth Fund but from government and quasi-governmental sources 
as well. In this regard, both the Red Cross and the Veterans Bureau, dealing with the 
mental health problems of returning veterans, provided significant training and 
employment opportunities for psychiatric social workers.29 
In sum, the shift to psychiatric approaches within the field reflected the new 
ideological and economic realities that faced social work in the 1920s. In turn, the 
resulting inward focus of the profession best resolved threats to its survival and at the 
same time seemed to assure the emergence of an unlimited market for its more 
refined product. But while these abstract philosophical, political and social forces 
provided the necessary conditions and means for the shift in social work towards the 
psychiatric viewpoint, they do not contain a fully satisfactory explanation for this 
shift. Changes in social thought reflect not merely responses ofhuman actors to 
abstract structural dynamics beyond their influence or recognition but are themselves 
shaped by the experiences ofhuman actors individually and collectively and the 
meanings placed on these experiences. As one settlement worker explained: 
You have to understand that it [the failure ofreform] wasn't just a 
political thing. For most ofus [social workers] it was our failure. 
We had failed. Most of us didn't think like economists or 
philosophers - I didn't anyway - we were workers. No matter 
how hard we tried it didn't seem to matter. When I went to a 
lecture on Freud it was like a revelation. Maybe we couldn't 
change the world, but I could do something for somebody, and if 
enough ofus did it. .. well, I don't know, but it seemed like he had 
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his finger on something and I thought maybe this was it. I mean, it 
was wrong finally, but what else did we have?3o 
Jacob Fisher, a leading figure in the rank and file movement, would echo this 
personal crisis many social workers felt as they sought to navigate the social and 
political changes of the 1920s: 
The world and the profession was adrift for awhile after the war. 
We were shell-shocked, and for a younger generation the old ideas 
and leaders seemed irrelevant. We needed a new road and Freud 
represented it. Itwas more than Freud, too - people were 
fascinated by personality and we weren't any different. Pathology 
was much more intrinsically rewarding than poverty. 31 
Bertha Reynolds, a leading proponent ofpsychiatric social work in the 1920s, 
reflects in her memoirs that the appeal psychiatric method held for social workers 
was more than just a new technique for application on others. Itwas also a source of 
apparent powerful personal transformation for the individual social worker, both as a 
provider and recipient of therapy: 
Counselling with students on the summer campus, 011 winter visits, 
or by mail, became a rewarding third vocation. A remark of a 
psychiatrist at the School.. .meant much to me. It was to the effect 
that something happened when students who had problems in 
learning counselled with me. They became 'like different people.' 
It was a sacred trust, whatever gift I had for helping people, and 
something I could not ignore, nor, in accepting it, fail to give it my 
best. .. 
No subject was more debated among psychiatric social workers in 
the 1920's than the question whether a psychoanalysis was 
necessary for professional success. That it was an advantage was 
rather generally conceded, and for a period ofyears New York 
City, which was almost the only place to obtain an analysis, was 
overloaded with social workers whose job performance was made 
unpredictable by the emotional storms they were riding in their 
personal therapy ... As the emphasis in psychiatric casework was 
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more and more placed upon the dynamic effect of the relationship 
between workers and client; it became increasingly necessary to 
consider what our own unconscious conflicts might be doing to the 
people we were supposed to help.32 
The vitiation ofsocial reform activities within social work was part of- but 
substantially more than - the desires of an anthropomorphized profession to obtain 
elevated social status. Likewise, individual social workers were not just naive pawns 
in the greater manipulations of a cabalistic funding elite or the recondite workings of 
abstract economic forces. The gradual dominance of theories and techniques of 
individual adjustment also, and importantly, reflected the real individual and 
collective experiences ofsocial workers - feelings ofdisappointment, confusion, 
success and hope. 
Dissenting Voices: Social Work, Socialism and the Labor Movement 
Not all the voices of social work in the 1920s mirrored the profession's 
general retreat from reform and its enthusiasm for a more personality-focused 
technique of individual adjustment. A handful of social workers constituted a small 
but vocal left wing within the profession and sought to forge close connections 
between more militant wings oforganized labor and elements of the Socialist and 
Communist parties. Some, such as Roger Baldwin and Mary van Kleeck, were early 
converts to the radical persuasion, while others, such as Grace Coyle, Eduard 
Lindeman and Harry Lurie, selectively flirted with the left while staking their faith in 
a core liberalism. 
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Social work's early radicals found their inspiration in the populist movements 
of the late 1800s, the militant organizing efforts ofunions such as the ILGU and the 
IWW, and the refonnist social critiques ofutopian socialists and the more pragmatic 
Socialist Party. But such sympathies and alliances were hardly well organized or 
widespread among social workers, and rarely were acknowledged by the profession's 
leadership. As the red scare began in the wake ofWorld War I, Roger Baldwin 
displeased many at the 1918 NCSW with a scathing critique that maintained social 
work's "obedience" to capitalism rendered the profession's work " ... undemocratic at 
heart - and the heart is its source of financial support.,,33 Baldwin's attacks on social 
work and its benefactors, his support of the Russian revolution and the IWW's 
anarcho-syndicalist ideals, and his imprisonment for draft resistance were far outside 
the profession's mainstream. 
Indeed, Baldwin's largely ignored plea at the NCSW for an alliance with the 
still nascent labor movement reflected the historic tensions that existed between 
labor and social work. As leaders of the Jewish Welfare Society in Philadelphia 
would later tell delegates at the 1926 NCSW conference: 
The fundamental differences between the objectives of trade­
unions and of social agencies is that while the case worker is 
interested in the individual, family, [and community] and 
fonnulated a program to meet its problems, the trade-union, on the 
other hand is concerned with its members at large ... Socialists, and 
to some extent trade-unions, have tended to look upon social work 
with suspicion and scorn, when they were not openly hostile.34 
The seeds of labor's suspicion regarding social work were sown in the early attitudes 
and practices of COS leaders and their workers. Concerned with the perceived baser 
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moral impulses of the poor and working masses, many early social workers were 
convinced that moral enlightenment, not the militant tactics of labor unions for better 
working conditions and an eight-hour work day, were central to the improvement of 
society. Many early charity societies openly opposed labor's use of strikes to 
pressure employers, often denying relief to strikers and their families and pressuring 
adults on relief to take the jobs ofstriking workers. Some societies, such as the New 
York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, viewed organized labor 
in the 1870s as a clearly anti-American movement closely aligned with " ... socialistic, 
incendiary and revolutionary dogmas" spread by such international revolutionary 
organizations as the Communist International. 35 
As compared to the charity organization societies, the goals oforganized 
labor and radical political movements received a more sympathetic response from 
the leaders of the settlement movement. The settlement movement's more 
pronounced emphasis on the betterment of environmental conditions for the poor and 
working class was considerably more well-disposed to the social and economic 
program of labor unions than the stricter moralism of the societies. At the peak of 
the Progressive movement, settlement workers often joined with labor unions in 
campaigns for housing laws, wage and hour regulation, legislation to improve 
factory conditions, and enactment ofchild labor laws. The attraction ofmany 
settlement workers to the Progressive Party also nourished an alliance with labor, as 
social workers became instrumental in the development of the party's 1912 social 
welfare platform, which championed the establishment of the eight-hour work day, 
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federal involvement in setting factory standards and the provision ofworkmen's 
compensation and social insurance.36 Many settlement houses opened their meeting 
rooms for labor organizers, and some within the settlement nl0vement, such as 
Florence Kelley and Jane Addams, were instrumental in the development of the 
National Consumers League and the Women's Trade Union League. Still others, 
such as Robert Hunter, Karl Borders, Vida Scudder and Ellen Starr credited their 
involvement with labor unions as instrumental in their conversion to socialism.37 
Despite the alliances that did exist between unions and some of the 
settlements, significant tensions between the two camps were ever apparent. While 
some settlement workers, such as Borders, Scudder and Starr were decidedly partisan 
in their support of unions, others were as suspicious and opposed to the union 
movement as their counterparts in the charity organization societies. Still others, 
such as Jane Addams, took a more circumspect view regarding unionism. Addams' 
support ofunion goals was tempered by her concern that the elements of"class 
warfare" engendered by the militant demands ofunions would undermine her vision 
of a class stratified but socially harmonious society.38 While sympathetic to the need 
for reform to better the conditions ofworking men and women, Addams feared the 
more militant and revolutionary wings ofthe labor movement, and believed 
settlements were called to a mediating role between the excesses ofcorporations and 
the political intrigues ofthe unions. Such attempts at mediation were often ill 
received by unions and served·to maintain the suspicion within organized labor that 
social work was, at most, a tenuous ally.39 
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The generally distant relationship that existed between the mainstream of 
social work and the labor movement following the demise of the progressive 
movement would solidify in the increasingly conservative character of the profession 
after World War I, as the profession's focus on individual adjustment began to 
supplant its more sweeping social reform ideals. Despite the 'chilling effect of this 
tum, a small but vocal number of social workers maintained their allegiance to the 
cause ofunions and a radical ideology. This left-wing of the profession, while 
relatively small in number, included both prominent social workers such as Mary 
Van Kleeck and Roger Baldwin, as well as a younger generation such as Harry Lurie 
and Karl Borders. All had been informed by the experiences ofProgressivism and 
the politics ofanarchism, the Socialist Party, and the emerging Communist Party. 
Still others, such as Florence Kelley, Eduard Lindeman and Lillian Wald would be 
inspired by the Russian revolution and subsequent trips to Russia to observe 
firsthand this new national experiment in socialism.4o While sharing a common 
dissatisfaction with the destructive aspects ofAmerican capitalism, members of this 
left wing in the profession represented more disparate voices of dissent than any 
organized program of action or well defined ideology. With the exception ofVan 
Kleeck and Baldwin, few would publicly pose any serious critique of the profession 
or directly challenge the profession's leadership. Rather, in the conservative climate 
of the 1920s, an organized radical presence was both rare and mostly ignored by the 
mainstream profession's leadership. 
73 
Despite the apparent paucity of radical thought and action within the 
profession during this period, two events in 1924 and 1926 would presage the later 
emergence ofan organized and left-led threat to the profession as represented in the 
rank and file movement. The first challenge to the profession's political 
complacency would be an intellectual assault mounted by Mary van Kleeck and 
Roger Baldwin at the 1924 National Conference ofSocial Work. The second event, 
led by workers in the Jewish Federation Societies ofNew York City would be less 
noticed but would constitute a more far-reaching omen of events to unfold in the 
next decade. 
Unlike Baldwin, an avowed anarchist and supporter of radical causes, Mary 
van Kleeck seemed an unlikely candidate for the mantle ofradicalleadership.41 
Raised in a family dominated by her Protestant minister father, van Kleeck was an 
active church member in her adolescence as well as being a member ofthe National 
Society of Colonial Dames. Drawn into the reform efforts ofprogressivism through 
her church activities, van Kleeck decided upon social work as a career and enrolled 
in Smith College. Upon graduation in 1905, van Kleeck was employed at the 
College Settlement House in the lower east side ofNew York City. For the next five 
years, van Kleeck investigated the lives of factory girls and women, publishing 
numerous monographs that were influential in eventual passage ofprotective laws by 
the state legislature. Following completion of a well-received book investigating the 
conditions ofwomen in the bookbinding trades, van Kleeck was appointed head of 
the Russell Sage Foundation's Committee on Women's Work (later renamed the 
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Industrial Studies Division) and launched a series of investigations into the work 
conditions ofwomen in factories. Van Kleeck's investigations drew her close to the 
ranks oforganized labor and she soon became a leading proponent ofworkmen's 
compensation, unemployment insurance, and social insurance.42 
Upon her appointment to the War Labor Policies Board during World War I, 
van Kleeck intensified her work with the labor movement, hosting a conference on 
the rights of trade union women in 1918. Including representatives from all the 
national and intemationallabor federations that admitted female members, the 
conference was hailed by The New Republic for its progressive platform on the rights 
and needs ofwomen workers: "The active and organized cooperation of the 
disciplined leaders of the American women's trade union movement is essential to 
the effective protection ofour industrial morale from the risks that inevitably attend 
the unregulated incursion ofwomen into industry.,,43 But as World War I came to an 
end, van Kleeck resigned from the War Policies Board to return to the Russell Sage 
Foundation, urging the development ofa permanent federal agency responsible for 
protecting the rights ofworking women. Lobbying congressmen, van Kleeck 
authored legislation that was subsequently introduced and passed in 1920, 
establishing The Women's Bureau in the Department ofLabor.44 
Following the war, van Kleeck sharply veered to the politicallefi. Inspired 
by the Russian Revolution and now convinced of the need for national social and 
economic planning, van Kleeck began a long association with the Communist Party 
and the radical unions of the Party's Trade Union Educational League (TUEL). 
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Joining with like-minded radicals in the profession, van Kleeck brought her 
commitment to socialism before the 1924 National Conference of Social Work.4s 
Amidst the relative conservative complacency ofthe 1920s, few delegates at 
the NCSW were kindly disposed to the presentations ofvan Kleeck and Roger 
Baldwin. Reflecting on the reform platform ofthe 1912 conference that had been 
incorporated into the Progressive Party campaign, van Kleeck and Baldwin 
castigated social work's retreat from progressive politics and its failure to recognize 
its common interests with the labor movement. Accusing social work ofbeing 
blinded by the class interests of its financial benefactors, van Kleeck argued that the 
emerging movement of industrial unionism held the key to future political power and 
economic change, a change van Kleeck believed would lead to worker control of 
national industry and government.46 Baldwin echoed van Kleeck, claiming that the 
lessons of the Bolshevik revolution and the rapid growth of labor parties in Europe 
and Mexico demonstrated a coming new world order based on the principles of 
socialism. Urging social workers to join the movement to create a worker's party in 
the United States, Baldwin cautioned the profession that " ...if social workers are to 
be participants in the essential struggle for larger human freedom ...they can achieve 
it only by identification with the cause of labor.,,47 Despite their inflamed rhetoric, 
van Kleeck and Baldwin were clearly standing outside the mainstream beliefs of 
their audience. As one observer noted, " ...they seemed odd rather than dangerous. 
There was polite applause, a mild rejoinder by Paul Kellogg, editor of the 
Survey ... then silence.,,48 
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While van Kleeck and Baldwin's admonitions to social work to recognize the 
growing power of labor unions went largely unnoticed by the profession's elite, in 
New York City social workers employed by the agencies of the Federation for the 
Support of Jewish Philanthropic Organizations were taking the first modest steps of 
turning it into an historic reality. Formal philanthropic organization within the 
Jewish community ofNew York had first appeared in 1828, when the Shearith Israel 
Congregation established the Hebrew Benevolent Society, an agency dedicated to 
providing family welfare services.49 As European Jews immigrated to the United 
States in increasing numbers during the nineteenth century, meeting the needs of 
these mostly poor newcomers led to a proliferation ofvolunteer relief organizations. 
To cope with the resulting complexities and rivalries that arose in financing and 
coordinating the various services provided by these charitable agencies, a centralized 
federation responsible for overall fundraising was established in 1918, representing 
some 92 programs in three city boroughs. so 
Initially reliant upon untrained volunteers, by the mid 1920s Federation 
constituent agencies were increasingly staffed by paid professionals, including social 
workers. Until 1925, many ofthese trained charity workers had been students in the 
School for Jewish Communal Work. While not a professional school of social work, 
it offered a series ofcourses in social welfare, recreation, and education services. 
Following the school's closure in 1922, the National Jewish Conference solicited 
funds from various foundations and Jewish federations to establish the Graduate 
School for Jewish Social Work in 1925. Through a cooperative agreement with the 
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New York School ofSocial Work, students in the program received the general 
professional coursework of the New York School and specialized training in 
communal work through the Graduate School for Jewish Social Work.51 
The growing professional make-up ofFederation caseworkers and 
supervisors quickly brought to the surface long standing tensions regarding working 
conditions, caseload size and training and personnel standards. Dissatisfied with the 
response ofFederation administrators to their concerns, caseworkers and supervisors 
formed the Association ofFederation Social Workers (AFSW) in 1926.52 Not yet a 
trade union in actual form, the AFSW articulated a core series ofdemands giving rise 
to its formation: 
1) Standardization of types of requirements for social workers 
employed in organizations under the Federation. 
2) An adjustment of minimum salaries commensurate with 
training requirements and the increased cost of living. 
3) Adjustment of increases to insure retention of experienced 
workers. 
4) Establishment ofhealth insurance for workers. 
5) Standardization of case load compatible with doing good 
work in a reasonable time limit.s3 
Despite the AFSW's calls for improved workplace conditions, in practice it 
emphasized standards ofprofessional practice and worked in a mostly cooperative 
manner with agency administrators: 
The prime importance which has grown out of the Association of 
Federation Social Workers is the cooperation of trustees, 
executives and staffs. With this cooperation growing stronger each 
year, it is conceivable that social workers will not be ashamed to 
ask for a living wage but with standardization aimed at by the 
Association, will receive it without asking. 54 
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While the initial organization and demands of the AFSW would not be accompanied 
by the more class-conscious political militancy ofunions as envisioned by van 
Kleeck and Baldwin, the early AFSW would foreshadow a new era for social work 
in the face of the Great Depression. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
INTO THE MAELSTROM 
What is involved here is a shift ofpowerfrom ownership to work, 
including the work ofthe industrial workers, the farmers, the 
professional workers, the intellectual workers, the experts in scientific 
management. The shift in powerfrom ownership to work is a shift in 
the fundamental principle ofthe organization ofour society ... Those of 
us who say "Let us have evolution and not revolution "; those who say 
"Don't let us go into chaos; let us just patch up the old" - those 
people are really supporting the old; they are swinging their support 
to the status quo ... there must be no preaching ofpeace where there is 
no peace. It lies with the working class, with which social workers 
have the bond ofcommon goals, to transform the principle of 
government and ofindustry alike from possession to creative work...1 
(Mary van Kleeck, 1934) 
The relatively sudden onset of the Great Depression occurred, almost 
ironically, at a time in which the masses ofAmericans appeared to be enjoying a 
period ofunprecedented economic prosperity. Certainly for American business, it 
was a time ofbright outlook for the future and huge profits for the present. During 
the decade of the 1920s, production and profit levels continued to rise and, at least 
for the middle and upper classes, hopes were high. On the surface it appeared that 
free enterprise was delivering on the promise of the good life. 
Under the surface of the rosy economic illusion in which the United States of 
the 1920s operated, however, ominous indications ofcoming hardship were 
establishing themselves. During the 1920s real wages fell sharply behind 
productivity, with workers averaging a forty-nine hour work week and a weekly 
take-home pay of around twenty-six dollars. Throughout the decade depressed farm 
prices produced an unprecedented number ofbankruptcies in rural America, and 
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increased mechanization in urban factories sent the unemployment rate steadily 
upward. While unemployment in the 1920s had always been stubbornly high, 
following the stock market crash of 1929, unemployment rates began to rise 
dramatically. By the spring, unemployment was estimated at nearly three million, 
and by the following spring of 1930 it would reach eight million. The crisis 
continued to deepen at an unprecedented rate; in 1933 nearly one third of the 
workforce, some fifteen million workers, were out of a job.2 
For those poor people who had never enjoyed the prosperity of the 1920s to 
begin with, to whom the day to day struggle for survival was a normalized 
experience, it may have merely appeared that more would join in sharing their 
misery. To the new poor, however, for the millions suddenly thrown into 
unemployment and desperate poverty, their world became a chaotic, confused 
nightmare. For those seeking private or public assistance, the situation in 1929 was 
extremely bleak. The practice ofrelief-giving in the United States had historically 
been viewed as primarily one for which responsibility lay with local communities or 
state governments, with little federal involvement or oversight. Furthermore, those 
services available to the poor and unemployed consisted of a patchwork ofprivate 
charities and publicly financed institutions, wholly inadequate to deal with the 
millions now in need of assistance. 
The Unemployed Respond 
At first, reaction from the unemployed was muted and slow to take shape. 
Many accepted the response of government and business that the crisis was 
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temporary - that self reliance was the key to recovery. President Herbert Hoover 
rejected calls for massive federal relief assistance, embracing the belief that relief 
was primarily a local responsibility. Too little too late, Hoover provided funding for 
a limited public works program in 1930, and established the President's Emergency 
Committee for Employment (PECE), an advisory committee that served to 
coordinate the funds and provide assistance to states and employers in developing 
job investment strategies.3 But limited federal intervention and the advice of PECE 
had little effect. As the crisis deepened, the newly unemployed found themselves 
immersed in a crushing poverty. Life savings were quickly used up, families were 
broken apart and the very essentials of food, shelter and heat were becoming scare. 
Slowly, as Piven and Cloward note, the poor came to see their situation in a new 
light: 
They began to define their personal hardship not just as their 
own individual misfortune but as a misfortune they shared with 
many of their own kind. And if so many people were in the 
same trouble, then maybe it wasn't they who were to blame, but 
the 'system' ... The resulting unrest of the unemployed began to 
manifest itself in a spontaneous and largely unorganized 
fashion. Incidents of individual and mass looting became 
increasingly commonplace. Relatively spontaneous marches, 
demonstrations, and even storming ofrelief offices occurred 
throughout the country.4 
In due time the unemployed began to organize their protest and resistance. 
Much of this organization came with the participation and leadership of the political 
left, particularly the Socialist and Communist parties. Organized groups of the 
unemployed now devised militant and sometimes violent tactics to agitate for relief. 
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Mass marches and rallies outside of city halls and relief offices became a common 
occurrence throughout the country, sometimes reSUlting in bloody confrontations 
between demonstrators and police ordered out to disperse the crowds. Groups of 
unemployed workers joined together to resist attempts ofauthorities to evict those 
who could no longer pay their rent or make mortgage payments. Riots, often the 
result of attempts by authorities to suppress protest rallies and marches, erupted in 
major cities throughout the country. In the face ofgrowing disorder, political leaders 
and newspapers spoke ominously of the subversive nature of the protesters and their 
organizations, and of the possibilities ofviolent revolution.5 
On a national level, the Communists took the lead in organizing the 
unemployed. Numerically a small political party beset by internal factionalism and 
largely composed ofnon-English speaking ethnic federations, the Communist Party 
quickly recognized the political potential of the crisis and the opportunity to both 
spread its revolutionary program and build its membership along the lines of a long 
desired Anglo-Anlerican face. In 1929, the party began organizing worker's 
Unemployment Councils through its labor-based Trade Union Unity League 
(TUUL), forming the National Unemployment Council (NUC), an announced mass 
organization of the unemployed.6 Within a short period the NUC was indeed a mass 
organization, boasting branches in over 45 states, including every major urban city in 
the country. The NUC concentrated its efforts on direct action to obtain relief. 
Council members joined picket lines of striking workers, planned and led mass 
demonstrations for public relief, organized resistance to evictions and occupied 
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offices of charity and public relief agencies. The growing strength and popular 
support of the unemployed movement could be seen not only in its local actions but 
in mass turnouts for their national protests. Over one million people participated in 
the first nationwide demonstration against unemployment jointly called for by the 
Communist Party on March 6, 1930. Over 100,000 demonstrated in Detroit, 50,000 
in both Pittsburgh and Chicago and huge crowds paraded in Seattle, Philadelphia, 
Cleveland, Milwaukee, San Francisco and Los Angeles. In New York City, a crowd 
ofover 100,000 were met by 25,000 police. In the ensuing violence, hundreds of 
protesters were arrested and scores injured and jailed. 7 
The Socialist Party also became active in organizing the unemployed. While 
the party's initial efforts centered on legislative refonn and lobbying, by 1932 they 
began actively organizing the unemployed into Unemployed Worker's Committees 
and Unemployed Leagues. In Chicago, Karl Borders, a settlement worker and 
member of the Socialist Party, organized the Worker's Committee on 
Unemployment. By 1931, Border's committee claimed a membership of 15,000. 
Borders would go on to organize the Socialist Party's Federation ofUnemployed 
Workers Leagues, claiming a national membership ofover 100,000 by 1932, 
considerably more than the 40,000 estimated to belong to the NUC.8 
A bitter rivalry between the Communists and Socialists ensued over the 
control and direction ofthe unemployed movement. Amidst Communist accusations 
that the Socialists were social fascists and Socialist countercharges that the 
Communists were totalitarians, the possibilities for one national organization seemed 
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dismal. But with the Communist Party's shift to the Popular Front strategy in the 
mid-thirties, merger discussions began in 1934 and culminated in a new national 
organization, the Worker's Alliance ofAmerica, now encompassing the NUC, the 
Worker's League and previously unaffiliated councils. Overall, the 1936 merger 
brought together a national organization of some 1,600 locals with an estimated 
membership ofover 600,000. The semblance ofunity that marked the merger was 
represented in its leadership as Socialist Party member David Lasser was named 
Executive Secretary and Communist merrlber Herbert Benjamin organizational 
secretary. 9 
The Quandary of Organized Labor 
At the onset of the Great Depression, the state oforganized labor in the 
United States was one of considerable weakness, both in terms ofnumbers and 
political clout. With the virtual destruction of the revolutionary IWW in the wake of 
the anti-Communist purges following World War I, the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) was the only national federation of labor unions. Established in 1886, 
the AFL, unlike the IWW, had focused its efforts upon the development of craft 
unions, mostly eschewing industrial workers. During the decade of the 1920s and 
into the early 1930s, the AFL largely continued its practice of refusing to recognize 
organizing efforts among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the bulk of the 
American work force. As a consequence, the growth of the AFL first stagnated and 
then declined precipitously. From a peak ofmembership in 1920, when 17% of the 
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work force was unionized, AFL membership had in fact been steadily declining from 
nearly five million to less than 2.5 million (or 9% of the work force) in 1930.10 
The AFL' s initial response to the deepening economic crisis was in keeping 
with President Hoover's assurances that the crisis was temporary, and AFL leaders 
advised their membership that an upswing would soon be forthcoming. Indeed, 
fearful of federal intervention in the employment market, AFL President William 
Green met with a conference of employers called by President Hoover in early 1930 
and pledged the AFL would avoid any strikes during the temporary crisis in 
exchange for a halt on wage cuts. Green would stand by this pledge in the summer 
of 1930, even as 60 major companies imposed wage cuts on their workers. I I 
Growing unrest among both employed and unemployed workers and their 
efforts on a mass scale to organize would eventually modify the AFL's lack of 
enthusiasm for unionization of industrial workers. But even after congressional 
passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, which provided 
federal sanction for the right ofworkers to organize unions, the AFL's response to 
the ensuring wave ofunion organizing in the industrial sector was conditional. New 
unions brought into the AFL as federal locals were deemed temporary and without 
voting rights until they could be absorbed into one of the existing craft unions. As a 
result, workers in factories were often split into a number ofdistinct craft unions, 
weakening any opportunity for collective bargaining. In addition, the AFL's 
discouragement of more militant organizing or bargaining tactics, such as the use of 
the strike, ran counter to the sentiments ofmany unionizing industrial workers. I2 
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The militant mood ofworkers and union organizers within the worsening 
conditions of the economic crisis could not long tolerate the restraints of the AFL. 
Proponents of a new industrial democracy movement, promoting a vertical basis of 
organizing unions that included all workers in a shop or business, agitated inside and 
outside of the AFL for the federation to open its ranks to the masses of industrial 
workers in need oforganizing. Among the first to experiment with developing a new 
national federation ofunions was the Communist Party's Trade Union Unity League. 
Composed of relatively small unions with left-leaning or Communist leaderships, the 
TUUL left the AFL in 1929, seeking to organize new unions and draw existing 
unions out ofthe AFL. Eventually beset by internal criticism within the Communist 
Party that the TUUL was engaging in the ideologically heretical work ofdual 
unionism, and unable to significantly expand its membership, the TUUL failed to 
develop a new national union of industrial workers. It would remain for another 
effort, embodied within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), to complete 
this goal of the TUUL and provide a nationally potent organization for industrial 
democracy. 13 
The Crisis in Social Work 
The response of the profession to the Great Depression initially resembled 
that of the rest of the nation: confusion and uncertainty. Not unlike the AFL, social 
work's leadership saw no immediate need for special measures or significant federal 
intervention to deal with the temporary economic downturn. While increasing 
applications for assistance from the unemployed were already stretching the 
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resources ofprivate charity agencies in early 1930, this upsurge in need was 
expected to subside shortly. Indeed, even the more liberal Survey paid scant 
attention to the stock market crash in a November 1929 issue, and the presence of 
Porter Lee on Hoover's PECE committee assured the profession that the modest 
public works program suggested by the committee would forestall any challenge to 
the private nature of the profession's relief-giving. For as PECE had declared in its 
statement ofmission, its members would work to ensure that " ... a11 possible efforts 
are made to provide each unemployed person with work, for work rather than charity 
is not only their choice, but their right.,,14 
Another measure ofsocial work's relative confidence in the President and his 
advisors could be traced to the support ofHoover's 1928 election by distinguished 
leaders such as Jane Addams and Homer Folks. Even in his home state ofNew 
York, popular governor Al Smith, Hoover's opponent in the election, failed to totally 
enthrall the liberal wing of the social work establishment. While Smith enjoyed the 
active support of the likes ofMary van Kleeck, Lillian Wald and William Hodson, 
others were less enthusiastic in their support. Future New Dealer Joanna Colcord 
conceded that there was little substantial difference between the candidates in terms 
of their record on social services; likewise, Edward Devine tempered his support of 
Smith by noting that Hoover was equally deserving ofsupport among social workers. 
Even Paul Kellogg, editor ofSurvey and a sometime socialist, admitted he admired 
Hoover's cautious but socially progressive record. ls 
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Despite the optimism within the profession that the Depression would prove 
temporary, the economy continued to shudder and decline throughout 1930. By the 
winter of 1931, Jacob Fisher recalls that there were few in the profession that did not 
concede the depth and apparent long-tenn nature of the crisis: 
As factories closed and the weeks piled up their dreary quotas of 
the unemployed, the typical social worker rushed about in a frenzy 
of activity compounded in equal parts of a recoil from any thinking 
and a joyous self-immolation in a great crusade against hunger and 
want. Doubt, hesitation, critical-mindedness were luxuries no one 
could afford. The country was in the trenches and so were the 
social workers. 16 
Throughout the country, private charity organizations were swamped by unemployed 
workers and their families seeking assistance. As growing numbers of applicants 
stood in lines at relief agencies, sometimes stretching into the street, private charities 
were overwhelmed by both the sheer magnitude of the need and by the escalating 
costs required to meet that need. The economic collapse that was bankrupting 
business was no more kind to the volunteer agencies; by spring of 1932 some 400 
agencies in New York City alone had closed their doors. The city-funded Home 
Relief Bureau, opened in 1931, was forced to turn away applicants by January of 
1932 and would continue to briefly open and then close its rolls throughout the year 
as emergency grants of funds were sporadically provided by Governor Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA).17 
Nor did the psychiatric social workers escape the clutches of the deepening 
Depression. The focus on the internal world of the client now emphasized in social 
casework was suddenly incompatible with the concrete demands of relief-giving. As 
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clinics closed and social workers left to supervise public relief agency personnel or 
provide direct relief services, the opportunities for and seeming relevance of longer 
term intensive treatment methodologies rapidly diminished. One psychiatric social 
worker summed up what a growing number of social workers were now 
experiencing, 
The clients I was seeing didn't seek shoriJ;lg up of their ego 
strength anymore, they wanted food in their family's bellies ... we 
realized that the game had changed but we didn't know which way 
to go. I knew that social work couldn't solve this so we started 
looking at the government for answers. ) 8 
Indeed, the profession's arena of control over relief giving was being 
severely challenged. By 1931 it was clear that private charities could no longer 
adequately respond to the massive character ofunemployment and that the entire 
system was in danger of imminent collapse. As states and cities began operating 
their own relief bureaus, increasing numbers ofuntrained and uncredentialed relief 
workers were hired to meet personnel needs that the small profession of social work 
could not supply. Threatened by the profession's own inability to ameliorate poverty 
within the confines of the voluntary agency, and concerned over the diminution of its 
professional standards of training and practice in the public relief agencies, the 
AASW moved towards support of federal responsibility for relief. As opposed to 
clinical treatment issues, debate on the role of the federal government in relief 
operations and the protection ofprofessional standards in that relief dominated the 
meetings of the NCSW in 1931 and 1932.)9 
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Much had changed in the mood and direction of the profession since the 
heady days of 1929. At that time, as Porter Lee elevated function over the cause of 
refonn in social work's calling, William Hodson, executive director of the New York 
City Welfare Council, had warned social workers of the pitfalls of engaging in 
political activity: 
... while the political support ofmen or parties raises problems for 
the social worker in their most difficult form, open participation in 
public affairs ... also presents difficulties for the obvious reason that 
the social worker is not a free agent but the employee of the board 
ofdirectors ofhis organization. In the public mind his action may 
be interpreted as having the sanction of the board, thus, by 
implication, committing the board members and the organization 
as a whole in a way which may be distasteful and embarrassing.20 
Even as the economic crisis deepened in 1930, NCSW President Miriam Van Waters 
made no reference to it in her Presidential Address to the NCSW, instead buttressing 
Porter's earlier proclamation of an objective, more politically neutral casework; 
The family case worker and the psychiatric social workers are alike 
in their reliance for treatment upon constructive attitudes, stressing 
competence and adequacy rather than humility and dependence. 
Thus the social worker is sharply differentiated from his ancestor, 
the philanthropist. His attitude toward personality sets the social 
worker far apart from the social reformer who adopts a program of 
militant social welfare, and fights the opposition with hatred. In so 
far as public opinion is aware of social work it identifies it with 
reform or uplift movements. This is a mistake. There is evidence 
that social workers derive from trends of thought quite distinct 
from 'reformers.' Reformers have commonly a low opinion of 
mankind.21 
But now in the grim times of 1932, the profession was rethinking its role and 
responsibility in promoting public policy. The 1932 NCSW meeting in Philadelphia 
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reflected the change in mood and tenor. As Survey correspondent Gertrude Springer 
noted, 
It was not a gay conference. There was no dancing in the hotels 
after the evening meetings, no outbursts ofcommunity singing in 
lounges and 10bbies ... All in all it was a deeply earnest Conference, 
sober but not somber, determined but not despairing, purposeful 
but not panicky. Not for years has a Conference in and out of 
hours been so truly a forum ofdiscussion.22 
Delegates now overwhelmingly supported the AASW's call for President Hoover to 
provide federal support for public relief. The National Federation ofSettlements 
distributed resolutions they had adopted calling for federal intervention and the 
enactment of unemployment insurance. William Hodson, unlike 1929, now exhorted 
delegates that the profession, under the leadership of the AASW, must combine their 
"knowledge and experience" into a program of legislative action and " ... the ever 
greater burden of responsibility for public policy.,,23 At the same time, Hodson 
urged social workers to recognize that the increasing number of untrained workers 
being employed in relief efforts threatened a "debasing" of the profession and 
required action to protect professional standards.24 
While the majority of speakers and delegates at the NCSW now 
acknowledged the necessity of federal intervention, coupled with the profession's 
consultation and leadership, an emerging radical wing within the profession began to 
stake out a different alternative for social workers. Once again, Mary van Kleeck 
would assume the role ofpolitical gadfly as she addressed the delegates. Reminding 
the conference of the admonitions for national planning and an alliance with the 
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labor movement that she and Roger Baldwin had made to the NCSW in 1924, van 
Kleeck now urged delegates to support a fundamental restructuring of the nation: 
I call attention to the fact that it is now eight years since that report 
was made in Toronto and that neither in 1912 nor in 1924 was 
there any reference to the idea ofplanning in the sense in which is 
being discussed today. Since that date the experiment in planning 
in Soviet Russia has emerged as a definite procedure. We must 
clearly recognize that Soviet Russia is the only country in the 
world which can present a demonstration of social economic 
planning directed toward raising of the standards of living of all 
people. I confess that I grow somewhat impatient with the efforts 
made in this country to differentiate the current discussion of 
planning from Russian planning. It seems to me unscientific thus 
to eliminate consideration ofan experiment which we should study 
in order to discover not only its technique but its sources of 
25 power. 
Unlike the tepid response of 1924, this time van Kleeck moved the audience to loud 
applause, such that one observer noted van Kleeck " ... was forced to get up and bow 
before the applause died down."26 In 1932, van Kleeck's position to the left of the 
mainstream was no longer as isolated as in 1924. Rather, van Kleeck was now 
articulating the position of a new tendency in social work, the dissenting voices of a 
self-proclaimed rank and file movement in social work. 
The Rise of the Discussion Clubs and Practitioner Groups 
As the profession struggled to cope with the challenges posed by the 
economic crisis, many social workers searched for an individual and collective 
understanding of the forces that had brought about such a massive economic collapse 
and the avenues for recovery. For some, the confidence of the profession's 
leadership in the established political order and the seeming obsession of the AASW 
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on the more mundane issues ofprofessional standards and membership requirements 
was eerily out of touch with the sense ofdesperation experienced in the lives of their 
clients and neighbors. Dissatisfied with the outlets of expression available through 
professional channels, and seeking exposure to alternative, often radical, 
explanations of and solutions for the crisis, a new forum for these mostly young 
social workers emerged in New York City, the Social Workers Discussion Club. As 
Jacob Fisher, an early participant and leader in the New York discussion club 
explained, 
Social workers in the early years of the Depression who felt 
dissatisfied with the thinking of the social work establishment, 
unhappy about the political and economic order, and anxious to do 
something about these two evils, found that a natural first step was 
a meeting to talk things over . You talked things over to find out 
how many felt the way you did. When you had a like-minded 
nucleus, you held a meeting to influence other social workers. In 
time a following was established.27 
The New York Social Workers Discussion Club held its first meeting in the spring of 
1931, with the avowed purpose ofproviding an " ... open forum for the analysis of 
basic social problems and their relation to social work.,,28 Held in a rented hall, the 
first meeting was billed as a debate on the causes and cures of economic depressions. 
The New York club became a model for social workers in other cities and by 1932, 
discussion clubs had been formed in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston. The 
discussion clubs would continue to expand throughout the country, including cities 
such as Baltimore, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Seattle, Los Angeles and San Francisco.29 
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For the next four years the discussion clubs did indeed serve as a forum for 
debate and critical analysis as participants addressed such subjects as unemployment 
relief, the role ofpsychiatry in social work, civil rights and the role oftrade unions in 
social work.30 The appeal of the clubs and the underlying conditions that made their 
rapid expansion possible were outlined in a 1933 pamphlet published by the New 
York club: 
The chorus ofvoices calling for a new order grows louder. As 
social workers with an expert knowledge ofmisery in all its 
manifold forms, we cannot afford to remain outside the forces 
shaping America to a new adjustment. We must be prepared to 
contribute the full measure ofour hard-won understanding ... Out of 
these meetings has grown an enlargement of the social horizon, a 
participation in and endorsement ofmovements of social 
significance, vitalizing, after a decade of absorption in technics and 
statistics.31 
While the clubs were billed as an op~ forum for discussion, not all social 
workers who created and participated in the discussion clubs shared Fisher's more 
benign explanation regarding their origin or purpose. Eleanor Cohen, a rank and file 
social worker in Chicago, explains, 
The [discussion] clubs were not a product of the [Communist] 
Party, but we were instrumental in their organization and direction. 
In Chicago, the Communist group in the club took the main 
responsibility for their organization and direction. Of course, we 
tended towards speakers that represented the views of labor, the 
unemployed workers and the forces allied against social fascism. 
To the best ofmy memory, the same was true in Cleveland, Los 
Angeles, Seattle and most of the clubs.32 
Regardless of the dispute between Fisher and Cohen concerning the role of the 
Communist Party in the development and management of the discussion clubs, the 
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clubs clearly sought politically left analyses and speakers. As Fisher notes, the 
young social workers attending the discussion clubs " ... found the 'Communist 
thinking' expressed by the speakers a novel and refreshing experience. ,,33 But not all 
the presentations apparently met the expectations of its audience. Fisher recalls one 
particular meeting on the influence of social forces in literature featuring Mike Gold, 
a prominent Communist writer and columnist for the New Masses and the Daily 
Worker: 
Contrary to the expectations of the C.P. members and sympathizers 
who had organized the meeting, Gold made a less than 
overwhelming impression on his social work audience. As a 
speaker he was not the articulate persuasive advocate he was pen 
in hand ... Worse, he seemed to many ofhis auditors to be 
patronizing them. Tired radicals and effete intellectuals, said Gold, 
were becoming disillusioned with capitalism because they had 
illusions to begin with. Raised eyebrows; was he talking about us? 
Capitalism, Gold went on, produced cripples, insane men, 
unemployed men, hungry children, and maladjusted virgins for 
social workers to putter with. The social workers in the room 
fidgeted; a few yawned; one young woman muttered loudly, 'What 
does he think we are, clients?' Restless members of the audience 
puffed furiously at their cigarettes. Some left while Gold was still 
talking ... The communists may have a case, I thought, but they 
would have to do better than this.34 
The discussion clubs soon moved beyond merely serving as a forum of 
discussion; increasingly, they provided an organizational base for social action. In 
New York City, members of the discussion club joined protests of the Harlem 
Unemployment Council in the spring of 1931, participating in a march in Harlem 
protesting discriminatory practices in the State Employment Service and the 
inadequacy ofrelief services to unemployed African-Americans. The club officially 
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endorsed a mass demonstration at city hall against unemployment in November of 
1931 and raised funds for the first national hunger march on Washington, D.C. in 
1932. The club also supported the Lundeen Bill (the Workers Unemployment and 
Social Insurance Bill) and raised funds to support the Amsterdam Congress Against 
War.35 
In 1934, the New York club made its first independent foray into political 
action, fonning a committee to investigate relief practices within the city's 
Emergency Home Relief Bureau (HRB). The committee report harshly criticized the 
HRB for inadequate standards of relief, charging that relief allowances and rent 
assistance funds were far below levels " ... allowing for minimum health and 
decency.,,36 On May 15th, members of the committee,joined by Harry Lurie, Lillian 
Robbins and John Slawson, prominent social workers in the Jewish federation 
societies, met with public welfare department director, William Hodson, to present 
their findings and recommendations. In a contentious meeting, the committee 
demanded immediate increases in relief allowances, an abolition of residency 
requirements for relief and a prohibition of evictions and foreclosures. Asked by the 
committee to publicly support increased funding as well as the report's other 
recommendations, Hodson demurred. While acknowledging that "The whole relief 
picture is a flop" and personally agreeing with the minimum standards recommended 
by the committee, Hodson rejected the committee's request that he openly support 
their recommendations, reportedly telling the delegation that such a position would 
" ...only get me in trouble.,,37 Following Hodson's rejection of the committee report, 
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club members issued an open letter, distributing it to Hodson, employees of the 
HRB, and the mayor. In the letter, the club outlined its recommendations and 
version of the meeting with Hodson, condemning Hodson for his recalcitrance: 
Such an attitude of fear on the part of a social worker in public 
office assigns to social work the job ofconstantly apologizing for 
pittances ... At the same time, we must condemn your 
encouragement ofpolice violence against the unemployed seeking 
to gain those very standards approved by you in your statements to 
the committee. 38 
Similar activism marked other discussion clubs across the country. In 
Philadelphia, club members joined with farmers and others to help distribute free 
milk to the unemployed. Members of the Newark, New Jersey, club endorsed and 
participated in strike activities ofemployees of the city's largest newspaper, The 
Ledger. In Chicago, the largest discussion club outside ofNew York, club members 
were active in raising funds for the legal defense of the Scottsboro Boys and labor 
organizer Tom Mooney and participated in actions of the local unemployed councils. 
The Chicago club was also noted for its early attention to personnel standards and 
practices in relief agencies. The Chicago club actively publicized and organized 
against relief agency practices ofunpaid vacations, uncompensated overtime and 
salary reductions imposed by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission.39 
As the discussion clubs of the emerging rank and file movement proliferated 
throughout the country, another movement, less politically-conscious than the 
discussion clubs, began to develop within AASW chapters during 1933. The so-
called "practitioners' movement',40 represented the concerns of social workers in the 
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AASW who feared the collapse ofprofessional standards and training in public relief 
agencies. Particularly concerned with salary cuts being instituted in relief agencies, 
the social workers who joined practitioner groups also represented a growing rift 
within the AASW between leaders ofAASW chapters, usually agency executives, 
and regular chapter members who were primarily employed as direct service 
practitioners. Believing that AASW chapter leaders were unconcerned with 
declining salaries (and in fact, often the instigators of such wage reductions within 
their agencies) and discouraged the participation ofpractitioner members in chapter 
decision-making, practitioners formed ad hoc study and discussion groups in three 
AASW chapters in Chicago, New York and St. Louis.41 
While membership in practitioner groups often overlapped with the social 
work discussion clubs, the agenda of the practitioner groups was considerably more 
tame than that of the clubs. The first practitioner group, formed in Chicago, in fact 
articulated no specific program, stating that it " ... wanted merely a medium in which 
workers might be free to express themselves on any subject with interested them.,,42 
To ensure this free expression, membership in the group was extended to all AASW 
chapter members with the specific exclusion of chapter executives. In a similar 
fashion, the New York group accused the AASW chapter of confIning itself " ... to a 
small inner self-perpetuating circle of executives, which prepares the program, steers 
committees, and makes all important decisions"; accordingly, the group concentrated 
its efforts on providing the " ... younger worker the opportunity for leadership and 
[preparation] to assume a more active role in the chapter itself.,,43 In St. Louis, the 
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practitioner group was less hostile, conducting several studies and making 
recommendations to the AASW chapter on issues pertaining to personnel standards 
and training for social workers in the public relief agencies.44 
While the practitioner groups would never formally expand beyond these 
three AASW chapters, they provided another indication beyond the discussion clubs 
of the unrest that social workers were feeling within the confines of the AASW and 
the growing concerns that social workers were expressing about the worsening 
workplace conditions in relief agencies and private charities. Despite their limited 
influence and number, the practitioner groups also served an important function for 
the emerging rank and file movement: providing entree with the AASW. In this 
regard, Fisher notes: 
The movement's leadership recognized that within the top councils 
of the AASW there were people like [Mary] van Kleeck and 
[Harry] Lurie, who could influence the association to take a more 
'progressive' position on relief, social insurance, and jobs for the 
unemployed, and that cooperation was possible and even useful on 
specific issues. The existence of the practitioner groups could 
facilitate such cooperation.45 
Social Work Unions Take Root 
The initial stirrings of the discussion clubs and practitioner groups 
represented a growing consciousness within the profession that the conditions of the 
Depression required not only social action on behalfofclients but a focused attention 
on the working conditions experienced by social workers themselves. While the 
practitioner groups were limited in merrlbership to AASW members, the discussion 
clubs embraced the growing number ofuncredentialed relief workers that 
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represented a significant proportion of the staff in public relief agencies. The rapid 
influx of these new, largely uncredentialed social workers was a direct result of the 
New Deal programs instituted by the newly-elected President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Within months ofRoosevelt's taking office, a wide array of legislation was enacted 
to restructure the economy and provide relief to a beleaguered population, including 
the Civil Works Administration (CWA), the Public Works Administration (PWA), 
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) the Farm Credit Act, the Railroad 
Coordination Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, The Home Owners Act, and 
the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). In the area ofdirect relief, Roosevelt also 
acted quickly. On May 12, 1933 he signed into law the Federal Emergency Relief 
Act (FERA), providing some five hundred million dollars for immediate use by 
states for reliefof the unemployed. The FERA would prove to be the major source of 
direct relief in the early years of the New Deal, providing money to be distributed 
among broad categories of the poor and unemployed. Its broad discretion in granting 
reliefwould swell relief roles, so much so that by 1934 some twenty million would 
be on public relief.46 
As states expanded their relief services under the terms ofFERA, thousands 
of caseworkers were required in order to process applications and determine need. 
With only 186 students receiving an M.S.W. degree nationwide in 1933, the 
profession did not contain nearly the number of social workers required to provide 
services.47 Instead, relief agencies looked to the unemployed themselves, and ~any 
of the new case workers were hired through the CWA and PWA public works 
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programs. Among these young relief workers, the poor working conditions of relief 
agencies and resentment of credentialed social workers who were often employed as 
supervisors, provided a potent combination in favor ofunionization. Bronislaus 
Zukas, an uncredentialed relief worker with New York City's Emergency Home 
Relief Bureau in the early 1930s recalls the sometimes explosive atmosphere: 
We were angry. The government, big business and the AASW 
were all in bed together. They kept saying everything would be 
fine, that Hoover and then Roosevelt were better than living with 
radicals, Communists and unions. Our offices were terrible. They 
were overcrowded, smelled like toilets ... W e didn't control how 
many clients we had, there was no overtime or compensation. 
Sometimes I worked 12 hours a day, six days a week for about 
thirty bucks a week ... The MSW's were condescending to us 
'untrained' caseworkers. They acted like they were the only ones 
who knew how to run things. Hell, we were the ones who had 
been unemployed, we knew what it meant to be poor, not 
them ... we had to build unions.48 
Despite the tensions rampant within the public relief agencies, it was in the 
private volunteer agencies that social work unionization would first take hold. Like 
all private charity organizations, New York's Jewish Federation Societies were 
experiencing severe financial pressures in 1931 as its constituent agencies struggled 
to meet the increasing needs of the Jewish community. In November 1931, 
Federation officials announced an across-the-board wage cut for all employees, 
including nurses, social workers, doctors, porters and clerical workers. The 
Association ofFederation Social Workers (AFSW), established in 1926 to represent 
social workers' concerns with professional standards and training, was forced to 
rethink the cooperative arrangements it had previously held with agency 
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administrators. Many of the AFSW's leadership were also members of the New 
York Workers Discussion Club, and they were instrumental in moving the AFSW to 
reconstitute itself as the Association ofFederation Workers (AFW), now more in the 
fonn ofa collective bargaining union representing all classes ofemployees,49 
The immediate hopes of the AFW to roll-back the wage cuts and win 
recognition as the union ofFederation employees were quickly dashed, as Federation 
officials refused to meet with them. After repeated attempts, the union 
representatives were finally granted a meeting with the federation's executive 
director, who promptly rejected all union demands. Unwilling to go on strike, the 
AFW could do no more than publicize the plight of its members in the press and 
struggle to maintain its membership through the development of ' 'worker's councils" 
in the Federation's constituent agencies,50 
Following a second salary cut in the fall of 1932, the AFW was more 
successful. Organizing efforts to combat the cuts rapidly expanded. Following a 
mass protest meeting and a petition drive among Federation employees, the board of 
directors announced a 95% restoration ofcuts. Buoyed by the restorations, AFW 
membership rose to over 400 by September 1933, and the AFW now clearly 
distinguished their interests with that of the federation board: 
The higher income class, who are represented by the Boards of 
private welfare agencies, set the social work program and 
contribute the funds that pay our wages. By reason of this position 
they collectively constitute our employer. If they do not want an 
adequate social work program they should be prepared to face the 
consequences. Theirs is a grave responsibility.51 
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But the restorations proved short-lived. Shortly after partially restoring the cuts, the 
Federation, now faced with a ruling that FERA funds could not be used by private 
agencies, announced a 20% cut in 1933. Once again the AFW swung into action, 
holding a mass protest meeting and this time producing a petition signed by over 700 
employees.52 
Following a year of stormy and unsuccessful nego~iations, on February 7, 
1934, the AFW staged the first recorded work stoppage in social work history. Five 
hundred Federation employees left their workplace, gathering for a mass rally at a 
local high school with hundreds of supporters representing unemployed councils and 
other unions. Observers reported a spirited meeting, highlighted by the reading of a 
letter of support from Mary van Kleeck and the appearance ofdelegations from the 
Graduate School for Jewish Social Work and the New York School ofSocial Work. 
Following the work stoppage, the Federation board rescinded all previous salary 
cutS.53 
The initial, though halting success ofthe AFW in organizing social workers 
was quickly, and more successfully, emulated by New York City's public relief 
workers. Relief workers employed by the city's Emergency Home Relief Bureau 
(HRB) held an initial organizational meeting of the Emergency Home Relief Bureau 
Employees Association (HRBEA) in December 1933. While only 100 of the 5,000 
workers employed by the HRB attended, a continuing series ofmass meetings were 
held during the month, and by the fourth meeting over 1,000 employees had joined 
the union. In January 1934, a committee from the HRBEA met with HRB 
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administration seeking recognition and presenting a list ofunion demands. Faced 
with the rapid consolidation of the union among its employees, the HRB recognized 
the union and agreed to a majority of the union's key demands, including: wage 
increases ranging from 14 - 80% for guards, matrons, clerical staff, bookkeepers and 
relief workers; the abolition ofenforced overtime; coverage by industrial 
compensation insurance; provision for sick and vacation leave; and the reinstatement 
of several employees previously dismissed for what the union considered unjustified 
grounds.54 
The considerable victory of the HRBEA propelled it into the leadership of 
now emerging social worker unions in other cities around the country. With the 
subsequent transfer of the HRB into the city's welfare department in 1935, the 
Association changed its name to the Association ofWorkers in Public Relief 
Agencies (A WPRA) and began organizing the entire department. In August 1935 
the A WPRA, now with nearly 5,000 members, entered into a formal collective 
bargaining agreement with the city. The importance of this agreement was 
prominently publicized by Social Work Today: 
August 29 will be remembered as a memorable date. On that day a 
collective agreement between the Home Relief Bureau ofNew 
York and the [A WPRA] ... went into effect, the first of its kind in 
social work. The Association .. .is the largest of its kind in the 
country. The precedent thus established may well serve as a 
powerful stimulus to demands by employee associations in other 
cities for similar agreements. 55 
In fact, the success ofboth the AFW and the A WPRA in organizing social 
workers and reliefworkers helped to launch similar organizing efforts throughout the 
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country in 1934 and 1935. In Philadelphia, over 200 employees turned out to fonn 
the Association ofPhiladelphia County Relief Board Employees, despite resistance 
from Relief Board Executive Director Dorothy Kahn, a national leader within the 
AASW. Welfare workers in Detroit fonned the Association ofPublic Welfare 
Workers, and in Cleveland, the Family Service Workers Association won salary 
increases for caseworkers in the county's Relief Administration after threatening a 
work stoppage. Similar wage increases were won by the Associated Relief Workers 
ofAllegheny County in Pittsburgh. Members of the Chicago discussion club fonned 
the Federation of Social Service Employees within the Illinois Emergency Relief 
Commission. Keeping with the club's previous interest in personnel and training 
standards, the Federation established a "Committee on Standards of Work and 
Working Conditions," including representatives from the city's largest social service 
agencies.56 Union organizing in the private charities also met with success, 
including employees in agencies in New York, Brooklyn, Boston, Chicago, 
Cincinnati, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis. All told, by the end of 1935 over 
forty unions in private and public relief agencies had been established throughout the 
country in over twenty cities. With the creation of the Administrative Workers' 
Union of the Alameda County State Emergency Relief Administration, the rank and 
file movement had now moved across the country from the east to the west coast. 57 
The Birth ofSocial Work Today 
The rising tide ofunionization among social workers found a national voice 
in the pages ofSocial Work Today, ajournal established by the New York Social 
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Workers Discussion Club.58 From its inception in 1934, Social Work Today would 
be recognized as the quasi-official journal ofthe rank and file movement, reporting 
not only on the progress ofunionization but articulating the political and 
philosophical views of the movement's leadership. In its opening editorial Social 
Work Today, unlike journals such as the thoroughly mainstream Compass and the 
liberal leaning Survey, clearly placed itself at odds with the social work profession: 
[Social Work Today] aims to meet the need for a frank, critical 
analysis ofbasic social problems and their relation to social work 
not obtainable through established professional channels. Its 
province will be all of social welfare. It will promote an interest in 
the fundamental reorganization society must undergo to provide 
security for all, and will support labor's struggle for a greater 
measure of control as the basic condition for the reorganization.59 
In staking Social Work Today's claim as an alternative voice within the profession, 
the editorial attempted to locate the economic and political bases for the emergence 
of the rank and file movement in social work: 
Under the cumulative pressure of four years ofcontinuous contact 
with the victims ofour chaotic social order, some have learned to 
question the traditional dogmas of the profession and to examine 
critically the shibboleths of 'awareness,' 'bearing witness,' 'social 
engineering,' and 'community integration.' They are painfully 
aware ofmany things that do not submit to awareness. They 
wonder who is doing the engineering and whether it is social. 
They suspect that talk ofcommunity engineering is a pleasant 
fiction to hide the ugliness of our class society. They are sick of 
merely bearing witness. 
There is a growing body which is applying in another spirit the 
charge to all social workers, to know their clients and to help them 
free themselves. They have heard the voice of labor speak 
compellingly in its own behalf. They are coming to feel that 
whatever skill and knowledge they may have can be put to most 
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effective use supporting by publicity and action the organization of 
labor and its fight for adequate relief and social insurance. 60 
Indeed, the first issue of the journal took seriously the editorial's promise of a 
"frank" analysis regarding social crises and the profession, marking its debut as a 
continual thorn in the side of the mainstream profession.61 Its lead article presented a 
satirical and critical account of a recent AASW conference convened to define the 
organization's position regarding federal relief policies. Taking pains to note for 
readers that the conference had no apparent intention of deciding on such positions, 
the article acridly described the AASW participants as " ... predominantly middle-
aged, predominantly women, predominantly executives. Most the talking is done by 
the men. The women take notes. ,,62 
Noting a contentious exchange on the fate of the Civil Works Administration 
between Harry Lurie and "lean and cocksure" FERA administrator Harry Hopkins, 
the article highlights Lurie's admonition to the conference that applause for Hopkins 
should not be taken as support ofgovernment reliefprograms.63 The article 
concludes its account, whimsically describing the conference's adjournment: 
Finis. The Committee on recommendations reports in the evening, 
but why stay, people ask, it's all over. Delegates sit about in the 
lobby and gossip. Shall we take the seven 0'clock train or the 
eight 0' clock? The women with the bleached hair and velvet 
wraps pass through to dinner. 64 
Other articles of a more serious tone reported on the National Convention Against 
Unemployment, a report of the Joint Committee on Unemployment's statement 
before Congress in support ofmassive increases in federal relief efforts, issues of 
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racism within the programs of the National Recovery Act and a briefhistory of 
unionization efforts in social work.65 
The appearance ofSocial Work Today received mixed reviews from rival 
professional journals. While the publication ofSocial Work Today was ignored in 
the pages of Compass, Survey noted in its arrival in its ApriI-1934 issue: 
There are undoubtedly in this troubled land many social workers 
even among the 'predominantly middle-aged, predominantly 
women' at whom SOCIAL WORK TODAY takes a little fling, who 
'are sick ofmerely bearing witness.' They will find in SOCIAL 
WORK TODAY a forthright expression of their impatience and of 
their pressure-mindedness.66 
The other major journal in the field, Social Service Review, took a more welcoming 
stance: 
An active group ofNew York social workers are to be 
congratulated in having organized for the publication of a new 
professional journal. This magazine is to appear monthly and 
should be an asset to a profession in which, as yet, so small a 
periodical literature has been developed. The Review shares with 
other social workers an appreciation for their undertaking. A new 
publication in these days, calls for courage, and the New York 
group has shown that courage is not lacking.67 
Through the pages ofSocial Work Today, the incipient rank and file 
movement would develop and express its program ofunionism and progressive 
social change. From an initial circulation of 1,000, the journal would increase its 
subscription base to nearly 5,000 by 1936 as discussion clubs and union members 
sold SUbscriptions and raised funds for its operation.68 Opening its pages to both the 
left wing of the profession and the representatives of the Unemployed Councils, the 
Socialist and Communist parties, and organized labor, the journal tackled a broad 
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range of social and political issues and causes. In later years, the journal's critical 
analysis would lead it and the social work unions it represented to be condemned by 
both congressional investigators and influential members of the profession as 
controlled by the Communist Party, charges that would help lay the groundwork for 
the eventual destruction of the rank and file movement. 
The Rank and File Organizes 
With the rapid proliferation of social work unions nationwide, the presence of 
numerous discussion clubs and practitioner groups, and a new journal representing 
the cause ofprogressive social work unionism, leaders within the rank and file 
movement laid plans for the development of a national organization in 1934. Rank 
and file activists attending the 1934 NCSW voted to create a National Coordinating 
Committee (NCC) of social work unions, charging the publishers ofSocial Work 
Today with planning and coordination ofa meeting to form the organization.69 
Following the conference, the executive committee of the New York Social Workers 
Discussion Club polled rank and file groups throughout the country seeking their 
opinions on the role of such a national coordinating body, suggesting procedures for 
its development and operation, and soliciting participation at a founding convention. 
In December 1934 the club issued a formal call for a February 1935 conference in 
Pittsburgh. In its call, the club outlined the proposed functions of the NCe: 
The dissemination of information and advice on practitioner activities. 

The promotion ofprotective organizations and discussion clubs. 

The promotion of rank and file sentiment for adequate standards 

for workers in public agencies. 
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The promotion ofrank and file sentiment for adequate social 

welfare standards. 

The coordination ofpractitioner activities at National 

Conferences.70 

The first national convention ofrank and file groups opened its three-day 
meeting on February 22 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. A report from the conference's 
credentials committee recorded 45 delegates representing 30 organizations. 
Seventeen of the represented groups were identified as protective organizations 
(unions), six as discussion clubs, four were classified as practitioner groups, and 
three groups represented unemployed councils or other organizations. The total 
membership represented in these 30 groups was impressive, totaling 8,810. 
Delegates clearly represented the direct service orientation of the unions; 32 of the 
delegates were caseworkers (19 from public agencies and 13 from private agencies), 
with the rest consisting of supervisors, clerical workers, research workers and 
unemployed delegates.71 
At the opening session, delegates were treated to the reading of formal 
greetings from organizations that could not attend as well as the ideological leaders 
of the movement. Mary van Kleeck's message congratulated the convention, 
callings its efforts"...ofgreat importance when social workers must relate 
themselves to industrial workers and those in other professions in united program for 
social security.,,72 Bertha Reynolds assured delegates in her message that " ... the 
convention is certain to make history. It is for you who are facing the issues of this 
critical time most courageously to shape the future of social work.,,73 True to his 
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explicit politics, Roger Baldwin's remarks particularly stirred the delegates: 
"Warmest greetings to those of you who are carrying on a vital job begun by pioneer 
social workers in the class struggle. We were few those days. You are many and 
may you be many more.,,74 
Over the next three days, delegates laid the foundation for a new national 
body, the National Coordinating Committee ofRank and File Groups in Social Work 
(NCC). The NCC was conceived as a center for the exchange and coordination of 
information and advise on the organization of rank and file unions, to advocate for 
adequate relief standards and public works programs, and to coordinate 
" ... cooperative action with organized labor in their struggles for the right to 
collective bargaining, and for the defense of civil liberties. ,,75 A committee to lead 
the activities of the NCC was also established consisting of Jacob Fisher as 
Chairman, David Kanes of the Philadelphia County Relief Board Employees 
Association as eastern regional vice-chairman, Joseph Levy of the Chicago 
Federation of Social Service Employees, midwestern regional vice-chair, and 
Bernard Riback, president ofNew York's EHRB Employees Association as 
Secretary.76 
Reflecting the rank and file movement's primary concerns with workplace 
security and the face ofpublic relief policies, considerable debate went into the 
adoption of related reports and recommendations. In their report, "A National Social 
Welfare Program," the convention decried the inadequacy ofNew Deal programs, 
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accusing the Roosevelt administration ofabandoning the needs ofthe unemployed to 
satisfy the desires ofbusiness: 
The social security program of the Administration proceeds upon 
the basis of 'sound caution' and consideration of the 'capacity of 
industry to pay,' rather than upon a true evaluation of the needs of 
the workers ofAmerica.77 
The report equally, but less directly, criticized the AASW and the mainstream of the 
profession for its general support of the New Deal and its remoteness from the 
victims of the Depression: 
Will social workers, as a large professional group, remain aloof 
from ... a people's movement? The attempts they have made to 
introduce proposals without the active participation of those who 
have the most to gain from them, have proved to be either impotent 
or deliberately misleading. The critical nature of the problem of 
insecurity with which the American people is faced, will 
increasingly force social workers to take sides.78 
The report concluded with a summary of the rank and file's estimation of the 
fundamental nature of the economic crisis: 
The underlying conflict broadly is between Labor and Capital. 
Social workers should seek to understand fully the nature of this 
contlict, the economic and political power that goes with the 
concentrated control ofwealth, and the sometimes brutal forms 
through which wealth defends itself. Unparalleled economic 
power yields only to economic pressure. Labor, by force of 
necessity, finds itself in the front line trenches in the struggle for 
security.79 
Convention delegates were equally strident in their demands for the right of 
workers to engage in collective bargaining in public and private social welfare 
agencies. Condemning the growing phenomenon of retrenchment in both sectors, 
the convention established a program for its unions, including: open hearings for 
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workers threatened with dismissal; mandatory yearly salary increases; the principle 
of equal pay for equal work; adequate housing and working conditions in agencies; 
the abolition ofcompulsory overtime and quotas; reductions in caseloads; and 
minimum standards for vacation, sick leave, and maternity leave. Finally, the 
program established the primacy ofunions, not professional associations, in ensuring 
adequate working conditions: 
The Convention recognizes as primary in importance the 
employer-employee relationship between rank and file social 
workers and administrative authorities and executives. Workers in 
social agencies are subject to the same economic hazards as 
workers in industry and commerce. This is equally true of 
professional and non-professional workers in social agencies. We 
therefore endorse the principle ofprotective or§anization as the 
most effective method of attaining these ends.8 
In addition to these major reports, the convention adopted a number of 
resolutions, including support of the Lundeen Bill on unemployment and social 
insurance, funding ofa new Federal Works Program, and support of legislation to 
allow collective bargaining in all federally-funded agencies and programs. 
Condemning recent dismissals ofa number of social workers involved in union 
organizing, the convention called upon FERA to investigate the circumstances of 
these dismissals and prevent what they considered discrimination based on union 
involvement. Finally, the convention adopted a resolution opposing all forms of 
racial discrimination and directed the NCC to hold all future meetings in facilities 
with non-discrimination policies in regard to meetings, sleeping quarters, and dining 
accommodations.,,81 
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As the Pittsburgh convention came to a close, delegates might have reflected 
on the dramatic changes that had occurred in the profession in a period ofjust five 
years. The relative confidence and complacency in the profession of 1929 had been 
shaken to its core, its hold on the field of social welfare now under challenge 
externally and internally. From the outside, a dramatic shift from private charity to 
public reliefhad undennined the profession's hegemony over both reliefpolicy and 
practices. Internally, a new group of social workers had arisen to challenge 
traditional conceptions of the professional social worker and of the relationship of 
social workers to their employers, now successfully organizing a national 
organization ofnearly 9,000 members. And when rank and file delegates would 
convene for their second national convention in 1936, their ranks would swell to 
some 12,000. While not all the members of the affiliated organizations of the NCC 
were social workers, the rank and file movement now could claim a membership 
larger than that of the AASW (which did not achieve a membership of over 10,000 
until 1940).82 
For the leaders of the profession, they could find comfort in the close alliance 
they had attained with the Roosevelt administration through the presence ofHarry 
Hopkins, Frances Perkins, Ewan Clague and other leading social workers in the New 
Deal brain trust. While the primary responsibility ofrelief had now shifted from the 
private sector to the federal government, at least the AASW had a place at the table. 
But as the rank and file movement began to assert the power ofboth its numbers and 
its critique of the profession, there were reasons for continuing concern. For those 
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who read the open letter to social workers from the NCC, distributed at the 1933 
NCSW and published in Social Work Today, the threat may have appeared quite real 
indeed: 
We appeal not only to the rank and file in this letter, but to all 
social workers who value their professional integrity and who seek, 
above all, to have it grounded in the welfare of the 
American ... peoples. There are tasks which you cannot shirk, tasks 
for all social workers inside and outside the rank and file 
movement who cannot accept a program ofreduction in the 
standard of living of the people of... America; who stand fast 
against attacks on civil liberties; against racial discrimination; 
against all devices leading to fascism in America, whether open or 
disguised. 
There are organizations thorough which you can play an important 
role, the American Association of Social Workers, state and local 
conferences, the various other professional groups in the field of 
social work. You can do much to align these organizations into a 
common front with us against the forces of reaction and despair. 
The road for unity on our common issues is very great. 83 
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CHAPTER 4: 

THE RANK AND FILE VS. THE PROFESSION 

Professionalism: An attitude characterized by a morbid concern with 
the advantages which accrue from a state ofsuspended 
animation ... The term professionalism describes the unwillingness of 
the old-time leadership ofthe professions to engage in any action 
which might bring them in line with changes in the social setting. In 
social work it includes opposition to union organization and to 
protest. l (Social Work Today) 
As delegates to the 1934 National Conference of Social Work gathered for 
their annual meeting in Kansas City a mixed mood filled the air. The country was 
suffering through its fifth year ofthe economic depression, and any hopes that 
President Roosevelt's New Deal would bring a quick end to the crisis were now 
seemingly illusory. A year before, the NCSW conference in Detroit enjoyed an air 
ofheady optimism as Harry Hopkins, one of social work's own and an architect in 
Roosevelt's recovery program, headlined the conference with the promise ofbetter 
times. Now, while proud of their representation and influence within the 
administration, social workers in Kansas City were groping for a sense ofdirection: 
The glowing enthusiasm with which they had left the Detroit 
meeting a year before was cold and dead. Qualified promises 
could no longer stir them. Dreams had been lost in confusion and 
they saw nothing ahead but hard reality. 2 
Still, the leadership of the NCSW and the AASW were loyal to the President's 
recovery program, and the conference agenda was replete with presentations from 
New Dealers such as Rexford Tugwell, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, and one 
of the members ofRoosevelt's New Deal brain trust, Harry Hopkins, administrator 
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ofthe Federal Emergency Relief Administration and Aubrey Williams, assistant 
administrator ofFERA. Indeed, just three months earlier Roosevelt had sent 
greetings to an AASW sponsored Conference on Governmental Objectives in which 
he promised " ... social workers and I have the same objectives in common - social 
justice for everyone.,,3 Accordingly, the conference planning committee and NCSW 
President William Hodson, a close colleague ofHopkins and director of the New 
York City Home Relief Bureau, had crafted the conference to buttress the 
profession's partnership with the administration's New Deal. The conference, 
recalled Bertha Reynolds, 
... promised to be a New Deal Conference ... Many social workers 
felt that, with our profession represented in the cabinet by Harry 
Hopkins and Frances Perkins, we had arrived and could give 
leadership in welfare matters which had hitherto been denied to 
4 
us. 
And as the conference got underway Tugwell invoked the New Deal spirit, calling 
on social workers to cont~nue their support of the administration, even if the 
expected outcomes were now more limited: 
I would see you enlisted as soldiers not in a new cause but in an 
old one. I would ask your loyalty not to a new faith but to an old 
one which is struggling to return to a lost democracy; it is trying to 
do it through a discipline of groups which opposes the 
individual...The most you can do for people is to discipline the 
institutions and forces which are inimical to the individual and so 
to provide freedom of action. You cannot forever go on providing 
subsistence for the idle at government expense. 5 
But neither Tugwell, Hopkins or the conference planners were prepared for the 
events of the following day. 
132 
Once again, Mary van Kleeck would challenge the profession in a 
presentation, entitled "Our Illusions Regarding Government." Interest in van Kleeck 
and her presentation had been building up prior to and during the conference. In 
1933, van Kleeck had startled the profession when she responded to her appointment 
on the President's Advisory Council of the United States Labor Service by resigning 
at its first meeting, citing her opposition to what she considered the anti-union 
character of the National Recovery Administration (NRA). From her position as 
chair of the subcommittee on labor policy for the American Civil Liberties Union, 
van Kleeck had also recently written Roosevelt on behalf ofthe organization 
expressing its opposition to the NRA. In addition to her criticism ofthe NRA, van 
. Kleeck' s outspoken support for the rank and file movement was well know within 
the profession, as was her even more controversial and frank admiration of the 
Soviet Union and its national planning system. Following a visit to the Soviet Union 
in 1932, van Kleeck had published glowing reports on Soviet national planning 
efforts in professional journals and in the pages ofSoviet Russia Today, drawing the 
ire ofmany in the profession'S leadership.6 
The backdrop ofinterest in van Kleeck's presentation was intensified the 
second morning of the conference. The day before, van Kleeck had addressed a 
meeting of the Urban League, and morning newspapers contained reports ofher 
admonition to the League that its middle-class composition could not provide 
leadership to the masses ofblack workers.7 As the conference session now got 
underway a correspondent from Survey noted the degree of anticipation: 
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Everything that happened afterward at the Conference must be 
viewed in light of the psychology engendered at the meeting on 
May 22 when 1500 people jammed into a hall half designed for a 
third that number, blocked aisles and exits, and equally endangered 
themselves in their determination to hear Miss van Kleeck discuss 
Our Illusions Regarding Government. 8 
van Kleeck did not disappoint the audience, focusing her remarks on what she 
considered two prevailing theories regarding the form of government. van Kleeck 
described the first theory as a mistaken belief that the state was a benign institution 
apart from transitory conflicting interests and ultimately reflective ofdemocratic 
governance in the betterment of the public good, a theory to which van Kleeck 
ascribed the misguided loyalty ofmost social workers and which characterized the 
political agendas of the profession. Calling such beliefs an illusion, van Kleeck 
argued that, in fact, a second theory of government better described the current 
situation in the United States: government serves and is an instrument of the 
strongest economic powers in a nation. In the case of the United States, van Kleeck 
argued that the power ofcapital so dominated government functioning that the 
primary interest of government was the protection of the interests ofbig business: 
The basic conflict of interest between labor and capital is too clear 
to need proof here. Our illusions regarding government arise out 
of a refusal to recognize these conflicts. They assume that the 
government is above the struggle and that if social workers can 
win the government to their program they will have done their part 
in establishing that elusive thing we call 'social justice.,9 
As van Kleeck expounded on her thesis that the inadequacy ofNew Deal relief 
programs represented the administration's collusion with business over the interests 
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ofworkers, she concluded with an attack on the profession's close alliance with the 
Roosevelt administration: 
Social workers are accepting important positions in various 
branches ofgovernment in this country. Those ofyou who believe 
that that is the way you can best serve must look well to the 
significance ofmass protests which are disturbing your working 
hours. Will social workers continue to bear the brunt of these 
protests against politicians in alliance with the property 
interests ... or will social workers rather look upon themselves as 
spokesmen for these protests ... A clearer view will inevitably lead 
to some refusals to take governmental positions if these demand, as 
many do, that social workers ... will work as apologists for the 
government of the day . 
...social workers need alignment with other workers, not drawing 
their inspiration from the relation ofsocial worker to client, but 
rather identifying themselves as fellow-workers ... not tempered to 
the 'temper' of the administration and Congress but to the needs of 
the working people, whose standards of living should be the 
primary and indeed sole concern of all branches of social work. to 
The audience response to van Kleeck was, according to Survey correspondent 
Gertrude Springer, "electric": 
The younger and more volatile rose as to a trumpet-call. The 
soberest were shaken. Even the numbers who only faintly knew 
what it was all about reacted in a way that can only be described as 
a shot in the arm. From that moment a good part of the 
Conference threw its earlier concerns to the winds and went off in 
full cry behind leaders ofone gospel or another. I I 
Reaction from the conference organizers was swift. The following day, 
Conference President William Hodson, in an act unprecedented in NCSW history, 
issued a public rebuke ofvan Kleeck's assault upon the New Deal. Objecting to van 
Kleeck's call for delegates to "repudiate" the Roosevelt administration, Hodson 
made his position clear, "I, for one, am still willing to throw my lot with the present 
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national administration, reserving always the right to differ and to criticize as a 
friend and not as an enemy.,,12 Harry Hopkins also responded to van Kleeck's 
speech, declaring "We who serve the government have no apologies to make," and, 
in response to a question regarding what political strategies the profession should 
engage in declared, "Before becoming very convinced of the brand ofpolitical action 
to adopt we need group study and discussion.,,13 
Under the leadership ofvan Kleeck, rank and file social workers vied for 
ideological domination of the conference. Buoyed by their recent successes in 
organizing unions in public relief agencies, they made their presence known in 
plenary sessions and ad-hoc meetings. Following Hodson's condemnation ofvan 
Kleeck, rank and file delegates organized a rump session attended by nearly 1,000 
conference delegates voting to censure Hodson. They again turned out in force when 
van Kleeck responded to Hodson in a second speech, "Common Goals of Social 
Work and Labor." In a final session on the impact of the NRA, van Kleeck held the 
floor alone as her two co-presenters, John Frey of the AFL and Frances Haas of the 
National Labor Board failed to appear. Reiterating her opposition to the NRA, van 
Kleeck warned her audience that the nature of the NRA represented a " ...corporation­
controlled form of labor organization under the Fascism which has been evolving 
within the framework of the New Deal.,,14 
The controversies so apparent at the Kansas City NCSW served to clearly 
demarcate the growing differences between the programs and philosophies of the 
rank and file movement and those of the mainstream of the profession. These 
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differences would constitute sharply diverging views regarding both the New Deal 
and the form and function of the profession. The rank and file's emphasis on 
unionization and identification with the industrial workers movement would place it 
far to the left of the mainstream profession in its initial opposition to the New Deal 
and its active support of left and progressive causes over the next decade. The labor 
orientation of the movement would similarly challenge the traditionally professional 
and politically neutral definition of social work that many in the movement saw as 
representative ofthe AASW and much of the profession's leadership. 
The Rank and File in the New Deal 
The left progressive political analysis that informed the participants of the 
early discussion clubs moved with them into the emerging rank and file movement of 
the early 1930s and the unions in which they often assumed leadership. Guided by 
the radical politics of the movement's mentors such as Roger Baldwin and Mary van 
Kleeck, and nurtured in the close alliance of the unions with left leaning 
organizations of the unemployed, a burgeoning peace movement and more radical 
expressions of the civil rights movement, the initial response of the rank and file 
movement to the New Deal was decidedly hostile. 
Mary van Kleeck's warning to social workers at the 1934 NCSW conference 
on the collusion between business and the government exemplified the general tenor 
of the rank and file movement's early reactions to the programs of the New Deal. 
While initially supporting federal responsibility for relief efforts, rank and file 
leaders soon characterized what they considered the meager programs of the New 
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Deal as evidence of a growing trend towards social fascism in the United States. The 
pages ofSocial Work Today in 1934 and 1935 were replete with articles by the 
movement's leaders warning social workers of the dangers of this creeping fascism 
as represented in the NRA, military control of the Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC) and the administration's reluctance to embrace the right ofworkers to 
collectively bargain. IS In Social Work Today's second issue, editor Jacob Fisher 
summarized the movement's position: 
As big industry moves into closer alliance with the state to retain 
its strangle hold upon the nation, liberalism translates its historic 
belief in man as a free agent into contemporary terms and demands 
the end of laissez-faire, playing into the hands ofbig industry. 
Behind the call for the abundant life the slow fascization of 
American economic life matures and takes hold ... We are today in a 
period ofdeclining capitalism and fascism fits the mood better. 
Creature of a middle-class that espoused liberalism ... and will turn 
to fascism tomorrow, social work cannot escape the fundamental 
realignments that society is undergoing today. 16 
Echoing Fisher, Eduard Lindeman also warned the journal's readers that the choices 
before them were stark: 
For our period ofhistory the two major polarizations are 
Communism on the one hand and Fascism on the other. The 
Fascist pattern is dominated wherever it appears by the open 
dictatorship ofbig industry which finds it necessary to take over 
the apparatus of the state to strengthen its hold on a shaky social 
and economic structure. And since Fascism represents in essence 
only another phase ofcapitalism [unemployment] continues in all 
its severity.I7 
The warnings of van Kleeck, Fisher and Lindeman concerning the threat of 
fascism inherent within the New Deal closely mirrored the position of the 
Communist Party during its so-called "third period," raising early questions among 
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some in the AASW that the movement was in the "Communist camp.,,18 Such 
concerns had some merit. In fact, the origins ofwhat would be referred to as the 
social fascist theories of the early 1930s were directly traced from the Comintern's 
Tenth Plenum held in Moscow in 1929. Proclaiming that the revolutionary 
movement had passed through a period ofrevolutionary upsurge between 1917 ­
1924, followed by a second period of capitalism's temporary stabilization, the 
Comintern now determined that a third period had emerged. This new period 
marked the worldwide economic crisis of capitalism that would, in the Comintern' s 
estimation, led to both capitalism's increasing tendency towards fascism and anti-
imperialist revolution among the working class. Declaring the theories ofsocial 
democracy as supported by the Socialist Party and liberal bourgeois democracy a 
disguised form of fascism, the Comintern directed communist parties to prioritize 
attacks on this new form of social fascism. 19 
As the American Communist Party declared a period of "class against class" 
in 1929, it condemned the Socialist Party and the AFL leadership as enemies of the 
working class, established the TUUL to lead opposition to the AFL, and attacked 
Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas as the leading "social fascist" in the 
country.20 With the election ofFranklin Roosevelt in 1932, the party applied its 
theory of social fascism to the New Deal, as party leader Earl Browder declared: 
It is clear that that fascism already finds much of its work done in 
America, and more of this is being done by Roosevelt. .. In the labor 
sections of the New Deal program [are] to be seen the clearest 
examples of the tendencies to fascism ... For the working class, the 
Industrial Recovery Act is truly an industrial slavery act. It is one 
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of the steps towards the militarization of labor. It is the forerunner 
ofAmerican fascism.21 
The apparent alignment of the rank and file movement's criticisms of the 
New Deal with the pronouncements of the Communist Party was more than 
rhetorical. Mary van Kleeck's association with the TUUL and the presence ofparty 
members in the rank and file unions clearly predisposed the movement towards at 
least partial agreement with the Communist's political platfonn. As rank and file 
activist and Communist Party member Margaret Levy recalls, 
The rank and file weren't a product of the party, but certainly 
many in the unions and in Social Work Today were members or 
close to us. The Communist's provided the clearest explanation of 
why capitalism was failing and why Roosevelt, Hopkins and all 
that crew couldn't lead us out of the Depression. Tp.ose ofus who 
were members obviously supported the party's line, but we didn't 
dominate or control the movement. You need to remember that 
what we were saying wasn't considered by everyone as 
unreasonable or the ravings of a group ofcrazies. Lots ofpeople 
came to similar conclusions independent ofus.22 
Indeed, the political landscape of the both the rank and file movement and the 
American left during the 1930s reflected the convergence ofmany tendencies that 
reflected to various degrees agreement with the political line of the Communist 
Party. But these tendencies reflected not only the analysis of the Communist's, but 
as well those of the Socialist Party and numerous other organizations that were 
anarchist or Trotskyist in orientation. Nor were the Communists, Socialists or the 
social work rank and file the only ones who had become disenchanted with the New 
Deal by late 1933 and early 1934. Even liberal, non-Communist journals such as 
The Nation, New Republic and Common Sense which had hailed the election of 
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Roosevelt and the implementation of the New Deal, became increasingly critical of 
Roosevelt's failures. The editors ofThe Nation expressed their disappointment that 
the administration's attempts to kick-start industry was being done at the expense of 
workers, employing little more than a strategy of"...trickle down from the top" and 
achieving little fundamental change in the economic arrangements that brought about 
the Depression.23 In a similar vein, the New Republic expressed its concern with the 
mixed results of the New Deal, criticizing Roosevelt for trying to mediate in the 
conflict between labor and capital rather than taking the side of one or the other.24 
But unlike these liberal journals, Social Work Today was noted in particular for its 
close agreement with the Communist Party's pronouncements, a fact not lost upon 
the profession's leadership.25 
Besides sharing a fear ofcreeping fascism within the programs of the New 
Deal, the rank and file movement and the Communist Party were equally allied in 
their calls for passage ofnational unemployment insurance. The legislative 
centerpiece of the Communist Party was the Worker's Unemployment and Social 
Insurance Bill, introduced in Congress by Minnesota Representative Ernest Lundeen 
in early 1934. Drafted by the Communist Party with the assistance ofMary van 
Kleeck, the "Lundeen Bill," as it was popularly referred to, was strongly supported 
by the Communist Party, the National Unemployment Council, the Workers Alliance 
and a broad coalition ofunions and progressive organizations.26 Reintroduced in 
1935, the Lundeen Bill called for the establishment ofunemployment insurance 
" ... for all workers and fanners ... unemployed through no fault of their own," to be 
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administered by and controlled by " ... unemployment insurance commissions directly 
elected by members ofworker's and farmer's organizations.,,27 The bill also 
authorized the development ofsocial insurance plans for those unable to work 
because of" ... sickness, old age, maternity, industrial injury, or any other 
disability.,,28 
Social Work Today and rank and file social work unions lined up in support 
of the Lundeen Bill in 1934 and 1935, passing resolutions calling for its passage by 
Congress. To publicly demonstrate support, eleven social work unions and 
discussion clubs sent delegates to the national Congress for Unemployment and 
Social Insurance held in New York City in January, 1935. The Congress, called by 
the NUC, attracted an audience ofover 3,000, representing unemployed councils, 
unions and other organizations in forty states calling for enactment of the Lundeen 
bill. Among the speakers greeting delegates were Communist Party leader Earl 
Browder, T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban League, Representative Ernest 
Lundeen and Mary van Kleeck.29 As the conference met to outline the demands of 
the unemployed, rank and file social workers, including Jacob Fisher, were 
appointed by the convention to be part ofa delegation sent to meet with FERA 
officials. After being informed that Harry Hopkins was ill, the delegates met with 
FERA Assistant Administrator, Aubrey Williams. An article in Social Work Today 
captured some ofwhat transpired: 
One by one elected spokesmen step forward to voice the demands 
of their group. A representative of the Public Relief Investigators 
Association ofMinneapolis, sent to Washington to convey to the 
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Congress and to the Administration their support of the Workers 
Bill. Another relief worker from Philadelphia, who reads a set of 
fifteen resolutions adopted by a caucus ofworkers in public and 
private social agencies ... demanded recognition ofthe right to 
organize, rank and file control ofwork projects, adequate wages, a 
socially useful works program, the cessation ofthe use of force 
against the unemployed, the enactment ofthe Workers Bill. 
Another relief worker, this time a Negro from the Home Relief 
Bureau in New York, protesting racial differentials in relief, 
distribution ofjobs and wages .... 
IfWilliams is struck with the appearance of staffmembers of relief 
agencies on the delegation he doesn't show it. He is in fact a bit 
impatient. He asks, are you all 'our' people? ..The hearing is over. 
The delegates leave their documents, their reports and resolutions 
with Williams. He piles them together, says they'll be looked 
into.3o 
Following the Congress, delegates at the rank and file's first NCC conference 
formally endorsed the Lundeen Bill and prioritized its passage in the work of its 
constituent unions.31 
The rank and file's support of the Lundeen Bill was organizationally 
channeled through activities of the Inter-Professional Association for Unemployment 
Insurance (IP A), which was primarily responsible for organizing the social work and 
other professional delegates who attended the Congress for Unemployment and 
Social Insurance. Founded in 1934, the IP A was organized by Mary van Kleeck to 
provide a base for professionals and their organizations to promote passage of the 
bill. In early 1934, van Kleeck published an open letter in the Bulletin ofthe 
Federation ofArchitects, Chemists, Engineers, and Technicians and Social Work 
Today calling for the formation of the IP A and soliciting membership. van Kleeck 
outlined the need for and purposes of the organization in the letter: 
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... 
The urgent need for unemployment insurance is the immediate 
reason for such an organization ... A Professional Workers' 
Association such as is proposed would be composed of interested 
individuals, employed and unemployed, whose first tasks would be 
study, conference with industrial workers, and fonnulation of 
programs of action in co-operation with trade unions and 
organizations of the unemployed.32 
Chaired by van Kleeck, the IP A included the well known psychiatrist Frankwood E. 
Williams as treasurer, Jacob Fisher as secretary and an executive committee 
composed of editor and publisher Kyle Crichton, economist Joseph Gillman, Herbert 
Benjamin of the National Unemployment Council, architect Percival Goodman and 
dramatist Elmer Rice. The IP A quickly organized some fifteen chapters throughout 
the country, and by the time of its first national conference boasted a membership of 
over 1,000. Members of the IPA were prominent in congressional hearings on the 
Lundeen Bill, providing testimony supporting both its constitutionality and its 
economic feasibility. Following the passage of the Wagner-Lewis Act, which 
contained the Roosevelt administration's program for unemployment and social 
insurance, the IP A refocused its efforts to support a broad array ofprogressive social 
and labor-related legislation by providing expert testimony before Congress by its 
members. But the defeat of the Lundeen Bill had effectively stripped the IPA of its 
primary tool for cross-profession organization, and it subsequently disbanded in 
1937.33 
The rank and file movement's strident criticism of the New Deal and its 
insistence on an unemployment insurance scheme, as outlined in the Lundeen Bill, 
greatly contributed to the deepening and contentious relationship that existed 
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between the movement and the AASW. Following the chaos of the 1934 NCSW, the 
disagreements between the AASW and the rank and file intensified as the AASW 
Committee to Outline a National Social Welfare Program met in the fall. Charged 
by the AASW with developing " ... general social principles considered as basic in 
planning a national social welfare program," the committee quickly splintered as it 
members argued over the merits of a "maximum" program put forth by committee 
chair Harry Lurie and Mary van Kleeck and a "minimum" program supported by the 
majority of the committee, including AASW president Dorothy Kahn, Grace Abbott, 
Ewan Clague and Linton Swift, executive director of the Family Welfare 
Association.34 The maximum program ofvan Kleeck and Lurie called for the 
development of a national program of social insurance based on "mass need" as 
opposed to individual insurance.35 Based on the principles of the Lundeen Bill, van 
Kleeck and Lurie advocated a national insurance program that would cover"... all 
unemployment, whatever the cause - industrial changes, occupational accidents, 
sickness, maternity, or old age.,,36 To fund the program, Lurie and van Kleeck 
advocated the use of income taxes, " ... thus demanding at once a redistribution of 
national income to the extent that continued unemployment requires divergence of 
funds from higher incomes to compensate for loss ofwages.,,37 While calling for a 
national program ofpublic works, van Kleeck and Lurie cautioned that to date such 
programs had been directed primarily towards ''unproductive tasks" by the Roosevelt 
administration.38 To remedy this they argued that a planned economy must be put in 
place: 
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A national social welfare program must of course face the fact that 
proposals for social insurance at this time cannot hope to do more 
than compensate for unemployment. They cannon constitute 
'employment insurance' nor establish economic security. Security 
which would eliminate the hazards of fluctuations in business 
traceable to the anarchy ofproduction under private ownership can 
be established only by the substitution of social economic planning 
for the ownership which by its results has proved its inability to 
maintain security. 39 
In contrast to the proposals ofLurie and van Kleeck, the minimum program 
supported by the rest of the committee outlined a proposal resembling the prevailing 
reliefprograms of the administration. Calling for a federal "Department ofPublic 
Welfare," proponents of the minimum program recommended the government 
continue through this new department to provide grants to states which would 
administer and provide relief, develop standards of eligibility and require "trained 
personnel" to administer relief programs.40 The minimum program recommended 
that unemployment compensation be set below actual wages on the job and that 
reliefbe provided only on the basis ofdemonstrated need: " ... advocates ofthis view 
hold that the primary responsibility for taking care of his needs shall, however, 
remain with the individual and his immediate family with public responsibility to be 
considered as secondary and supplementary.,,41 
As Lurie drafted the report of the Committee to submit to the AASW's 
Division ofGovernment and Social Work, open dissension within the committee 
erupted in a series ofcommunications between committee members. Ewan Clague 
expressed concern that the stance ofLurie and van Kleeck called for socialism, and 
other supporters of the minimum program believed the report should emphasize 
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public welfare programs, not systems of social insurance. Calling the maximum 
program "the impossible program," AASW President Dorothy Kahn labeled Lurie's 
report "biased," and after consultation with Kahn, Grace Abbott, Linton Swift and 
other members of the committee, AASW Executive Secretary Walter West 
responded on January 26, 1935 to Lurie's report, declaring: 
there is ample evidence that this document does not represent the 
considered views ofyour Committee ...it seems to me that the 
problem which your statement has raised for the Conference 
management and for the chapters is one which involves a totally 
different ap,groach to that which we have to consider with current 
programs ... 
Three days later, the Steering Committee of the Division on Government and Social 
Work voted to not accept Lurie's summary of the two programs and agreed that 
separate memos from the differing camps would be sent to chapters prior to a 
planned conference to take up the report. However, as the conference date 
approached, the steering committee reversed course, deciding to withhold 
publication or distribution of the draft reports.43 
As Lurie and van Kleeck complained ofcensorship by the AASW, rumors of 
a dispute between a left and right wing in the committee circulated among AASW 
chapters prior to the March conference. On the morning that the conference got 
underway, AASW officials finally agreed to the release ofLurie's report.44 Lurie 
outlined the differences between the maximum and minimum programs to 
conference delegates and a debate ensued. Declaring the minimum program a 
"glorified poor law," Lurie and van Kleeck defended their maximum program and 
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the merits of the Lundeen Bill, while defenders of the minimum program argued its 
reasoned improvements within the framework of the current relief system.4S 
Following two days ofdiscussion, Social Work Today reported that the conference 
ended in confusion as final revisions to the conference report, now supporting the 
minimum program were debated and voted upon: 
, We regard as a great social advance,' says the report, 'the 
acceptance by the present federal administration of the principle of 
governmental responsibility for economic security.' Immediately 
there is objection from the floor ... The statement is amended to 
convey the deep disappointment ofmany delegates with the 
inadequacy of the proposal to meet the vital needs of the 
unemployed. The resolution declaring against discrimination in 
employment practices also fails to appear. Some one makes a 
point of it and it goes into the Report ... In discussing the 
administration's program the Report stated that 'a majority' of 
those present regarded it as a great social advance, whereas no 
actual report had been taken and the word used at the meeting had 
been "some. ,,46 
Tensions between the AASW and the rank and file movement continued to 
deepen as the Roosevelt administration announced plans in 1935 to reduce federal 
commitments to direct relief with the tennination ofFERA and the further 
development ofwork relief programs in the Works Progress Administration. As the 
AASW considered calling a national delegate conference to advocate for the 
-continuation of direct relief, concerns mounted over the possible influence of the 
rank and file on the conference, particularly in light of the Kansas City NCSW. 
While rank and file unions joined protests ofunemployed councils and were well 
represented at the Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance, the AASW 
sought a more moderate course. Internal debate over the nature and purpose of the 
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conference reflected the association's fear of the rank and file, as Grace Marcus 
urged the AASW to restrict the rank and file's possible influence: "I don't think that 
group should be given the floor or allowed to speak so much this year.,,47 
The reverberations of the 1934 NCSW conference and the first national rank 
and file conference also continued to color the relationship between the mainstream 
of the profession and the movement. Survey solicited and published a sharp 
rejoinder to Mary van Kleeck's remarks at the conference. Entitled "Illusions 
Regarding Revolution," the article warned readers of the danger's represented by van 
Kleeck and the rank and file: 
The greatest danger that lies ahead ofus is the danger that the 
American people may become confused in the fog ofconservative 
and radical propaganda, may mistake the location of the battle-line, 
and fighting over irrelevant issues may wake up to find the New 
Deal a vanished dream ... 
... there is a certain danger in listening to the prophets who dream 
of far-off things that you cannot do anything about. . .Ifyou can 
believe that nothing is happening now and that the real struggle is 
still in the future, then you can draw aside and retreat into the 
dream world where Communism makes faces at the wicked 
capitalist. ..The battle is not between the New Deal and the 
Communist State.48 
The profession's leaders also increased their counterattack against the growing 
influence of the rank and file. AASW President Dorothy Kahn decried the 
movement's assaults upon the profession, declaring that "The outstanding fact of this 
year in social work is the attacks on social workers and their clientele, on 
professional standards from without and - I regret to say - from within.,,49 Porter 
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Lee also weighed in, expressing his disagreement with social workers who entered 
the political arena: 
There may be social workers who are expert on taxation, on 
collectivism, on constitutional law, on the proposal to make the 
production and distribution ofmilk a public utility - but they did 
not become expert in these matters as a result of their training and 
experience as social workers. Unless he has had other training I do 
not see how any social worker could assume the role of leader or 
advocate in these legitimate fields of social action without risk 
both to these programs and to the status of social work. so 
Indeed, the concerns of the AASW were not without merit. Following the formation 
of the rank and file's National Coordinating Committee at its 1935 conference, NCC 
chair Jacob Fisher boasted of the movement's growing power, directly challenging 
the continued role of the AASW as the profession's representative: 
[The rank and file's] combined strength is formidable and is 
growing every day. The Pittsburgh convention proved among 
other things that the rank and file movement is by way of losing its 
character as a minority movement. The total membership 
represented by official delegates was over 8,200, which is close 
enough to the 8,600 figure of the American Association of Social 
Workers to suggest that within a very short space of time the new 
groups may soon be able to challenge effectively the A.A.S.W.'s 
claim to speak for the whole of social work.Sl 
Following their successes at the 1934 NCSW, the rank and file once again 
made their presence known at the 1935 NCSW in Montreal. This time the NCC 
developed a program ofworkshop sessions, sponsored a booth for Social Work 
Today (over which the NCC had assumed control following the Pittsburgh 
conference), and published a daily "Rank and File Bulletin" for distribution at the 
conference.52 Despite the increasingly hostile rhetoric of the AASW, NCSW 
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Conference President Katherine Lenroot (Chief of the Children's Bureau) struck a 
more conciliatory tone towards the rank and file, noting their accomplishments while 
omitting any reference to their union character: 
One of the most significant developments of social work in the last 
two years has been the 'rank and file movement,' which is well 
represented at this Conference. Young people in direct daily 
contact with those served by social work are developing through 
practitioners' groups and discussion clubs challenging and 
vigorous points ofview and programs, and are emphasizing 
association with other groups. 53 , 
The NCC sponsored program at the conference reflected the broad array of issues 
and causes espoused by the movement, including presentations on "The Negro in 
Social Work," "Mental Hygiene in a Changing World," "Casework A Realistic 
Approach," and "Social Work and Fascism." Nearly 1,000 delegates attended 
presentations by Mary van Kleeck and Herbert Benjamin on the relationship between 
the unemployment movement and social work, where once again van Kleeck served 
as the ideological spokesperson for the movement. 54 Calling on the profession to 
take a more leading role in social action, van Kleeck pointedly dismissed the 
profession'S alliance with the New Deal: 
The time has surely come to go back to the period of some years 
ago, when social workers were ready to voice their protests. I wish 
that our social work journals that have so loyally supported the 
present administration because of the social promises, might soon 
become once again journals ofprotest. Social workers are a fairly 
large group today, and with their allies and socially minded 
supporters their influence can be widened. We must let the people 
know the facts. We need a leadership ofprotest, not a willingness 
to accept political promises as genuine adoption ofnew 
principles ... we must stand in defense of the civil liberties of the 
workers.55 
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The Professional as Worker 
The growing gulfbetween the profession and the rank and file movement on 
the proper role of social work in the arena of social action reflected more than a 
philosophical disagreement on tactics. Rather, it equally represented profound 
differences regarding the very conception and definition of the social worker and the 
nature ofprofessionalism. The identification of the rank and file movement with the 
industrial worker's movement and its emphasis on the development of a unionized 
worker identity differed sharply from the AASW's goals for professionalization. To 
leaders of the rank and file movement such as Eduard Lindeman, the identification of 
the social worker was inextricably linked to its realignment with the interests of the 
working class: 
For the American professional the crux of the matter must be 
sought in the meaning and application ofclass-groupings. In the 
past the professional has aligned himself primarily with the 
privileged classes. He has thought ofhis profession, not as labor 
on behalf of the community but rather as a badge of superiority. 
His organizations have avoided a trade-union concern with the 
economic welfare of their members. They have dealt largely with 
the superficial aspects of so-called professional ethics and the 
social amenities ... protective organizations in the field of social 
work, depart sharply form the professional association in 
emphasizing the identity of their interests with those of labor.56 
Through the pages ofSocial Work Today, the rank and file's intellectual leaders 
attempted to articulate an alternative view of the professional social worker than that 
supplied by the AASW. To leaders such as Mary van Kleeck, Harry Lurie and 
Bertha Reynolds, the identification of social workers with the struggles of the 
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working class was central to any meaningful re-conceptualization of social work 
practice. For van Kleeck, social work's primary purpose and function lay in service 
to the working class in both its immediate time ofcrisis as well as for its long term 
interests: 
We [social work] have the difficulty ofdetermining our own 
normal function in society, because in a kind ofobverse 
relationship we have more jobs when other workers have less. But 
it is a short-signed view ofsocial work to think it functions 
normally only in abnormal times. On the contrary, the basic 
interest, even ofour own group, lies also in sustaining the cultural 
and educational services of society ... Toward that end political 
movements are essential; and the political movement can be most 
inclusive, and therefore the stron~est ifbased upon a program of 
immediate needs of the majority. 7 
In this regard, van Kleeck believed that the full nature of social work's professional 
character and function would not emerge until the political movement ofworkers 
assumed political and economic control of society: 
There is just one test to apply to any political movement: whether 
it grows out of the needs of the masses of the workers and farmers, 
and to what extent it aims to meet their needs; and whether its 
leadership is fully responsible to workers and farmers 
themselves ... This does not mean the setting up ofone group in 
society as superior to another group. It assumes that the baSic 
standards of living of the people must rest on the standards of 
living ofworkers and farmers; and that the security of the people 
as a whole and of the middle class can be achieved in no way 
except through security for the producers. Ifprofessional workers 
can come to the realization ofthis basic condition ofour own 
security; and ifwe in the profession ofsocial work can take our 
part in bringing such a movement into action, then we shall 
achieve a fruitful relationship to the development ofour own 
program in social work. 58 (emphasis added) 
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Lurie argued that the identification of social work with the class struggle 
required new fonns of social casework. To Lurie, casework could no longer be 
content with the aims of individual "self-maintenance," "social adjustment," or 
"personality development."s9 Seeing such activities as primarily attempts to create 
"little islands of security" in the absence ofjust social order, Lurie suggested that 
casework required a practice centered on a radical "new orientation and a new 
structure of community life": 
What is needed, in essence, is a change from a system of 
production and services functioning only in response to the profit 
motive to a system ofcollective social life in which the resources 
ofa community, material and cultural, are to be used by the 
organized community ofworkers and developed for their benefit 
and their benefit alone. It is infinitely larger than a problem in 
social work - it is the main social problem in this period ofour 
history.60 
Like van Kleeck, Lurie suggested that the actual functions of social workers were 
secondary to the central struggle for social justice and would in fact derive their 
more specific character out of this struggle: 
To have a part in the solution of the problem, therefore, means for 
the individual the necessity ofadding to his functions as an 
employed professional worker the function of a socially conscious 
worker who, in alignment with other workers, seeks for a practical 
approach to these current problems. This will require 
identification with a workers' movement, an organization of 
individual workers of all ranks and vocations seeking through 
political and economic means to place the whole ofour common 
life under democratic contro1.61 
Drawing upon her psychoanalytic training and attempting to integrate Marxist 
theory, Bertha Reynolds argued that social casework found its function in dealing 
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with "the relationship between individuals or groups and their physical or social 
environment" (emphasis in original).62 In this regard, Reynolds believed that social 
casework could only apply such a model in the presence of a healthy social order: "If 
the social order is so sick that resources for subsistence, health, work and the 
development ofpersonality are not there, social case work can never supply them in 
any adequate quantity or in any healthy way.,,63 To Reynolds, social work had not 
been yet been able to develop a full sense of casework practice based on relationship 
due its origins within an unhealthy society, and thus did not know " ...what its 
possibilities might be in a sound social economy.,,64 Like Lurie and van Kleeck, 
Reynolds' felt the only resolution to the profession's contradictions lay in its 
participation in the greater struggle for human and economic rights, applying what 
special skills and knowledge it had to that struggle: 
With patient and determined study we shall find some principles to 
guide us. Perhaps we shall find others who share these principles, 
and we must not let non-essentials divide us from them, for in an 
interdependent world disunion spells death ...1 doubt whether it 
matters much whether we say we participate as human beings or as 
social workers. Our profession has made us different from what 
we would have been as actors or butchers, and we can not slip it 
off as a garment when we take part in vital matters. It may be that 
because we are social workers we shall bring to a blind struggle a 
bit more ofclarity, and because we know people well we may 
relate ourselves to others more constructively, even in the midst of 
destructive forces.65 
Social Work and the Tactics of Labor 
While the rank and file's hazy conceptions of an alternative form of social 
work practice paled beside the profession's established principles of social casework, 
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their application of labor tactics to the field was both more explicit and more 
threatening to mainstream social workers and the AASW. As organizing efforts in 
public relief agencies intensified in late 1934 and through 1935, so did the militancy 
of their tactics in the face of increased resistance from agency administrators and 
retractions in federal relief efforts. Tensions mounted as both public and private 
agencies discharged increasing numbers ofunion leaders and activists for various 
reasons of inefficiency and insubordination. In this regard, the case ofSidonia 
Dawson would be an early incident illustrative of the severely strained relationships 
that fonned between the rank and file unions and the AASW. 
In October 1934 Sidonia Dawson, a supervisory aid at the New York 
Emergency Home Relief Bureau, was dismissed on charges of insubordination after 
she protested the use ofpolice by the HRB to breakup a demonstration by members 
of the New York Unemployment Council. During the course of the police action 
several protestors were injured and required medical attention. The following day 
flyers protesting the police action appeared in the HRB office, attributed by the HRB 
management to Dawson, head of the union's local grievance committee. Later that 
day Dawson participated in a mass demonstration outside the office where she 
addressed the crowd and accused the HRB of engaging in racial discrimination in 
relief practices and of tolerating police brutality. After meeting with HRB 
administrators, Dawson was fired as HRB officials infonned Dawson that her 
", ..activities both inside and outside of the precinct office during the past week have 
indicated that it is no longer desirable to have you remain on the staff.,,(j6 
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The EHRB Employees Association demanded the immediate reinstatement of 
Dawson, publishing an open letter in the New York Post protesting the dismissal. In 
the letter, the EHRB Employees Association accused the HRB of tolerating police 
brutality in relief offices and Public Welfare commissioner William Hodson of 
seeking to deprive HRB employees from " ... exercising their constitutionally 
guaranteed civil liberties [including] free speech, press, and the right of 
assemblage.,,67 Hodson responded with an accusation that " ... a small number of 
left-leaning employees in the HRB" were attempting to wrest administrative control 
of the HRB, and issued an order forbidding HRB staff from discussing their work or 
the work of the HRB with any newspaper or broadcast media.68 Following the 
exchange, the EHRB Employees Association held a public trial, in which union 
leaders accused the HRB ofpromulgating policies " ... that keep clients ill and 
freezing in slum buildings ... [and starting] a campaign ofdismissals, punitive 
transfers and petty persecution ofprominent members of the Association. ,,69 Union 
officials also produced copies ofpersonnel files on Dawson and other HRB 
employees who had been dismissed. Dawson's file included a detailed record ofher 
union activities, an anonymous note that charged with her with being"... red of the 
deepest red," and a memo from her supervisor to the director of the HRB stating 
" ... she has been known as a red.,,7o 
As publicity over the Dawson case continued, the local AASW chapter 
agreed to investigate the circumstances ofDawson's firing and the working 
conditions in the HRB upon the request ofthe local practitioner group. In its 
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findings, the AASW report made no recommendations regarding the disposition of 
Dawson's case but commented that " ... divided loyalty and mental conflict must 
inevitably endanger the esprit de corps and unity ofobjectives between executives 
and staff essential for good services to clients.,,71 While the report objected to the 
use ofpolice in the HRB office and recommended the HRB improve its working 
relationship with employees, the report also condemned the union for its 
"revolutionary tactics" and "disruption to hasten the revolutionary order.,,72 
Agreeing with union complaints that the physical condition of the HRB offices were 
"miserable," the report went on to object to "disruptive" protests as a legitimate 
means to resolve problems: " ... we can only state that social work and lay opinion 
must be effectively mobilized to relieve these intolerable conditions.,,73 Rank and 
file confidence in the AASW in the wake of its decidedly mixed findings was further 
eroded by comments on the Dawson incident published in Survey. While supporting 
the need for hearings before dismissal, an article describing the incident appeared to 
echo the findings of the AASW committee: 
We have noticed that in the case under discussion the worker 
involved did not use established intra-mural procedures to state her 
protest. ..but adopted instead certain provocative tactics 
embarrassing to the administration ... we realize that the right of 
self-expression and the form it may take are a proper concern of 
administration.74 
The Dawson firing was one ofmany dismissals that plagued union organizing 
efforts. In December 1934 Bernard Riback, President of the N ew York Home Relief 
Bureau Employees Association, was fired for "insubordination and inefficiency," 
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including the allegation that he over-stayed a lunch break.75 Like the case of Sidonia 
Dawson, Riback was fired after he attempted to intervene in an incident in which 
police officers were struggling with unemployed demonstrators. In response, 
members of the union staged a protest attended by 2,000 employees and members of 
local unemployment councils.76 In Chicago, Frank Komacker, chairman of the 
Chicago Federation of Social Service Employes was fired from the Chicago 
Unemployment Relief Service for alleged "slumping" in his work, and another union 
leader was fired shortly thereafter on charges ofdistributing leaflets protesting the 
firing during work hours.77 In New Jersey, the Essex County Emergency Relief 
Administration fired the president of the Newark Relief Workers Association and the 
union's newsletter editor following union protests of announced budget cuts. Within 
two months two more workers were fired for "insubordination in regard to budget 
control" in response to orders to cut family relief budgets. Both workers, leading 
members of the Newark Relief Workers Association, were accused not ofdisobeying 
orders, but, in the words of the agency, " ... an attitude ofdefiance [in which] they 
held a constant threat of client riots over the heads of their supervisor. They 
disrupted the whole morale of the office.,,78 As firings of additional union officials 
and activists continued in the Essex County office, the agency director denied any 
anti-union purge, stating that given the firing of the union president " ... chances for 
the organization's growth are much greater now that it could look to a more 
constructive leadership.,,79 Similar dismissals of union leaders and activists for 
insubordination and communist sympathies were reported in the pages ofSocial 
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Work Today in Baltimore, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, 
Cleveland and St. Louis.8o Noting the dismissals ofDawson, Riback and others, 
Social Work Today complained: 
The discharges ... are the latest of a series of firings through which 
relief officials hope to crush opposition to their destructive 
policies. Further intimidation may be anticipated with the 
progressive development of the crisis. The problem is not local. It 
is national in scope.81 
The firings ofunion officers and activists and other fonns ofharassment 
pushed unions to intensify their use ofmilitant tactics. In New York City, the Home 
Relief Bureau Employee's Association accused the HRB administration ofa 
concerted campaign to break the union by the use of arbitrary firings ofunion 
officers, surveillance ofunion activities and discriminatory treatment ofunion 
employees. The union fonned a Joint Committee of rank and file unions to 
investigate their charges and submit a public report. In April, the Joint Committee 
publicly released their report at a meeting attended by HRB employees and 
administrative staff. The report supported the charges of the union that the HRB had 
conducted a campaign ofdiscrimination against the union and called for the 
reinstatement of four union officials fired for "inefficiency and insubordination. ,,82 
In addition the committee called for the end ofpolice presence in HRB offices, 
discriminatory treatment ofunion members in job assignments and evaluations, and 
a system in which the committee alleged the HRB forced some employees to spy 
upon the activities ofunion co-workers.83 
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The relationship between the HRB and the union, now renamed the 
Association of Workers in Public Relief Agencies, continued to worsen, finally 
reaching a head in October of 1935. In September the HRB announced that due to 
contractions in federal relief funds some 900 employees would be discharged in 
November, the first ofwhat they estimated would be a total of3,000 layoffs. On 
October 24, over half of the 15,000 employees of the Bureau staged a mass walk-out 
and held a protest rally at Madison Square Garden. Under the slogan "We Need Our 
Jobs, Our Jobs Need Us!," the demonstration drew an audience of over 15,000, 
including HRB employees, members of local unemployment councils, 
representatives of 60 unions, and members of the public. Following the walk-out 
and rally, the HRB announced it would rescind all but 1,200 of the 3,000 planned 
dismissals. Most of the 1,200 not re-hired were subsequently transferred in to the 
work projects of the WPA.84 
The New York City unions were not the only rank and file unions to engage 
in strikes and walk-outs, extending their efforts to organizing workers in WP A work­
relief projects. In April, 1935, under the leadership of the local rank and file union, 
over 5,000 relief workers went out on strike in Rochester, New York to protest 
inadequate salaries. Other walk-outs over salary and working conditions were also 
conducted in 1935 by WPA workers with the assistance of rank and file unions in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio and Chicago. Organizing was more difficult in some cities such 
as Kansas City, where relief administrators put a letter in paychecks ofworkers 
advising them that "inciting discord among the employed [WP A] men" would bring 
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dismissal, and infonned WP A workers that"...ifyou are discharged from your work, 
for just cause, you cannot go back on the reliefrolls.,,8s 
The use ofwalk-outs, strikes and other labor tactics by the rank and file in 
New York and elsewhere raised concerns among leaders of the profession, 
particularly within the AASW. In opposition to the AASW's attempt to develop a 
professional image and program, the tactics of the rank and file were seen by some in 
the AASW as threatening its emphasis on moderation and professional decorum. 
While believing that social workers could appropriately organize themselves into 
"efficient, coordinated groups," Ewan Clague warned social workers that the use of 
labor tactics were inadvisable due to the unique relationship that existed between the 
profession and the administration: 
In dealing with the Government it is impossible to use the more 
aggressive tactics that are used on a private employer ... such action 
against the Government is always interpreted as being directed 
against the public as a whole. Any politician can cry 'subversive,' 
'revolutionary,' 'communistic,' and easily persuade the public that 
concerted action by a group ofGovernment employees is a threat 
to the general welfare. ,,86 
Clague extended his opposition to the use of labor tactics to private charities as well, 
arguing that " ... the worker in a private agency cannot avoid having some concern 
about the prospects for raising the agency's budget in the annual community 
appeal."S7 Instead, Clague urged social workers to maintain a professional demeanor 
when faced with conflict and, consistent with the stance of the AASW, to at all times 
ensure a maintenance ofprofessional standards. 
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Joining Clague, John Fitch, a respected faculty member at the New York 
School of Social Work, spoke for many in the mainstream profession who opposed 
the tactics and programs of the rank and file, particularly the use of strikes: 
... there is a difference between social workers and industrial 
workers that makes inappropriate for the former what might be 
good tactics for the latter. Social workers have a professional 
responsibility that iron molders do not have. Social workers are 
entitled to decent working conditions and decent 
remuneration ... However, they did not enter social work solely, or 
even primarily, to make a living ... the strike weapon is not an 
appropriate weapon for the social worker. Ordinarily, a strike 
would do so much damage to the accomplishment of the higher 
purposes which his work contemplates that I think it would be 
better for him to change his occupation rather than jeopardize those 
higher purposes.88 
Even more liberal social workers, such as Survey editor Paul Kellogg, questioned the 
degree ofmilitancy employed by the rank and file. While strongly supporting the 
right of social workers to organize and engage in demonstrations, picketing, work 
stoppages and strikes, Kellogg questioned the motives and ethics of the rank and file: 
...when it comes to policy-making it is up to those who participate 
to ask themselves what it is, collectively, they want to get through 
their organization no less than how to go about it. The choices 
before them range all the way from personal security in the job to 
unsettling the economic order. There is a whale of a lot of 
difference between tactics used to better relief and the same tactics 
used to break down a relief administration as part of a general 
agitation. Social workers face also the distinction between an 
ordinary industrial dispute and one where social responsibilities 
enter in, whether it concerns the water supply of a city, care of the 
sick or the help that gets to destitute families. 89 
The debate over the proper relationship of the profession with the labor 
movement spilled out beyond the higher echelons of the AASW into its local 
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chapters. In New York, the AASW chapter, ofwhich Harry Lurie and John Fitch 
were both members, debated the appropriateness ofunionization in its chapter 
meetings of 1934 and 1935. Minutes of those meetings indicated a clear split in the 
membership, with one faction led by Lurie strongly advocating support of social 
work unions, while the other faction, represented by Fitch, questioned the ethical and 
practical consequences ofunion affiliation. Similar debates wracked chapters in 
California, Washington, Illinois and Indiana.9O 
For a More Just Society 
In addition to the rank and file's emphasis on militant forms ofunionism, the 
movement's involvement in progressive political causes would also strain its 
relationship with the mainstream of the profession. During the 1930s the leaders and 
unions of the rank and file would actively engage themselves in the anti-Fascist and 
peace movements, protests of the unemployed, advocacy of the Republican cause in 
the Spanish Civil War and support for the black civil rights movement.91 Once 
again, the mainstream profession's perceived extremism of these causes would raise 
questions regarding the movement's relationship with the Communist Party and 
directly challenge the conduct of the profession. 
The movement's commitment to civil rights would directly affect the 
profession in the midst of the 1935 NCSW conference in Montreal. Three black 
members of the Home Relief Bureau Employees Association attending the 
conference were refused accommodations by six hotels and appealed to the rank and 
file's NCC for assistance. Word of the situation reached Mary van Kleeck as she 
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was making a presentation, and she interrupted her remarks to publicly condemn the 
act, calling upon the conference officers to ensure that in future all NCSW meetings 
be held in cities that would not discriminate against racial minorities. Conference 
delegates subsequently adopted a resolution condemning racial discrimination, and a 
delegation led by rank and file delegates met with the General Secretary of the 
Conference to ensure accommodations for the black delegates.92 Following the 
meeting, The NCSW Executive Committee issued a statement on the incident: 
The Executive Committee wishes to go on record to the Montreal 
Committee on Arrangements commending them for their success 
in confonning to the policy of the Conference in obtaining 
accommodations for delegates of the Conference, and notes with 
satisfaction the absence ofundesirable experiences of 
discrimination arising because ofracial factors in housing and 
caring for the delegates. The Executive Committee, however, 
deplores the several instances ofdiscrimination which have arisen 
locally outside the responsibility or activity of the ... Committee, 
which indicates attitudes ofdiscrimination against Negro 
delegates.93 
Dissatisfied with the statement, representatives of the NCC called upon the 
conference leadership to take measures to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of 
delegates at the 1936 conference scheduled for Washington, D.C., a city known for 
extensive racial covenants in public accommodations. Rank and file delegates were 
further angered when the publication of the conference proceedings included an 
unprecedented footnote in the published version ofMary van Kleeck's speech, in 
which she denounced the incident. Indeed, the addendum to the paper appeared 
more defensive than explanatory, noting that " ... these members had arrived late 
without advance registration ... Moreover, after offering to secure rooms which were 
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not accepted because they were too far away and at too high a rate, the 
Committee ... made hotel space available.,,94 
In response to the concerns of conference delegates and the NCC, the NCSW 
Executive Committee agreed to examine their policies regarding non-discrimination 
before the Washington, D.C. gathering. Dissatisfied with the response of the NCSW, 
the NCC continued to apply pressure on the NCSW Executive Committee, and 
eventually the 1936 NCSW was moved to Atlantic City as the committee could not 
obtain guarantees ofnon-discrimination in Washington, D.C. However, racist 
incidents that sparked protest at the 1935 conference were repeated in Atlantic City 
after one of the hotels that had signed agreements ofnon-discrimination with the 
NCSW refused to serve black delegates in their bar and lounge. Once again, the 
NCC protested the NCSW's lack of response and demanded the NCSW vigorously 
enforce its own policies.95 
NCC representatives met with Conference General Secretary Howard Knight, 
who advised the NCC that it was the position of the NCSW that the guarantee of 
non-discriminatory accommodations did not include bar service. Upon the demands 
of the NCC, the issue was brought before the NCSW Executive Committee, which 
affirmed its belief that ", ..the Conference has no responsibility beyond essentials and 
would not give consideration to the use of cocktail bars. ,,96 Carrying their demands 
to NCSW President Edith Abbott, the NCC called upon her to reverse the policy of 
the Executive Committee and attempted to smooth the now sour relations between 
the rank and file and the NCSW: 
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The principle at issue is not prohibition or temperance, but equal 
treatment. Mr. Knight in our discussion feared the development of 
ugly situations ifNegroes and whites drink together ... there are 
members of the Executive Committee who misunderstood our 
motives in raising this issue, and who believe that our sole purpose 
is to embarrass the Conference ... [The NCC] assure you ofour 
wholehearted desire to work sincerely and constructively with the 
Conference.97 
But if the NCC expected Abbott to reverse policies and seek more cordial relations 
with the rank and file, they would be disappointed in her reply: 
With regard to the question you raise about the Conference making 
a formal demand for equal treatment ofNegroes at the bar, I 
assume Mr. Knight will have told you about the official action of 
the Conference. This was that we took no action regarding this 
particular issue ... My reason for thinking that we should take no 
action is that I believe that the business of the Conference is to 
make it possible for all ofour membership to have an opportunity 
to attend all of our meetings .. .I do not think that it is the business 
of the Conference to assure any kind ofrecreational facilities to 
any of its members. If a golf club gives privileges to men and not 
to women, this seems to me a matter about which the Conference 
is not concerned. If a bar admits men and excludes women, this 
seems to me again a matter about which we have no concern. This 
applies also to the matter of any racial lines that may be drawn in 
these fields.98 
While the rank and file had mixed success with the established leaders of the 
NCSW, they were more successful, and more militant, in the protection of the rights 
ofblack reliefworkers and black relief recipients. This was particularly true in New 
York City, where the majority ofblack reliefworkers were employed and the rarik: 
and file unions were the most organized and numerous. Here, the work of the rank 
and file unions in the Harlem district ofNew York was most prominent. As early as 
1934, reliefworkers in the Harlem HRB established close connections with the 
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Communist Party's League of Struggle for Negro Rights (LSNR), first established in 
1930 to oppose lynchings.99 By 1934, the LSNR had joined with unemployment 
councils in campaigns against job discrimination in the local reliefoffices. The 
Harlem branch of the Communist Party had concentrated on relief employees in its 
organizing efforts and had successfully established several shop units in the Home 
Relief Employees Association HREA), providing previous leadership in the HREA's 
protests against racial discrimination in the Civil Works Administration. In April of 
1934, the HREA joined with the LSNR in sponsoring a series ofpublic meetings 
protesting the dismissals ofblack relief workers and discriminatory treatment of 
black clients. Following several meetings with relief officials, coupled with 
demonstrations in and outside ofrelief offices, the HRB reinstated several black 
reliefworkers and agreed to appoint blacks to the HRB's grievance committees. lQO 
The HREA would be equally important in the LSNR's attempts to pressure a 
cafeteria near a Harlem relief office to hire black countennen. As the customer base 
of the cafeteria was largely composed ofHRB employees, a union supported boycott 
coupled with picketing and demonstrations outside the cafeteria soon led to the 
cafeteria hiring several black employees.101 
In October of 1934, the HREA again protested discriminatory practices 
within the HRB, including charges that the HRB unfairly denied supervisory 
promotions to black relief workers and demanding the hiring of additional black 
relief workers. The HREA held a mass protest rally ofHarlem relief employees to 
publicize their demands, only to have the HRB respond with the firing of the 
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association's leader. Stung by the HRB's actions, the union mobilized community 
support, including the LSNR, the International Labor Defense (the Communist 
Party's legal defense organization), and local black ministers and politicians to form 
a Joint Committee on Discriminatory Practices to pressure the HRB. Following 
several months of demonstrations, protest meetings and marches, the HRB reinstated 
the association's chainnan, promoted a number ofblack workers to supervisory 
positions and increased their hiring ofblack relief workers. The campaign was so 
effective that by the end of 1935, black relief workers represented the largest number 
ofblack professionals employed by the City.102 
The rank and file relief unions would also strongly protest discriminatory 
practices within the WPA, CWA and the PWA in New York and throughout the 
country with mixed success. In New York, the union was instrumental in organizing 
campaigns within the black community to demand that black workers were provided 
a proportional number ofjobs in WP A projects, with an emphasis on work training 
in skilled labor. While the WP A refused to adopt a quota system, they did increase 
their hiring ofblack workers generally and into skilled work in particular. A similar 
campaign in Illinois, while not as extensive as the New York efforts, yielded more 
modest gains. 103 
Civil rights issues were also prominently featured in the pages ofSocial Work 
Today, including reports on the struggles in Harlem, the activities of the National 
Negro Congress, the needs ofurban blacks and the treatment ofblacks in the 
programs of the New Dea1.102 Indeed, where rank and file unions were yet to be 
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established, the journal could do little more than expose discriminatory practices. 104 
This was particularly true ofLos Angeles in 1934, which Social Work Today 
described in an article entitled "Jim Crow in Relief': 
It is a rigid rule that a Negro case worker must not serve white 
clients. The rule does not work conversely; white case workers 
may and do visit Negro applicants ... There is not a single Negro 
district director in the Los Angeles County Relief Administration, 
and there are only three case work supervisors ... LACRA divides its 
files into 'black files' and 'white files. ' 
In a number of instances, workers on projects have united to 
protest against attempts to separate them on the basis of race. 
Social workers are much more backward. I do not know of a 
single instance where case workers have done anything to balk 
segregation or discrimination either in their own work or among 
the clients of the agencies they serve. lOS 
While racial discrimination in relief practice would continue throughout the 1930s, 
the later development of national federations of social work unions within the CIO 
would strengthen anti-racist organizing, and propel these unions into the forefront of 
CIO unions most committed to anti-discrimination practices and the promotion of 
black members into union leadership positions.106 
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CHAPTERS: 

TOWARDS A UNITED FRONT: 

THE RANK AND FILE IN ITS MIDDLE YEARS 

As never before, American social work today must integrate itselfin 
the wide, social community. It mustfind its friends and it must isolate 
its enemies ... Social work is passing from social isolation to genuine 
social diagnosis; now it must pass along to matured social action ... By 
and large the New Deal years are coterminous with the period in 
which social work has become organic in government. In these 
months social work is called upon to prove whether it is capable of 
sustaining and enhancing the relationship.1 
(Social Work Today, 1938) 
As delegates to the Second National Convention ofRank and File Groups in 
Social Work gathered in Cleveland in 1936, the rapid expansion ofsocial work 
unions nationwide now posed new questions in regard to their relationship to the 
broader labor movement. At the 1935 founding convention, unions and discussion 
clubs affiliated with the NCC had pointedly rejected affiliation with the AFL. 
Concerned with the craft nature ofAFL organizing, delegates to the 1935 conference 
had avoided reference to AFL affiliation in their published reports and resolutions. 
Rather, in their debates, delegates expressed the fear that affiliation with the AFL 
would result in the formation ofweak and isolated unions separated by the AFL's 
preference to develop multiple craft unions representing different classes of 
employees within single agencies.2 
But following the 1935 conference, an increasing number ofthe NCC's 
affiliate unions began joining the AFL, seeking to institutionalize both their 
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recognition by employers and their bargaining efforts with agencies within the less 
isolated context ofa national federation ofunions.3 AFL affiliation also reflected the 
relatively weak position of the Nee - it could provide neither the financial or 
organizational resources needed by unions in their organizing struggles that were 
available to them through the AFL. Indeed, the Nee's financial report presented at 
the 1936 conference indicated a total income ofonly $488.00 during the year and a 
deficit ofnearly $200.00.4 Alarmed that individual union affiliations with the AFL, 
in the absence ofa strong national social service employee union, would weaken 
rank and file efforts, the Nee opposed AFL affiliation despite its own rapidly 
devolving role into one of a mere clearinghouse of information for unions. Holding 
to its hopes for a national union, the Nee passed official resolutions asking unions to 
use restraint when considering such affiliation and argued its case in Social Work 
Today: 
The problem presented by the relation of a national organization to 
the A. F. ofL. is not merely one of affiliation or non-affiliation. In 
view of the craft character ofthe great majority ofA. F. ofL. 
unions the question of the circumstances under which affiliation 
could be obtained is ofparamount importance ...In the judgement of 
the [Nee], the advantages ofretaining the vertical union form of 
organization outweigh the values accruing from individual A. F. of 
L. affiliation on a craft basis ... the development of a sufficiently 
large and powerful vertical union in the field of social work would 
make it difficult for the A. F. ofL. to refuse an application for a 
charter backed by the will oftwenty or thirty thousand union 
members ... [Affiliation] is conditioned entirely by the effective 
launching of a national organization. 5 
Despite the calls of the Nee to avoid AFL affiliation in lieu ofone national 
union of social service workers, a number ofpublic relief worker unions, most 
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notably workers in the Baltimore Transient Bureau, requested and were granted 
charters as lodges of the AFL's American Federation ofGovernment Employees 
(AFGE). By the time of the 1936 conference, the NCC's largest affiliate, New 
York's Association ofWorkers in Public Relief Agencies, was also seriously 
considering AFL affiliation, as were the Philadelphia Association ofCounty Relief 
Board Employees and the Chicago Association ofWorkers in Public Agencies. 
Further weakening the arguments of the NCC, in December 1935 the AFGE 
announced the formation ofthe American Federation ofState, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME). Unlike its parent, the AFGE, AFSCME adopted a vertical 
or industrial form oforganization, opening its membership to clerical and technical 
workers as well as professionals. With some 10,000 AFL members immediately 
eligible for transfer into AFSCME, it appeared that the affiliation ofNCC unions 
with AFSCME would thus fulfill the demands of the NCC for a large national 
union.6 
Reflecting the inexorable move of rank and file unions into the AFL, 
delegates at the Cleveland NCC convention affirmed affiliation with the AFL. While 
delegates expressed continued support ofthe NCC for its efforts as a source of 
information and coordination for organizing efforts, they uniformly endorsed AFL 
affiliation. In a report of the relationship between the AFL and social work unions, 
delegates enthusiastically supported affiliation, ending the report with a fictional 
dialogue between two social workers on the merits ofjoining the AFL: 
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Bill: Say, Sam what's this about your favoring our association 

affiliating with the A. F. of L.? 

Sam: I think if everyone knew the advantages we'd gain from 

affiliation, we wouldn't be able to get in soon enough. 

Bill: What are some of the advantages that you think we'll get? 

Sam: Well, in the first place we'll be directly federated to over 

3,000,000 wage and salary earners throughout the country 
now organized in the A. F. ofL .... This can help us in swinging 
the support of the labor movement in this city to maintaining 
and advancing public provisions for social services and 
unemployment relief ... Speaking in the interests of a large 
proportion of the city's population on relief and also on behalf 
of the organized workers in the community, our delegations 
could have considerable weight. .. 
Bill: 	 How can we answer the arguments raised that joining the A. F. 

ofL. will interfere with the desirable professional objectivity 

of social workers? 

Sam: 	 There are two sides to this question of objectivity. As 

professional social workers we have an obligation to maintain 

and advance the standards of social welfare. We should 

support those groups who are also working in this direction. 

We should recognize that labor in its organized struggles to 

improve wage and working standards is paralleling the efforts 

of social workers to raise standards ... 

Bill: 	 Well, Sam, you can count on me to help in talking it up. I 

believe you're right that we'll find new enthusiasm and new 

energy by A. F. ofL. affiliation. With the support of 

organized workers of all types ... we should be able to advance 

our movement as well as being of some real assistance to the 

A. F. ofL. 
Sam: 	 Put it there, Bill! Gee, it's 6:30 and my dinner is calling. 

What do you say we close shop?' 

Presaging the coming dissolution of the NCC, the conference's Constitutional 
Committee reversed its plan to increase the NCC's budget, instead retaining its 1935 
financial allotment. Formalizing the NCC's redefined role as one of information and 
coordination versus acting as a proto-union, and sensitive to charges that the NCC 
might be viewed as engaging in dual unionism in opposition to the AFL, the 
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convention revised its constitution to describe the NCC as a "committee," deleting its 
previous description of the NCC as an "organization."s 
Following the 1936 NCC convention, rank and file affiliation with the AFL's 
AFSMCE accelerated. Within months, major rank and file unions made the move, 
including the New York and Chicago unions, the Washington, D.C. Federation of 
Social Workers, the Milwaukee County Department ofRelief Workers Union, the 
Minneapolis Social Workers Council, and the Association ofPhiladelphia County 
ReliefBoard Employees. As the mergers continued, AFSMCE membership swelled 
to over 25,000, representing some fifteen lodges of state, county and municipal 
employees. By the end of 1937 there were some 21 lodges representing workers 
nationwide in family social service agencies, recreation and community centers, 
employment bureaus, relief agencies and settlement houses.9 Despite its initial 
reservations regarding AFL affiliation, shortly after the NCC conference, Social 
Work Today acknowledged that " ... the vigorous campaign for A. F. ofL. 
affiliation ... has borne fruit."}O 
As public reliefunions moved into the AFL, so did significant numbers of 
unions representing social workers in private charity agencies. Most prominent of 
these unions was the N ew York Association ofF ederation Workers, which was 
granted a charter in 1936 with the AFL as the renamed Social Service Employees 
Union (SSEU). With an initial membership of400 members, the New York SSEU 
lodge was soon joined by SSEU unions in Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles, 
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and within the next year the SSEU would claim five chartered locals and several 
thousand members. I I 
With the rapid affiliation of the NCC's constituent unions into the AFL, the 
continuing usefulness of the NCC came under question. While the NCC had not 
fulfilled its goal ofone national union representing both public and private workers, 
the establishment ofAFSCME and the SSEU appeared to be the most realistic 
approximation of their hopes. Accordingly, the NCC issued a report to its members 
in January 1937 recommending dissolution. Citing evidence that the emergence of 
the two national AFL unions had essentially completed the goals of the NCC, the 
report requested a vote on dissolution at its next membership meeting. Dissolution 
was formally voted on at the annual conference, and the NCC's control ofSocial 
Work Today was terminated, now leaving it as an independentjoumal. 
Responsibility for planning programs at annual NCSW meetings was placed in a 
joint committee representing rank and file unions. 12 
The Second New Deal and the Popular Front 
As rank and file unions gravitated towards the AFL, they faced new practical 
and political challenges in the face ofPresident Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and 
the institution ofhis second phase of the New Deal. During Roosevelt's first term 
rank and file unions and their leaders had been highly critical ofNew Deal programs, 
criticism that had intensified with the termination ofFERA and retraction in WPA 
programs. Reflecting the disenchantment of the rank and file with the New Deal, 
Social Work Today published numerous articles in 1935 and 1936 outlining the 
184 
movement's opposition. Headlining its May 1936 issue with the banner "Quitting 
the ReliefBusiness," the journal featured articles condemning the Roosevelt 
administration's failures in serving the unemployed, youth and resident aliens.13 In 
its lead article, Harry Lurie summarized the movement's major complaints: 
With the wreckage of the NRA and ofother attempts of the New 
Deal to find a more modem method of coping with the economic 
depression and salvaging the economic order, it became essential 
for the federal government to revise its relief program and its relief 
theories. Piece by piece, the social welfare program, much of it 
still on paper or in speeches, was dismantled or forgotten. First, 
Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act which 
encouraged labor union organization was repealed through a 
process of administrative erosion. Wage rates in the codes were 
dropped to a discouraging degree. The "social security" plans 
became the Wagner-Lewis bill, acknowledged even by some of its 
friends as having unsound provisions and inadequate benefits. A 
broad housing program for the low income classes expired without 
even a blue print to mark its burial, and industrial and land 
settlement programs were whittled away long before the fanciful 
and unsubstantial character of the projects could be 
demonstrated ... The termination ofFERA in 1935 and the 
restriction of the federal program to WP A, completed the 
demolition of the original unemployment relief structure. 14 
As the rank and file approached the 1936 election, many in the movement 
supported the Communist Party's efforts to promote a Farmer-Labor Party, including 
delegates to the NCC's 1936 convention. In its 1936 national platform the NCC, 
while deciding not to formally endorse support of the Farmer-Labor Party, put forth 
a strong appeal for social workers to reject both the Democratic and Republican 
parties: 
... the growing movement for a new political party, representing the 
workers, farmers and professionals, speaking in their own interests 
and designated as a Farmer-Labor Party, demands a critical 
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examination by social work organizations to determine how closely 
our programs are identified and the power such a political grouping 
would represent for the fulfillment of this program. Following such 
an examination, we have an obligation to support that political party 
whose aims accord with ours and which has the power to achieve 
these aims. I5 
Despite the calls in early 1936 by the NCC and Social Work Today for the formation 
of a Farmer-Labor Party to challenge Roosevelt, the position of the movement began 
to rapidly shift towards Roosevelt as the election approached. In October 1936, the 
editors ofSocial Work Today now provided an assessment to its readers that the 
defeat ofRepublican AlfLandon was ofparamount importance, declaring "Slogan 
number one: Fight Landon!" 16 While not directly endorsing Roosevelt, the journal's 
choice was clear. Declaring that a victorious Farmer-Labor Party would not be 
possible until 1940, the editors urged readers to support Farmer-Labor local, state 
and congressional candidates, pointedly omitting support of its Presidential 
candidate. To complete the sudden alignment ofthe movement to a critical but 
supportive stance regarding Roosevelt, Social Work Today responded to his 
subsequent overwhelming reelection victory with a seemingly placid and surprising 
response considering its previous hostility: 
In the election of 1932, the majority ofAmerican voters registered 
their dissatisfaction with the Republican Party, the governmental 
policies and the administration ofHerbert Hoover. Now, four 
years later, an even larger majority register a more vigorous 
rejection of the Republican candidates, sponsors and 
platform ... There is no question but that the election gave 
unmistakable evidence of the desire of the majority of the 
American people for liberal and progressive policies of 
government, for social security provisions and for increased 
governmental control over business organization.I7 
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Indeed, over the next few months, the political line ofSocial Work Today 
dramatically swung from one ofbitter opposition to Roosevelt to more critical 
acceptance. In February 1936, the journal featured an article by soon-to-be editor 
Frank Bancroft on the priorities facing the new Congress. Bancroft, declaring "We 
elected Franklin Roosevelt and the United States Congress to tackle the problem of 
unemployment head-on," outlined a program of legislative reform not far from the 
President's own positions, including passage of a National Labor Relations Act, 
liberalization ofthe Social Security Act, and increased benefits for the 
unemployed. I8 Two months later, in an editorial entitled "We Support the 
President," the editors ofSocial Work Today announced their full support of 
Roosevelt's proposal to expand the Supreme Court, declaring that " ... the crushing 
defeat administered reaction in the November elections makes of the President's plan 
the primary issue facing the country ... The place of all social workers is with the 
President on this issue.,,19 
More tempered support ofRoosevelt would continue throughout 1937, 1938, 
and 1939. By 1938, the pages ofSocial Work Today no longer called for the 
dismantling of the capitalist system and its replacement with a worker's democracy 
modeled after the Soviet system. Instead, the journal acknowledged defense of the 
New Deal as a primary task facing the rank and file, declaring that the central issue 
was " ... the people and Roosevelt versus special privilege and popular betrayal.,,2o 
Urging social workers to rally behind the programs of the New Deal, Social Work 
187 

Today, while somewhat grudging in its support, linked the New Deal's success with 
that of social work's own advancement: 
Imperfectly, unevenly, inadequately, the New Deal administrative 
and legislative block have, since the 1936 national elections, tried 
to carry forward a program ofrecovery and reform. By every 
demagogy known to the long and dishonorable history of that 
black art, anti-social forces have tried - and all too often succeeded 
- to hamstring that program... Wherever ... concrete unity is 
achievable, it is of the most critical importance to the program of 
social work. ..To the extent that we are realistic, we will that that a 
unified labor movement is our greatest single ally.21 
Despite the movement's growing affection towards the New Deal, its support 
remained at least initially guarded, and Social Work Today continued to voice the 
movement's condemnation of failures in the administration's social and economic 
programs, most notably the tepid performance of the WP A, the lack ofquality and 
sufficient numbers of low income housing, services for migrant workers, the needs 
of youth, and Roosevelt's alleged foot dragging on civil rights and anti-lynching 
legislation.22 However, by the end of 1939 the movement had put aside most of its 
criticisms and now fully embraced the New Deal, declaring "The New Deal is Our 
Deal": 
Times have changed ... The New Deal is the determination of the 
American people to make democracy the organizing principle of 
all of their national life ... The pre-depression days are gone. Before 
us lies a new era, a new ordering of the affairs ofmen. SOCIAL 
WORK TODAY believes that social workers want it to be more 
democratic, not less. It believes that the continuation, 
consolidation and extension of the New Deal is the only immediate 
way to insure this result.23 
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The journal's now solid support of the New Deal was echoed within the unions 
whose opinions it represented. Joining with Social Work Today, Abram Flaxer, a 
former leader within AFSCME and now President ofthe CIO's State, County and 
Municipal Workers ofAmerica (the largest national union of relief workers), 
pronounced labor's new faith in the New Deal: 
The New Deal has made government service a more adequate 
service to the people, by concerning itself with social services ... A 
people's government must be staffed by men and women of the 
people. The people who man the job must not only be fit to 
perform the job but also should be of a mind to defend the New 
Deal. The strongest defender ofthe New Deal is labor.24 
(emphasis added) 
The initial and sudden shift of the rank and file movement in 1936 from open 
hostility to the Roosevelt administration to its gradual rapprochement and eventual 
embrace of the New Deal by 1939 reflected more than a sudden maturation or 
abandonment of the politically-left analysis of its leaders such as Mary van Kleeck or 
Bertha Reynolds. Rather, it mirrored a strategic shift in strategy heralded with the 
Communist Party's halting adoption in the period between 1935 and 1936 of its 
Popular Front approach to political work, reflecting the close relationship enjoyed 
between the CP and key leaders of the rank and file movement. Developed in 
meetings of the Comintern's Seventh World Conference in 1935, the Popular Front 
line reflected the Comintern's recognition that its campaign against social fascism 
was in error. While calling the shift a response to ''new conditions" as opposed to 
errors inherent in its Third Period analysis, the Popular Front recognized the 
increasingly defensive position Communist party's were experiencing worldwide.25 
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As reactionary and fascist parties and governments in Germany and other European 
countries increased in number and power, the Comintern reevaluated its previous 
rejection of alliances with the forces ofbourgeois and social democracy, now calling 
for a "united front" with its previous enemies on the left.26 
The American Communist Party's incorporation of the Popular Front strategy 
was initially slow and marked by confusion. Unsure of the full intent of the 
Comintern's new position, throughout late 1935 the party's leaders continued their 
attacks upon Roosevelt and what the party's paper, The Daily Worker, considered the 
administration's "trend to fascism. ,,27 Hoping that the formation ofa Farmer-Labor 
Party would provide the basis for a united front, the Communist Party requested and 
received permission from the Comintern to launch the party in opposition to 
Roosevelt. However, attempts by the party to gamer support from the Socialists, 
labor leaders and populist political leaders such as Minnesota Governor Floyd Olson 
and New York's Fiorello LaGuardia failed miserably, as the now new allies of the 
Communists feared a third party would usher in a Republican victory. Following 
consultation in Moscow with representatives of the Politburo in May 1936, 
Communist Party leader Earl Browder returned to the United States, announcing that 
full formation ofthe Farmer-Labor Party would be put on hold. hlstead, Browder 
now proclaimed that defeat of the Republican Party and its reactionary allies in the 
1936 election was the primary mission of the party, adopting the slogan "Defeat 
Landon at all costS!,,28 And so, in a period of a few months the party's new political 
line reversed from a course ofunrelenting hostility to a new defense of the New 
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Deal, a less critical stance regarding Roosevelt, and an emphasis on defending 
democratic rights within the confines ofAmerican capitalism.29 
The Popular Front strategy would dominate the political activities of the party 
throughout most of the remaining decade. Now the ranks of labor, liberal 
organizations, and even the Democratic Party became the focus ofparty activities. 
Embarking on what was now called "The Democratic Front," American Communists 
sought to establish a broad coalition of liberal and progressive organizations in their 
struggle against domestic and worldwide fascism. Indeed, calls for socialism were 
no longer deemed necessary or even desirable; rather, working class unity in defense 
ofdemocracy became the new program of the party as it declared in its 1936 
National Convention, "Communism is twentieth-century Americanism.,,30 During 
the following decade, the new cooperative approach of the Communists would both 
legitimize their presence in progressive political discourse and extend their influence 
and prestige into the ranks of organized labor, among intellectuals, and within 
progressive movements for peace and civil rightS.31 
The extent to which the Communist Party's introduction of the Popular Front 
strategy directly influenced the rank and file movement's sudden tum in political line 
in 1936 is, in the final analysis, unknown. However, the close alignment of the 
movement through the pages ofSocial Work Today with the party's pronouncements 
regarding the abandonment of the Farmer-Labor Party and the subsequent embrace 
of the New Deal was not a matter of sheer coincidence. Influential leaders of the 
rank and file such as Social Work Today editors Jacob Fisher and George Wolfe 
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were party members, as were a significant number of rank and file union leaders, 
including Abram Flaxer within AFSCME (later head of the CIO's SCMWA, the 
State, County and Municipal Workers ofAmerica), SCMW A national organizer 
Henry Wenning, and Lewis Merrill, head of the CIO's United Office and 
Professional Workers ofAmerica and containing a large contingent of social work 
unions. Similarly, Bertha Reynolds was a member of the party and Mary van 
Kleeck, while not a member, was closely allied with the party and its top 
leadership.32 While the movement's close mirroring of the party's line would later 
lead to both charges and denials ofcommunist control, based on the fragmentary 
evidence perhaps Jacob Fisher most accurately characterizes the relationship enjoyed 
between the party and the rank and file movement: 
The rank and file were often close to the party. Many ofus were 
members or closely associated with its organizations. We read the 
Daily Worker and were keenly interested in what they had to say. 
The editorial positions ofSocial Work Today certainly could be 
said to sometimes "mirror" the party's lines, but to say we were 
"dominated" by the party would be simply incorrect. We were as a 
whole an independent movement and journal, often in agreement 
with the party and sometimes opposing its positions ...The party 
was certainly powerful in the various public relief unions, and in 
fact consolidated their control in the CIO through their assuming 
leadership in key national positions, but for the most part the rank 
and file members were interested in bread and butter issues and 
professional standards, not the pronouncements of the party over 
this thing or that. 33 
Fence Mending With the ProCession 
As the movement began to take a more conciliatory approach in its 
relationship to the policies of the Roosevelt administration, so did it begin to move 
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away from its antagonistic relationship with the AASW. In June 1936, Social Work 
Today published an unprecedented editorial entitled "A Plea for Understanding," 
extending an olive branch to the profession. Noting the AASW's initiation ofa 
campaign to improve the image of social work in the public eye, the editors asked, 
"Before we expect understanding from a resistive public, must we not first recognize 
that there is need for understanding within the ranks of the profession itselfl,,34 
Declaring that the union movement shared a genuine concern with the AASW over 
professional standards, the editors proclaimed the rank and file in alliance with the 
AASW, while retaining a divergence in analysis: 
The professional society offers a program of interpretation 
attributing to ignorance and cultural prejudices the major blocks to 
public acceptance of social work. The trade union cannot accept 
the concept of an undifferentiated public on whom all the 
deficiencies ofour order are projected. It locates the difficulty in 
the unwillingness of the wealthy taxpayer to support a welfare 
program which is both expensive (to him) and which is a threat to 
the low standard of living in the general population on which his 
profits depend.35 
While outlining the differences between the two camps, Social Work Today argued 
that such differences were one of emphasis and did not constitute a basis for non­
cooperation. Rather, the editors argued that there was "ample room" for the 
development of"legitimately separate interests" in such cooperation, concluding 
"Never have standards affecting clients and staff been so threatened. The dreaded 
effects of the withdrawal ofpublic relief are upon us. Can social work afford to have 
its ranks divided?,,36 
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Reminiscent of the movement's shift regarding the New Deal in the wake of 
the Popular Front strategy, Social Work Today continued to draw closer to the 
initiatives of the mainstream profession and the AASW. Throughout 1937 the 
journal increased its reporting on AASW programs, congratulating the association 
chapters' increasing involvement in the political arena through lobbying and now 
open support of increased federal assistance: 
It is encouraging to consider that the professional organization in 
our field, the American Association ofSocial Workers, has loaned 
itself least to reactionary purposes and has attempted the most 
progressive action of all similar professional bodies. The causes of 
this are not far to seek; they grow directly out of the functions of 
the Association as they are affected by the changing situation in 
the world about us ... The necessity for engaging in some sort of 
'social action' is no longer a problem ofthe Association, for it is 
seen emerging directly from its purpose.37 
Now echoing the AASW's concern with the protection ofprofessional standards, 
rank and file unions took up the cause, most notably in New York City. There union 
members demanded that the Public Welfare Department stiffen its requirements for 
hiring of staff into the positions ofsupervisor by adding "high academic and 
experience qualifications" combined with.a written exam to the position 
requirements.38 Faced with the support ofover 50 local unions and the local AASW 
chapter, the department's commissioner agreed to the proposal and a new civil 
service examination procedure was implemented. Further acknowledging the 
AASW's concern that uncredentialed relief workers were threatening the standards 
of the profession, Social Work Today launched a new series entitled "The Case Work 
Notebook" in its October 1936 issue. Citing a growing "insecurity" among relief 
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workers regarding their ignorance of"professional material," the journal's editors 
sought to tread a blurry line between the journal's professed dedication to wider 
social problems and the need ofrelief workers for more "technical tools": 
Case work as a system is slow, individualistic, and still heavy with 
its infancy. That it can be effective under certain conditions in 
relation to a limited number is true. But it is not intended as a 
"mass method." Another aspect that we must not overlook is that 
the personality troubles toward which case work is directed are 
heavily precipitated today by the external state ofour society ... we 
find ourselves facing the ivory tower of limited techniques or, 
conscious ofour professional responsibility, performing to the 
limit ofour ability the case work function ... we believe that further 
development of the questions raised will help workers in clarifying 
case work confusion. These and other pertinent questions will be 
covered in the successive columns ofCase Work Notebook.39 
Over the next four years the Case Work Notebook would address a wide range of 
case work practice, theory, and technique that was increasingly well within the 
confines ofestablished approaches taught in professional schools of social work. 
The monthly column featured discussions on such professionally-oriented topics as 
the importance ofpersonality in the process of diagnosis and treatment planning, 
applications ofRank ian psychology, the use ofrelationship in social case work, the 
role and use of anxiety in treatment, and the importance ofbalancing identification 
with client experiences and the objectivity ofa professional approach.40 
The rank and file movement's increased concern with the protection of 
professional standards through the negotiations of its unions and in the pages of 
Social Work Today would also be accompanied by growing cooperation with the 
AASW and leaders ofthe mainstream profession. Attacks on professional standards 
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of training and education, prominent in the early years of the rank and file's 
development, were now replaced with a call for alliance with agency administrators 
to secure professional standards: 
The average practitioner wants to grow professionally. Growth, 
however, is seldom possible without the full cooperation of agency 
executives ... formal study is necessary to acquire what is 
tantamount to a anew body ofknowledge. Workers can and do 
take courses offered by experts in the field ... As the body ofcase 
work knowledge expands, room develops for specialization - as in 
medicine and other broad professional fields. Some workers 
become particularly skilled in one area, some in another. In this 
sense their development is uneven but this does not imply that one 
type of skill is more valuable over another. Each workers makes 
his own contribution ... The executives and the workers become 
integral parts ofone agency and work together toward ever higher 
standards.41 
Increasingly, established leaders ofthe profession became contributors to 
Social Work Today as the rank and file modified their criticisms ofboth the 
administration and the profession. Once threatened by the massive infusion of 
untrained relief workers into the field, social work leaders such Karl de Schweinitz 
and the University ofPittsburgh's Marion Hathway now called for the profession to 
support the training needs of these workers. Noting that " ... trade unionism in the 
social work of the future will tend more rather than less to be the common meeting 
ground of trained and untrained personnel," Hathway called for schools of social 
work to adjust their curriculum and methods of training delivery, institute early 
morning and late afternoon classes to accommodate workers, and to work with 
public agencies to provide leaves of absence for workers to attend schoo1.42 
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As Social Work Today increased its coverage ofmore mainstream social 
work concerns, other members of the mainstream profession became contributors. 
Building on articles introducing rank and file members to social group work, Grace 
Coyle advised readers on the relationship between group work and social action, 
emphasizing that social workers could create a better society through " ... orderly and 
democratic methods ofchange.,,43 Wayne McMillen, who became president ofthe 
AASW in 1940, also became a contributor to the journal, expressing sympathetic 
recognition of the reasoned role ofunions in bettering working conditions for 
members of the profession: 
If organization is the best formula for working toward better 
conditions, then the next question is "What type oforganization - a 
professional organization or a union?" I have been a member of a 
professional organization for many years and I believe such 
organizations have a very important contribution to make. But a 
professional organization would obviously include only a part of 
the workers in any office .. jt seems to me an interesting bit of 
evidence that while you may need a vertical union for protective 
purposes, you also need a professional organization for other 
44 purposes. 
Even former enemies of the movement such as Dorothy Kahn and Grace Marcus 
were no longer an anathema to the rank and file as it moderated its assessments of 
the profession. Once a target of rank and file criticism for her early resistance to 
unionization and her criticism of its tactics, by 1940 Dorothy Kahn, now Assistant 
Secretary ofAASW, would praise rank and file unions in the pages ofSocial Work 
Today for their opposition to cuts in relief.45 Grace Marcus, who earlier believed the 
rank and file movement was a dangerous trend within the profession spouting 
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" ... economic dogmas that caricature Marxian theory," was now featured in articles 
lauding the influence of Sigmund Freud and explaining changes in theories of relief­
giving during the previous decade.46 Even Virginia Robinson, who had previous~y 
attacked Social Work Today and the union movement for their political extremism 
and espousal of militant union tactics, now noted in 1937 that"... social workers and 
rank-and-filers are nearer today in social philosophy than they were five years 
ago.,,47 
As the politics of the Popular Front employed by the rank and file movement 
served to bring them in closer alliance with the mainstream profession, so did the 
profession's increasing amenability to social action in defense of the New Deal 
soften their concerns with the movement. The rank and file unions' increasing 
attention to professional standards, as well as their focus on betterment ofworkplace 
conditions were no longer manifestly antagonistic to the goals of the AASW. But 
tensions between the two camps did not disappear entirely, as the mainstream of the 
profession continued to be suspicious of the rank and file's more leftist positions on 
foreign policy and their apparently close relationship with the Communist Party. 
And as the United States inched closer to war in the late 1930s, the profession's 
lingering suspicions would tum to both attack on and disavowal of the movement. 
Into the CIO 
As relations between the mainstream profession and the movement waxed 
and waned throughout the latter half of the 1930s, the rank and file's dedication to 
building a union movement took on renewed vigor. While the dissolution of the 
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NCC had marked an end to the dreams of its founders for a single national union of 
social service employees modeled on the more pure lines of industrial unionism, 
other dissenting voices within the AFL would emerge to sweep the rank and file 
movement's unions into a new and militant organization: the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO). 
Just as rank and file delegates to the 1935 and 1936 NCC conventions 
debated the advisability ofaffiliating with the craft oriented AFL, a similar and more 
momentous struggle was taking place within the AFL itself. The tensions within the 
AFL over the desires to retain its craft union orientation and simultaneous calls for it 
to embrace industrial workers into its fold intensified in the early 1930s, finally 
exploding with the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 
and its provisions guaranteeing the right ofworkers to form unions free of employer 
influence or control. Despite fierce resistance by employers, a staggering number of 
workers, primarily located in basic industry, took up the call for union organizing. In 
an unprecedented display ofmilitancy, workers throughout the country warred with 
employers to achieve union recognition. In the first year of the NIRA, over 900,000 
workers nationwide went on strike and the number nearly doubled in 1934. Trade 
union membership soared, as nearly three quarters of a million new union members 
entered the AFL, independent unions, and the Communist's TUUL. For the AFL, 
which gained nearly 500,000 members in the wake of the NIRA, this new influx of 
unions represented not only a significant revival of its previously shrinking 
membership but new dangers to its leadership and its control over the form of these 
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new unions. The growing strength of industrial worker unions within the AFL, 
particularly John Lewis' United Mine Workers (UMW), as well as the International 
Ladies Gannent Workers Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
ofAmerica (ACW A) would lead to internal demands that the AFL abandon its craft 
orientation in favor of industrial unionism.48 
Dissatisfied with the AFL leadership's resistance to industrial unions, the 
UMW, ILGWU, ACW A and other industrial unions within the AFL formed the 
Committee on Industrial Organization in 1935 to challenge their national leadership 
and promote industrial unionism within the AFL. As the AFL leadership denounced 
the CIO's formation as dual unionism, it contemplated expelling the CIO unions. 
Fearful that such expulsions would split the labor movement, the AFL leadership 
vacillated between expulsion and accommodation of the CIO. But events within the 
CIO itself would propel the AFL to act decisively. While the AFL debated the 
merits of expulsion, the CIO continued to develop an internal federation of industrial 
unions. Responding to the failure of the AFL' s Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel, and Tin Workers to mount an organizational drive among steel workers, the 
CIO organized its own Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) in 1936, 
directly challenging the AFL leadership over control ofthe industrial union 
nlovement. Similar organizing efforts in the rubber, auto, electrical and radio 
industries would swell the ranks of the CIO in what was now a direct and open 
challenge to leadership of the AFL. As attempts to maintain unity collapsed in 1937, 
the AFL expelled the CIO unions. Under the leadership of the UMW's John Lewis, 
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the expelled unions fonned the Congress of Industrial Organizations in November of 
1938, challenging the AFL for control of the entire national labor movement.49 
The fonnation of the CIO would have a catalyzing effect upon the rank and 
file's AFL unions. In the summer of 1937, the CIO chartered two national unions, 
the State, County, and Municipal Workers ofAmerica (SCMWA) and the United 
Office and Professional Workers ofAmerica (UOPWA), opening these unions to the 
rank and file social work unions. SCMWA sought to organize workers in all public 
agencies nationwide, while the UOPW A was chartered to organize office and 
professional workers in the private sector. Within a matter ofmonths, existing social 
work unions within the AFL's AFSCME moved into both SCMWA and the 
UOPWA. Led by the powerful New York A WPRA union, by June of 1938 nearly 
one quarter ofSCMWA's 35,000 members would represent employees in public 
welfare agencies in over a dozen states. Seven locals of the SSEU, most from the 
New York and Chicago locals would now comprise some 2,000 of the UOPWA's 
forty five thousand members. Only a small group of several hundred mid-western 
welfare workers remained within AFSCME.50 
The move from the AFL to the CIO was not an easy one. Many unions, 
particularly the SSEU locals entering the UOPW A, faced new battles for employer 
recognition. Locals in Chicago, Philadelphia, New York and Los Angeles all waged 
protracted struggles for recognition. In June 1938 the New York City SSEU Local 
19 made history when it successfully concluded the profession'S first collective 
bargaining agreement with the National Council of Jewish Women. While the 
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contract initially covered only some 25 employees, by the early 1940s some 50 
private agencies would have contracts with UOPW A locals. The success of the 
contract with the National Council ofJewish Women would be quickly followed by 
a UOPWA contract with the Russell Sage Foundation. 51 SCMWA organizing within 
the public sector was more rapid and initially successful than that of the UOPWA. 
New SCMWA unions in New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland were able to 
win salary increases, reinstatements ofdismissed workers, liberalized vacation and 
sick benefits, and establishment ofgrievance proceedings. Increasing the number of 
public case workers and reducing existing caseload standards were also major goals 
of the newly forming SCMW A, and between its unions in New York and Detroit 
alone, over 300 new positions were established and caseload reductions were 
achieved by a number of SCMW A locals. 52 
Backed by the growing power and resources of the CIO, SCMWA and its 
leader Abram Flaxer (formerly an official in AFSCME), and the UOPWA, directed 
by Lewis Merrill, continued to organize public and private social welfare agencies 
nationwide. Successful drives in Iowa, California, Minnesota, Kentucky, 
Washington, Missouri, and Indiana would continue to increase the union 
membership. By the end of 1939 some 36 SCMW A locals had been established 
nationwide in public welfare departments and SSEU membership in the UOPWA 
had increased to nearly 4,000.53 The achievements ofSCMWA and the UOPWA 
was not lost on CIO head John Lewis. Recognizing the initial success ofhis union's 
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foray into social services, Lewis welcomed the rank and file into the CIO in a special 
message to social workers published in Social Work Today: 
The Committee for Industrial Organization welcomes the addition 
ofsocial workers to the ranks oforganized labor in 
America ... Social workers, whose daily task is to delve into the 
living conditions ofAmerica's poorer families, have an unequalled 
opportunity to inspect the social byproducts ofour industrial 
system ... The responsibility ofand the opportunity of social 
workers are therefore two-fold. They have a responsibility to 
uphold the right ofdemocratic organization among the workers 
with whom they come in daily contact, and they need the 
advantages of the same free, democratic organization for 
themselves.54 
Lewis' enthusiasm for social work's entry into the CIO was shared equally by the 
rank and file. The CIO's emphasis on organizing industrial workers and its 
insistence on the development ofvertical unions seemed at last to fit the vision of the 
movement's early advocates. Jacob Fisher, now president of the New York Social 
Service Employees Union (UOPW A), perhaps best summed up both the relationship 
of the rank and file to the CIO in 1938 and the movement's lessened political 
presence in the profession: 
[Social workers] hoped to find in the CIO the kind ofvigorous and 
imaginative leadership which they had looked for in vain in the A. 
F.ofL. And they were not disappointed. The CIO took seriously 
the problem oforganizing social work, as it took seriously the 
problem oforganizing the steel industry. It spent money. It set up 
offices, hired organizers, issued literature and conducted 
meetings ... 
It is this absorption in the important task ofbuilding a solid 
smoothly running union with its feet on the ground that has made 
1937-38 so different from other years. The past twelve months 
saw no manifestos issued, and no general appeals to the conscience 
of social work. ..The guiding principles have been and still are 
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identification with labor through membership in trade unions and 
cooperative action between social work and the labor movement in 
the achievement oftheir common goals. The course ofevents this 
year dictated intensive self-organization as an integral part of this 
program.55 
As the decade of the 1930s was coming to a close, the rank. and file movement had 
found a home in the CIO and had begun to repair the serious rift that had developed 
between it and the profession. But as stonn clouds ofwar in Europe began to 
envelop the United States, the politics ofthe Popular Front would begin to break 
down and, once again, the movement would find itself at odds with the profession 
and its unions under attack from both within and without. 
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CHAPTER 6: 

REPRESSION, RESISTANCE AND DESTRUCTION: THE FINAL YEARS 
..Just a racket, a Communist controlled racket. l 
As rank and file unions representing social workers in the CIO continued 
their organizing efforts and slowly attempted a rapprochement with the mainstream 
profession in the late 1930s, the convergence of foreign and domestic events would 
soon unravel both efforts and refocus enmity upon the movement. Once again, as in 
the days of the Popular Front, the movement's apparent adherence to the twists and 
turns of the Communist Party's political line would come under question in the wake 
of the 1939 non-aggression pact between Gennany and the Soviet Union. The 
apparent closeness between the movement and the Communist Party would place the 
movement at odds with the profession and evoke aggressive attacks upon rank and 
file unions by state and federal officials seeking evidence they were controlled by the 
party. While temporarily abated during World War II, the attacks ofanti-Communist 
investigators upon the rank and file unions, coupled with the acquiescence of the 
mainstream profession in the face of these attacks, would eventually lead to the 
destruction ofboth the unions and the movement as a whole. 
Peace, Collective Security and the Politics of the Popular Front 
Throughout the 1930s, both the rank and file movement and the mainstream 
profession shared alarm over the rise of fascism in Europe. Indeed, following the 
consolidation of the Nazi regime in Gennany in 1933, many Americans, including 
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social workers, called for the United States to fonn an alliance of collective security 
with the Soviet Union to forestall the spread of fascism.2 Most strident in these calls 
was the American Communist Party, which denounced U.S. isolationist policies and 
characterized the Chamberlain government in England and the government ofFrance 
as containing fascist tendencies threatening to world democracy. In particular, the 
Communist Party called upon progressive organizations and its allies in the Popular 
Front to defend the Soviet Union from possible Nazi aggression through their 
support of a collective security pact between Russia and the United States.3 
Calls for collective security became the centerpiece of rank and file unions' 
foreign policy positions during 1937 and 1938 as reflected in both the speeches of its 
leaders and in resolutions passed by the SCMW A and UOPW A locals and the 
national CIO.4 While support ofcalls for collective security was generally favorably 
reported on in mainstream social work journals such as the Compass and Survey, 
Social Work Today most vigorously argued the case for a collective security pact. 
Condemning the policy ofneutrality pursued by the Roosevelt administration, the 
journal's editors took up the cause ofalliance with the Soviet Union in November, 
1937, declaring that, "There is an inherent weakness in the democratic-pacifist 
reaction to the choices with which nations are faced this day. Soviet Russia has been 
calling attention to this weakness at every opportunity."s The journal's editors called 
upon the Roosevelt administration to repeal the Neutrality Act, which prevented the 
purchase ofwar materials by Spain and China, and supported a boycott of Japanese 
products. Invoking the spirit of internationalism, one contributor to the journal 
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exhorted social workers to ally with clients, unions and peace organizations to 
protect freedom and the "provision ofbread and security,,6: 
The links in the collective striving for bread-peace are 
international. The Spanish loyalists are at the barricades for us all. 
We respond to the International Brigade and with the North 
American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy. Worker 
elements in the present Chinese struggle think of the Japanese 
worker-soldiers, not mainly as enemies, but potential allies. This 
has far-stretching implications. When social workers face war, 
they face in fact an epochal situation, pregnant with a new life.7 
By early 1938, Social Work Today's demands for collective security 
intensified amidst Communist Party denunciations ofreactionary elements in the 
governments of England and France. In an editorial in its April, 1938 edition, Social 
Work Today's editors warned its readers that " .. .international anarchy and world 
fascism" was at hand in the absence ofU.S. support ofcollective security.8 
Declaring that social workers wanted peace, the editors urged its readers to demand 
that the U.S. government actively support anti-fascist struggles in Europe and Asia: 
We are all too well aware of the treasonous cynicism of the 
English fascist, Chamberlain; of the indecisiveness of the French 
Popular Front foreign policy; ofour own vacillation between 
international statesmanship and isolationism. But today is not the 
time for people with a social conscience, with devotion to a 
democratic and peaceful world, to sigh and bite their nails ... There 
is a remedy. There is one remedy. That remedy is collective 
security ... SOCIAL WORK TODAY calls upon every one of its readers 
to become an active and determined worker for peace and 
democracy through collective security. It is the most important 
task confronting the world today.9 (emphasis in the original) 
The journal's calls for collective security were also accompanied by warnings that 
cooperation alone might not prevent world war. In this regard, the journal's editors 
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supported a "positive peace policy" ofcontainment that, if resisted by fascist 
governments, included a call for American military response: "Ifwar-makers 
respond to this peace action with war, they must be defeated with war."tO 
While the mainstream of the profession generally shared Social Work 
Today's calls for collective security, the position of the journal and that of the rank 
and file unions regarding the appeasement policies of the British and French 
governments, and their outspoken admiration of the Soviet Union, were less popular. 
In contrast to Social Work Today's support ofpreparations for war, many leaders of 
the profession and its mainstream journals viewed the origins and solutions of the 
international crisis as primarily economic in ternls, believing that ensuring freedom 
of trade among democratic countries would contain the spread of fascism. Both Paul 
Kellogg, editor ofSurvey, and John Gavit, editor ofSurvey Graphic, supported this 
more moderate stance. Kellogg and Gavit, while supporting the concept of 
collective security, believed that the assurance of free trade among democratic 
countries and the concomitant restriction of trade with fascist governments could 
avert a world-wide conflict. 11 Likewise, the National Federation of Settlements and 
local chapters of AASW supported changes in the Neutrality Act to allow the sale of 
arms of Spain and China, as well as condemning trade with Gennany and Japan. t2 
Solomon Lowenstein, president of the 1939 NCSW, also represented the views of 
many in the mainstream ofthe profession who opposed U.S. intervention in the war 
in Europe. Lowenstein eschewed support of either collective security or isolationist 
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policies but agreed with Kellogg and Gavit that properly applied trade policies could 
avert war. 13 
Ofgreater importance, perhaps, than the differences over the meaning of 
collective security between the rank and file movement and the profession, was the 
movenlent's unabashed support ofthe Soviet Union. Here, clear differences between 
the mainstream of the profession and the rank and file manifested themselves. 
Throughout the late 1930s, many of the mainstream profession'S leadership 
increasingly saw no significant distinction between what they considered the 
totalitarianism ofboth fascism and communism, a comparison strongly disputed by 
Social Work Today and many leaders ofrank and file unions within the UOPWA and 
SCMWA.14 While such differences rarely surfaced publicly, the apparent sympathies 
of the movement towards Soviet-style communism would later estrange it from the 
mainstream profession and divide the movement itself in the wake ofthe Nazi-Soviet 
pact ofnon-aggression. 
Despite the growing differences between the rank and file and the profession 
on the matter ofcollective security, both found common ground in the case of the 
Spanish Civil War. In 1936, pro-fascist elements ofthe Spanish military under the 
command ofgeneral Francisco Franco revolted against the leadership of the newly­
elected leftist government. From the onset of the civil war until the defeat of the 
government in 1939, the cause of the Spanish loyalist government received the 
sympathetic support ofU.S. liberals and progressive organizations. The Communist 
Party would soon become the focal organization rallying support for the loyalists, 
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holding up the civil war as an example of the betrayal ofwestern democracies 
through their policies ofneutrality. The party was instrumental in organizing 
numerous organizations to support the loyalist cause, including the Spanish Aid 
Committee, the American Friends of Spanish Democracy and the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade, one of several volunteer units ofAmericans organized by the Communist 
Party that fought on the loyalist side in Spain. IS 
The cause of the Spanish loyalists temporarily united both the rank and file 
and the liberal wing of the mainstream profession. Social work radicals and union 
leaders, such as Mary van Kleeck, Roger Baldwin, Lewis Merrill and Abram Flaxer, 
as well as liberal social workers such as Paul Kellogg and Grace Coyle, joined a long 
list of academics, artists, writers and union officials in an open letter to President 
Roosevelt supporting the lifting of the U.S. embargo against selling arms to Spain. I6 
Rank and file unions and AASW chapters alike supported the formation of the Social 
Workers Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, a subsidiary organization of the 
American Friends of Spanish Democracy. Once again, rarlk and file social workers 
such as van Kleeck, Bertha Reynolds, Jacob Fisher and Joseph Levy, as well as 
liberals such as Paul Kellogg, Gordon Hamilton, Owen Lovejoy and Lillian Wald, 
joined ranks as members of the committee's Executive Board. 17 Throughout the 
course of the civil war, the Committee would raise funds for medical supplies, the 
construction ofhospitals, and the care of refugees. In addition to fund raising, 
several delegations of social workers led by Committee member Constance Kyle 
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made trips to Spain to identify needs and hold fund-raising meetings in the United 
States upon their return. 18 
For some social workers in the rank and file movement, mere financial or 
moral support ofthe loyalist cause would not suffice. In June, 1937, a small notice 
in Social Work Today announced: 
In Memoriam 
Julius Rosenthal 
Social worker, active trade unionist in the Association ofWorkers 
in Public Relief Agencies, friend of SOCIAL WORK TODAY, 
volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion with the Loyalist 
forces in Spain: killed while fighting Fascism that Democracy 
might live - April, 193719 
While the number of social workers who fought and died in the civil war are 
unknown, Julias Rosenthal was the first so recorded, symbolizing in his death the 
depth ofcommitment the rank and file placed in defeating fascism.2o 
From Collective Security to "The Yanks Are Not Coming" 
The calls ofSocial Work Today and the rank and file unions of the SCMWA 
and UOPWA for the United States to shed its neutrality continued unabated through 
the summer of 1939.21 As Franco was poised to claim victory in the civil war in 
Spain, Social Work Today lamented the collapse of the loyalist forces, attributing its 
defeat to the failures of the western democracies: 
[Spain is] a victim, like Austria and Czechoslovakia, to the 
connivance of the pro-fascist heads of the British and French 
governments with the deadly enemies ofdemocracy. In this 
betrayal the United States has played its part by a 'neutrality' 
which denied the S~anish government its right to purchase the 
means ofdefense ... 2 
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But events in August 1939 would suddenly and dramatically alter the movement's 
strident calls for an end to U.S. neutrality. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the 
Soviet Union announced the signing of a non-aggression pact between the two 
countries, sending shock-waves ofdisbelief throughout the left-progressive 
community in the United States and much of the world. 
In the United States, the Communist Party was caught equally unawares by 
the announcement of the pact's signing. Prior rumors of such an impending pact had 
been met with scorn by the party, prompting party leader Earl Browder to compare 
the chances of such an agreement as less likely than his election to the office of 
President.23 Now, the party was in disarray as it sought to both understand the 
reasons for the pact and explain this sudden change in Russian policy to its members 
and its allies within the Popular Front. In early September, the party's Political 
Commission met to decide on a course of action. Within less than a month, from the 
signing of the pact to the conclusion of the Commission's deliberations, the party's 
vigorous campaign for collective security was replaced with a new call: "Keep 
America out of the Imperialist War!,,24 Reversing course, the party now declared 
that the war in Europe was imperialist in origin and should be opposed by the 
American people: 
The war that has broken out in Europe is the Second Imperialist 
War. The ruling capitalist and landlord classes of all the 
belligerent countries are equally guilty for this war. 
This war, therefore, cannot be supported by the workers. It is not a 
war against fascism, not a war to protect small nations from 
217 
aggression, not a war that workers can or should support. It is a 
war between rival imperialisms for world domination. The 
workers must be against this war.25 
The sudden shift ofthe Communist Party from demands for collective security to a 
call for isolationist policies was accompanied by new attacks by the party upon the 
Roosevelt administration and previous allies in the Popular Front that refused to 
agree with the party's new line.26 The impact of this sudden policy reversal by the 
party devastated much of the respect and prestige it had earned during the earlier 
years of the Popular Front. Over the course of the next two years, membership in the 
party would decline dramatically, as would the membership ofmany Popular Front 
organizations closely associated with the Communist Party. Indeed, the party's 
premiere ally, the American League for Peace and Democracy, with an estimated 
membership of 20,000 in August of 1939, lost over 1,000 members per month until 
its disbanding in 1940. Other organizations close to the party suffered similar losses, 
including the American Student Union, the League ofAmerican Writers, The League 
for Peace and Democracy and American Friends of the Soviet Union.27 
While much of the liberal community within and outside of social work 
recoiled with distaste in reaction to the Communist Party's reversal ofpolitical line 
in the weeks following the signing ofthe non-aggression pact, the unions represented 
by the SCMWA and UOPWA, as well as Social Work Today, quickly revised their 
own line, now declaring that the war in Europe was purely inspired by the imperialist 
policies of the western democratic governments.28 In its first issue following the 
announcement of the non-aggression pact, Social Work Today published a special 
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editorial, entitled "The War and the New Deal.,,29 Dropping their previous calls for 
collective security, the editors now declared that the programs of the New Deal could 
only be defended by a policy ofpeace and neutrality: 
The answer to us is clear. The basic things which America can 
offer the world today are a strong prosperous, democratic social 
organization and a foreign policy consistent with it. .. The New Deal 
march toward social progress must be intensified. Unification 
there must be, yes, but it must be unification around satisfied need. 
The other kind of 'unification' - clinging to the status quo, a status 
ofsocial injustice - leads straight towards mass discontent, toward 
30disillusionment with democracy, toward war as a panacea. 
To defend this "march" of the New Deal, Social Work Today now advised its readers 
that social workers must make America " ...a force for peace" and " ... prevent our 
being dragged into a war ofwhich we want no part ... ,,31 
Refining its switch in position from one ofcollective security to one of strict 
neutrality, in January, 1940, Social Work Today drew up a statement ofprinciples, 
"Meeting Social Need: A Peace Program.,,32 Declaring that it was time for social 
workers ", ..to speak out for the maintenance and extension of social progress" and 
"point out the dangers ofwar propaganda," Social Work Today's editors articulated a 
program calling for the protection of social gains at home through a resistance to 
33
war. The Peace Program statement detailed seven principles for peace and 
continued social progress: 1) the protection and expansion ofbasic social welfare 
program; 2) the prevention ofdiversion ofsocial welfare funds to the military; 3) 
resistance of the administration of social and civil services by the military; 4) the 
public redistribution ofgovernment profits obtained through the sale of arms to 
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foreign governments; 5) the protection ofcivil rights and the continued rights of 
unions to collective bargaining; 6) the commitment of the profession to the 
maintenance ofpeace; and 7) an intensified alliance between the profession and 
community organizations in support ofpeace and the protection ofdemocratic 
rights.34 Tapping the anti-war sentiment widely prevalent in the field, the principles 
were endorsed by over 75 national and local leaders in the profession, including 
leaders of the UOPW A and SCMW A unions and rank and file supporters such as 
Mary van Kleeck, Harry Lurie and Bertha Reynolds. In addition to the movement's 
expected supporters, leaders in the mainstream ofthe profession, including Dorothy 
Kahn, Gordon Hanlilton, Paul Kellogg and Karl de Schweinitz, also endorsed the 
statement ofprinciples.35 
While the support ofSocial Work Today's Peace Program by many in the 
mainstream of social work reflected a genuine opposition to American entry into the 
war within the whole of the profession, many of the statement's signatories 
questioned the journal's seemingly mirrored stances of the Communist Party, 
particularly the journal's condemnation ofEngland as a main instigator of imperialist 
war and its opposition to U.S. aid to the British government.36 To buttress the 
journal's position, Mary van Kleeck attempted to explain to readers the reasoning 
behind the non-aggression pact and make the case for understanding war in Europe 
as a fundamental expression of imperialism. Arguing that the non-aggression pact 
was necessary in the face of the Soviet Union's inability to rely on the League of 
Nations and the Chamberlain government to ensure a pact ofcollective security 
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against Germany, van Kleeck maintained that the German-Soviet pact had 
effectively blunted further imperialist ambitions of the British and French. For 
American social workers, van Kleeck argued that " ... our position in the world crisis 
must therefore be one ofconstructive neutrality, independent ~fthe conflicts which 
do not concern us, but demanding that they be subordinated to the human interests 
implied in all our work.,,37 
Trade unions representing social workers in the CIO also took uP. the banner 
ofnon-intervention, joining with the anti-war sentiments ofCIO chief John Lewis, 
whose fear ofU.S. intervention led him to briefly consider the launching of a third 
party to oppose Roosevelt in the 1940 elections. As the CIO passed resolutions 
against U.S. intervention at its national convention, Lewis made labor's case for non­
intervention: 
Involvement or intervention in the European war is repugnant to 
every healthy-minded American. The American electorate is 
anxious to demonstrate this fact in the political election of 1940. 
The major political party that permits war, or potential war 
profiteers, or professional politicians with an aggressive military 
complex, to dominate or write its platform will find itself 
hopelessly beaten by the votes of an outraged electorate in 
November.38 
National conventions ofboth the SCMWA and UOPWA passed resolutions 
opposing intervention and, condemning what the unions considered a rising tide of 
war hysteria fanned by the Roosevelt administration, called on its members to defend 
social welfare programs from possible conversion into programs for military 
preparedness.39 But unlike the CIO's Lewis, leaders of the SCMW A and the 
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UOPWA enthusiastically embraced the Communist's "The Yanks Are Not Coming" 
slogan, fonning hundreds of local union "The Yanks Are Not Coming" and "Peace" 
committees during early 1940, including over 70 such committees in New York City 
alone.40 The Joint Committee ofTrade Unions in Social Work (JCTU), a coalition 
ofSCMW A and UOPW A unions, carried the movement's peace message to the 
1940 NCSW conference held in Grand Rapids, Michigan. There, members of the 
JCTU obtained over 1,000 signatures from delegates in support ofSocial Work 
Today's Peace Program statement and sponsored sessions warning social workers of 
the dangers ofU.S. involvement in the war in Europe.41 
Throughout 1940 and early 1941, the pages ofSocial Work Today 
increasingly emphasized the need for social workers to support U.S. neutrality. 
Reversing its earlier support of the New Deal during the days ofthe Popular Front, 
the journal renewed its criticisms ofRoosevelt and the inadequacies of the New 
Deal. Editorials and articles condemned reductions in the WP A and the 
militarization of the CCC and other federal work projects as the journal's editor, 
Frank Bancroft, warned ofan increasing deflection of social welfare programs into 
war preparedness programs: 
It is my finn conviction that rational understanding ofwhat is 
happening around and to the social services, and determined action 
on the basis ofsuch understanding, are the primary needs of all of 
us in social work at the this moment. Federal social services, 
deflected from their proper objective ofdealing constructively with 
pennanent social programs, are being integrated into the national 
defense program. This is being done as an organic part ofa 
governmental policy supported by the worst enemies of these 
222 
programs, of substituting a war economy for the consumers' 
economy toward which ... the New Deal was directed.42 
Bancroft went on to clearly articulate the journal's main thesis, reminiscent of its 
charges ofNew Deal social fascism in the early 1930s: "True American patriotism 
today lies .. .in the determination that America will be the first great power to deal 
successfully with its domestic fascism in time to prevent war ... fascism cannot be 
fought by fascism, but must be fought by its opposites -liberty and security.,,43 
Despite the anti-war sentiments expressed by delegates to the 1940 NCSW 
and the AASW's delegate assembly, as U.S. entry into the war seemed increasingly 
likely, by late 1940 many in the mainstream ofsocial work, unlike Social Work 
Today and the CIO trade unions representing social workers, moderated their 
previous pacifism and moved to support war preparations. In September 1940, the 
New York State chapter ?f the AASW formed a Committee on the Social Aspects of 
Defense, and the national AASW Committee on Government and Social Work also 
began deliberations on the role of the profession during times ofwar. Noting these 
developments with alarm, Social Work Today warned that the AASW " ... might act as 
convenient messengers from the military to the civil and social side ofAmerican life, 
rather than as professionally skilled ambassadors from the people ... ,,44 
While significant numbers ofthe AASW and its leadership continued to 
prepare for the possibilities ofU.S. entry into the war, Social Work Today intensified 
its calls for neutrality and defense ofdomestic social welfare programs. In its final 
issue before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Social Work 
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Today made a special appeal to social workers attending the 1941 NCSW, presenting 
what it called a "People's Program in 1941": 
Today social workers find themselves in serious conflict because 
of the severity of the impact of the present war program upon the 
people's program ofdemocratic social advancement. It is 
increasingly difficult for them to face resolutely the fact that the 
war program is not the people's program .... 
The American people have the wit and the courage to organize 
themselves for peace more effectively than they have been 
organized for war... Today, in a dozen ways, they are organizing for 
themselves a life ofpeace, freedom and security.4S 
As word of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union reached the American Communist 
Party on June 22, 1941, yet an?ther shift in its foreign policy line would soon be 
forthcoming for both the party and the rank and file movement. On June 28, the 
party's National Committee silently abandoned its previous characterization of the 
war in Europe as an imperialist war, now calling upon the American government to 
support military efforts to defeat fascism.46 Once again, the editorial line ofSocial 
Work Today would reflect this sudden shift from neutrality to war preparation. In its 
first issue published after the Nazi invasion, Albert Deutsch explained the new set of 
circumstances facing progressive social workers and their unions: 
One simple, inescapable fact pounds upon our social thinking 
today: we're in a war. It's no longer a war ofwords, but an 
honest-to-goodness shooting war, a war between two mutually 
incompatible worlds - democracy and fascism ... Social workers, as 
such, have as large a stake in victory as nay other single group in 
the population, for fascism is the annihilation of social work ... 
This is no phony war ... We've watched a monster follow its 
destructive path for eight years ... We must kill it or be killed ... This 
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is a good time to be a social worker - for those who can take it. 
Let's gO.47 
Trade unions representing social workers also altered their political line 
following the German invasion. Delegates to the 1941 SCMW A Second Biennial 
Convention endorsed the Roosevelt administration's provision ofaid to the Soviet 
Union and Britain. Addressing the convention, SCMW A president Abram Flaxer, 
who months previous had condemned U.S. war preparations, now pledged its 
membership would support the government's preparations" ... for all out aid to the 
war efforts of those nations now engaged in the war to wipe out the menace of 
Hitlerism.,,48 With the Japanese bombing ofPearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the 
shift of the rank and file unions and their voice, Social Work Today, was complete. 
Declaring in its January, 1942 issue that"...the job ofour field ofwork a major 
instrument in Victory," the journal now identified its "essential task" as 
" ...articulating the most progressive and imaginative social and professional thinking 
ofour field around social mobilization. ,,49 Like Social Work Today, the SCMW A 
and UOPW A also pledged the full support of its member unions in the war effort and 
joined the CIO national leadership in backing a no-strike policy for the duration of 
the conflict.5o Beset by financial debt and its staffnow drawn away by the war, the 
February, 1942 issue ofSocial Work Today would be its last, its final article perhaps 
appropriately authored by Bertha Reynolds: 
We know there will be blood, sweat and tears. We know there will 
be new heights ofheroic devotion. We know that the united will 
of the people will not lose. We know that grim realities like guns 
and tanks and airplanes will make possible - or fail to make 
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possible - the intangibles like human brotherhood really lived out, 
creative achievement, peaceful work, love and worship. We are 
resolved that the battle ofproduction, grim as it is, shall not fail, 
and the clash of arms shall not cease until the world is safe from 
pestilent terror and free men can shape their destiny. 51 . 
Red Scares, War, and a Cold War: The Demise of the Rank and File Movement 
As the tortured twisting of foreign and domestic policy lines continued 
throughout 1940 and 1941 in the pages ofSocial Work Today and in the resolutions 
of CIO unions most closely linked to the Communist Party, particularly the SCMWA 
and UOPW A, both the journal and the unions soon came under attack for alleged 
communist domination by elements within the profession, conservative forces within 
the CIO, and state and federal subversive investigation committees. While the rank 
and file trade unions and Social Work Today briefly seemed to be assuming a 
leadership role in their promotion ofthe Peace Program, supported by so many at the 
1940 NCSW, by 1941, charges ofcommunist domination of the journal and trade 
unions representing social workers began to surface within the profession. Most 
prominent in these attacks was the Social Work Trade Unionists for Britain and 
Democracy committee, headed by John Fitch. Accusing the rank and file unions of 
being dominated by Communists, the committee distributed mimeographed papers to 
leaders of the profession and delegates to the 1941 NCSW elaborating on their 
accusations.52 Tracing the evolving political line ofSocial Work Today through 
October of 1940, the committee charged the journal in its first paper with 
consistently being in accord with the Communist Party: 
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The above [analysis] ofSocial Work Today editorial policy speaks 
for itself. In both domestic and foreign affairs the journal has 
consistently taken a stand which parallels the C.P. line, has 
employed the same arguments, and has, therefore, shown that its 
present isolationist concern cannot be regarded as a logical result 
of intellectual conviction. 53 
A second mimeographed attack on Social Work Today was distributed by the 
committee in June of 1941. Tracing the journal's continuing shifts in foreign and 
domestic policy, the paper reasserted its claim that the journal and officials of the 
SCMWA and UOPWA were aligned with the Communist Party, taking pains to list 
the names ofno less than 46 individuals who were staff or sponsors of the journal. 54 
The committee continued its attack at the 1941 NCSW conference, distributing a 
flyer accusing the SCMW A and UOPW A ofbeing tools ofpropagandists opposed to 
enemies of totalitarianism. The increasing agreement ofmany within the profession 
that the rank and file unions were suspect was, indeed, indicated by some 80 
signatures of support on the flyer, many ofwhom had signed the Peace Program 
statement ofa year ago. 55 
The growing tendency within the mainstream of the profession to associate 
the rank and file unions with the purported totalitarian politics of the Communist 
Party reflected a growing consensus within the whole of the American liberal 
community during 1939 and 1940 that both communism and fascisnl were equally 
dangerous threats to democracy. Following the Communist Party's reversal of its 
political line after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, liberal-left 
pUblications such as The Nation and the New RepUblic now condemned the party and 
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its supporters as untrustworthy and subservient to the interests of the Soviet Union. 56 
As a growing consensus ofanti-Communism developed among liberals, many 
liberal-left organizations began adopting so-called "CommuNazi" policies during 
1939 and 1940, denying membership to and expelling suspected members of the 
Communist Party and fascist organizations.s7 Reflecting the rising tide of liberal 
anti-Communism, Survey Graphic published several articles equating the dangers of 
communism with fascism, including an appeal by Archibald MacLeish for liberals to 
reject the Communist Party's policy of anti-fascism and instead " ... adopt the policy 
of aggressive pro-democratic action ..."s8 Even Harry Lurie, a formerly stalwart ally 
of the rank and file unions, began to turn away from the movement's defense of the 
Soviet Union and its perceived allegiance to the Communist Party. Stung by the 
Moscow trials and the Nazi-Soviet pact, Lurie rejected association with the 
Communist Party and criticized Social Work Today editor Frank Bancroft for the 
magazine's " ...tendencies in the administration of the magazine that are inclined to 
be dogmatic and inflexible in character," and warned Bancroft that " ...should SWT 
become increasingly orthodox and rigid in its point of view, I believe that I, for one, 
would begin to lose interest in it since I don't believe in the finality of truths and 
revelations...,,59 The extent ofdisenchantment ofsome within the rank and file 
movement regarding its Communist members was further dramatized by the 
rejection of Communist association by Roger Baldwin. Once one of the movement's 
most strident and radical intellectual leaders, by 1940, Baldwin now considered 
Communism as equal a danger as fascism. Baldwin, Executive Director of the 
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American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), joined with liberal anti-Communist 
Executive Board members in 1940 to expel board member Elizabeth Gurley Brown, 
an open Communist and member of the party's National Committee. Brown's 
eventual expulsion was strongly opposed by ACLU board member Mary van Kleeck, 
who resigned from the board and subsequently broke off relations with Baldwin, just 
as Baldwin severed his ties with the rank and file movement. 60 
While allegations ofCommunist domination of the rank and file unions 
increased during 1940 and 1941 within the profession, rank and file alarm over such 
accusations was quickly superceded by the formation in the early 1940s of state and 
federal subversive activities committees investigating Communist subversion in 
labor unions and other organizations throughout the country.61 As fears of 
Communism began to share an equal footing with the dangers of fascism, in 1939 the 
Roosevelt administration began to take steps against the Communist Party, 
conducting numerous investigations into the activities of the party and arresting party 
leader Earl Browder on charges ofpassport violations.62 In Congress, anti­
Communist legislators passed the Alien Registration Act, popularly referred to as the 
Smith Act, requiring the registration ofall non-citizens with the government and 
providing for the deportation of aliens shown to be members of revolutionary 
political organizations. Included in the provisions of the Smith Act was a sedition 
clause, establishing the act of teaching or advocating the overthrow the government 
as a federal crime. Under the provisions ofthis new sedition law, mere membership 
in an organization promoting such acts was sufficient for conviction. Adding to the 
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provisions of the Smith Act, the 1940 Congress also passed the Voorhis Registration 
Act, required all organizations "subject to foreign control" to register with the 
Department of Justice.63 Even prior to the passage of the Smith Act and the Voorhis 
Registration Act, Congress had authorized the creation ofthe House Un-American 
Activities Committee in 1938. Under the leadership ofMartin Dies, an ardent 
opponent of the New Deal and staunch anti-Communist, HUAC was empowered to 
investigate communist and fascist influence in suspected organizations as well as 
allegations of such infiltration in government agencies.64 
As the HUAC launched a series of investigations into fascist and communist 
subversion in the late 1930s and early 1940s, so-called Little Dies committees were 
similarly authorized by several state legislatures. While the HUAC had concentrated 
its investigations on communist subversion in New Deal projects such as the Federal 
Writers Project, the Federal Theatre, and the CCC, as well as organizations such as 
the Farmer-Labor Party and the ACLU, many of the state-initiated subversive 
activities committees focused on public relief unions in their investigations of 
communist sUbversion.6s The most ambitious of these Little Dies committees would 
surface in California, where the Assembly Relief Investigating Committee, under the 
chairmanship of Samuel Yorty, was authorized by the legislature to investigate 
alleged communist infiltration into the State's Relief Administration (SRA).66 
Declaring that the SCMW A, the union representing relief workers, was under the 
control of the Communist Party, the committee held a series of investigatory 
hearings throughout California in 1940. In the wake of the investigations, numerous 
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SCMW A members were arrested on charges ofcontempt by the committee, and a 
wholesale purge of SCMW A members in the SRA began. In Alameda, over 30 
workers were dismissed, including the entire executive board of the local union, and 
18 employees of the Stockton SRA office arrested for defying the investigating 
committee were subsequently dismissed. SRA offices in Los Angeles, Visalia, and 
San Francisco witnessed similar dismissals ofunion leaders and members, severely 
weakening SCMW A.67 The committee's attacks on SCMW A were accompanied by 
similar attacks on unions and their members within private agencies. In Los 
Angeles, members of the SSEU local ofthe UOPWA were dismissed on charges of 
inefficiency and subversion by the Jewish Social Service Bureau, and the union 
battled to maintain its right to collectively bargain on behalf of its members. 
Members of the UOPWA were also accused ofbeing communists by the Yorty 
committee and its successor, the Tenney Committee, in San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
and San Diego as the SSEU locals struggled to maintain their membership.68 
The investigations of SCMWA and UOPW A in California were replicated in 
various degrees by subversive activities committees in other states. In Pennsylvania, 
over 50 employees of the Philadelphia County Board ofPublic Assistance, including 
the entire executive board of the local SCMWA, were fired over charges of 
association with the Communist Party and violations of the Hatch Act (prohibiting 
political activity by government employees) following hearings of the Dies 
Committee into communist influence in Philadelphia.69 In addition to investigating 
the SCMWA, the Dies committee focused its attention on Social Work Today and its 
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National Committee ofCooperators, a fundraising group that included Bertha 
Reynolds, Mary van Kleeck, Abram Flaxer, Lewis Merrill and others. After hearing 
testimony on the journal, the committee declared the journ~l a "Communist Front" 
publication and added its supporters to its lists ofcommunist sympathizers.70 In 
Newark, New Jersey, local leaders ofthe SCMWA were accused by the local relief 
agency ofbeing communists and summarily dismissed without hearings, almost 
breaking the union. 71 Similar investigations in Michigan, Texas, Illinois, and 
Maryland also targeted the SCMWA and UOPWA, resulting in dismissals ofunion 
leaders and activists for alleged communist subversion, seriously undermining union 
gains made over the previous years.72 
As unions representing rank and file social workers reeled under the assaults 
of government investigations, they came under equal attack by anti-Communist 
elements within the CIO. While the presence ofCommunist Party union organizers 
in the initial organization of the CIO had been tolerated and even solicited by CIO 
president John Lewis, Lewis' toleration was based on a recognition ofparty 
organizational skills as opposed to any agreement with the party's politics.73 During 
the late 1930s, an uneasy alliance between Lewis and the Communist Party was 
maintained, primarily due to Lewis' opposition to Roosevelt, who Lewis feared was 
leading the nation into a world war. Lewis' opposition to Roosevelt, and his hands­
offattitude towards communists in the CIO, engendered resistance from more 
conservative CIO union leaders, coalescing behind the leadership ofSidney Hillman, 
president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. An ardent supporter ofRoosevelt 
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and openly anti-Communist, Hillman accused Lewis ofharboring communists in the 
labor movement and called for the expulsion ofcommunist and left-led unions and 
their supporters, including the SCMW A and UOPW A. Lewis, fearful that Hillman 
was in alliance with Roosevelt to take over the labor movement, rebuffed Hillman's 
charges and refused to take action against union leaders who were open Communist 
Party members or suspected ofparty affiliation.74 
As the conflict between the Hillman forces and Lewis broke into open 
warfare in 1939, the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact further 
spurred anti-Communist sentiment within the CIO. Much to Lewis' chagrin, the 
United Auto Workers (UA W), led by Walter Reuther, passed resolutions at its 1940 
convention supporting Roosevelt, condemning the totalitarianism ofboth Germany 
and the Soviet Union and barring members who were affiliated with subversive 
organizations from holding offices in the union.7s The pro-Roosevelt and anti­
Communist stance of the UAW, one of the largest CIO unions, was a direct 
challenge to Lewis and an ominous portent ofhis future ability to maintain control of 
the CIO. As most ofthe CIO unions, including those led by open members ofthe 
Communist Party, announced their support for Roosevelt in the 1940 election 
campaign, Lewis announced his endorsement ofRepublican candidate Wendell 
Wilkie, further eroding his standing within the CIO. At the 1941 CIO c~nvention, 
Lewis announced his intention to step down, nominating Phillip Murray to replace 
him. In a frontal assault against Lewis, unions under the leadership ofHillman 
introduced a resolution to bar Communists and fascists from holding union offices. 
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While the resolution was defeated as a result of last minute negotiations by Lewis, 
the convention passed a compromise resolution condemning fascist and Communist 
ideology as having "...no place in this great modem labor movement.,,76 Fearful of a 
draft-Lewis movement at the convention, the Hillman forces threw their support 
behind Murray, who assumed leadership ofthe CIO, thus temporarily averting anti­
Communist purges. 
With the outbreak ofWorld War II, attacks on communism in the CIO 
generally subsided as the unions declared a no-strike pledge for the duration of the 
war and directed most of their activities'to support of the war effort.77 Like the other 
CIO unions, both the SCMW A and UOPW A generally adhered to the no-strike 
pledge. During the war, the public relief and welfare unions slowly gained 
membership, although such gains were hampered by frequent layoffs due to dramatic 
drops in relief rolls and intensive staff turnover within relief agencies as many male 
workers joined the military. As the unions refrained from their previous militant 
insistence on improved salaries and benefits for the duration ofthe war, real wages 
for public relief workers dramatically declined between 1941 and 1944, not returning 
to pre-war levels until 1945.78 
Partially as a result of the declining political militancy of the unions during 
the war, a muting of anti-Communism, and a shared priority on serving the war 
effort, rank and file unions and the AASW grew closer during the war years. Unions 
representing social workers worked closely with the AASW during the war on war 
fund drives, community chest fund-raising, and preparations for social welfare 
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programming in the post-war period. As relations between the rank and file unions 
and the professional organization wanned, the CIO sponsored a series of formal 
meetings in 1945 between their social work unions and the AASW to chart out 
common cooperation, culminating in the formation ofa joint AASW -CIO Civil 
Service Association Information Exchange.79 Relationships between the unions and 
the AASW would continue to strengthen in the immediate post-war period, such that 
in 1946, the AASW, while not fully endorsing social workers' engagement in 
collective bargaining, included a set ofprinciples regarding collective bargaining and 
approval ofthe right of social workers to join unions in its policies on personnel 
practices. While the mainstream ofthe profession now recognized trade union 
merrlbership as not necessarily being in conflict with professional identity, the 
AASW continued to view labor activities as a primarily non-social work function. 80 
With the end ofWorld War II, the SCMWA, UOPWA, and other CIO unions 
quickly returned to their more militant tactics of the pre-war period as they sought to 
rebuild their membership and restore salary levels and benefits that had either 
stagnated or fallen during the war. In the wake ofthe war's end, a wave of strikes 
swept the nation throughout 1945 and 1946 as employers and unions battled over 
union demands for increased benefits and wages and employer attempts to maintain 
the lower benefit levels they had enjoyed during the war.81 Like other CIO unions, 
the SCMW A and UOPW A aggressively sought increased benefits for its members 
and pursued contracts for collective bargaining with additional public and private 
social welfare agencies. In 1946, the SCWMA merged with the CIO's United 
235 
Federal Workers ofAmerica, a union of federal employees, to form the United 
Public Workers ofAmerica (UPWA). As SCMWA president Abram Flaxer 
assumed leadership ofthe UPWA, the new union now consisted ofbetween 60,000 
and 70,000 members, including an estimated 8,000-10,000 public reliefworkers.82 
The newly-fonned UPW A engaged in walk-outs and strikes in numerous cities, most 
notably New York, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, as part ofhighly 
successful efforts to win imprOVed wages and benefits for its members.83 Also 
seeking to improve their position, the UOPWA accepted into its union the Federation 
of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Teachers, increasing its membership to over 
45,000 under its new president, James Durkin. While social work membership 
remained relatively small in the UOPWA, perhaps 5-6,000 total members in 30 
locals nationwide, SSEU locals also joined in the CIO strike wave in New York, 
Chicago and Los Angeles and were largely successful in regaining benefits lost 
during the war.84 
Unions representing rank and file social workers emerged from World War 
II with a growing membership and a renewed association with the mainstream of the 
profession. Successful campaigns to revive stagnating membership during the war 
and new collective bargaining contracts in public and private agencies had been won 
during 1945 and 1946. And while the demise ofSocial Work Today had deprived 
the movement ofa central voice, the progressive politics espoused in its pages 
continued to be voiced in union newsletters and the joint councils of social work 
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unions that had fonned prior to and during the war. As one social work trade union 
leader of the time recalled, 
Most ofus [social workers in unions] were giddy at the end of the 
war. Giddy about peace and giddy about the future of the union. 
We had survived the red-hunters before the war and had overcome 
people like [John] Fitch and his reactionary group of social 
workers. The question ofcommunism was irrelevant to us for the 
most part. Sure, many like [Abram] Flaxer, [Elizabeth] Nelson and 
[James] Durkin were members of the party, but that wasn't an 
issue. They served the interests of the rank and file, not the party. 
It was the cold warriors who puffed up the communist stuff, they 
destroyed our unions, not the communists. 85 
Despite the successes of the unions representing social workers in the 
immediate post-war period, a rising tide of anti-Communist sentiment in Congress 
and the nation as a whole, would revive itself in the new era of the Cold War. 
Finding its origins in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, in which President Truman 
announced that American foreign policy would challenge Communist aggression 
wherever it was deemed to threaten freedom and democracy, the politics of the Cold 
War would come to dominate both foreign and domestic policy during the late 1940s 
and 1950s.86 As the perceived threat of communist aggression outside the borders of 
the United States was converted into an equal fear of internal communist subversion, 
once again the specter ofcommunist subversion would envelop the unions in a 
ruthless witch hunt from both within and outside of the labor movement. 
Within the CIO, the revival of anticommunist forces signaled the beginning 
of a bitter struggle within the leadership of the CIO over the communist question. 
Struggles between anticommunist and communist and left-led groupings wracked the 
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United Automobile Workers, the United Electrical Workers, and the National 
Maritime Union. In October of 1946, 34 CIO unions formed the CIO Committee for 
Renovative Trade Unions, with the expressed purpose ofousting what they 
considered communist-controlled unions.s7 At the CIO's 1946 national convention 
unions in the committee put forth a resolution calling on the CIO to reject policies 
" ...emanating from totalitarianism, dictatorships and foreign ideologies such as 
Communism and Fascism.,,88 CIO president Phil Murray, seeking to avoid a fatal 
split in the union, appointed a six-person committee to draft a compromise 
resolution. Included on the committee were Abram Flaxer of the UPW A, Mike 
Quill, the open Communist leader of the Transport Workers Union, and Ben Gold, 
president of the Fur and Leather Workers ofAmerica, also an open member of the 
Communist Party. Faced with pressure by Murray to adopt a compromise that would 
avoid expUlsions, Flaxer and the others on the committee reluctantly adopted an 
alternative resolution subsequently passed by the convention stating that convention 
delegates " ...resent and reject efforts of the Communist Party or other political 
parties and their adherents to interfere in the affairs of the CIO.,,89 But the hopes of 
Flaxer and other union leaders accused ofheading communist-dominated unions that 
the compromise resolution would avoid purges were quickly dashed. Following the 
national convention, local and state CIO conventions in New York, Michigan, Los 
Angeles, Washington and other areas adopted similar anticommunist resolutions, 
ousting suspected communists from leadership positions in the state and local union 
joint councils.90 Seeking to avoid internal dissension, UOPW A president Lewis 
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Merrill ordered his union members and officers to avoid identification with the 
Communist Party, threatening disciplinary action against those who failed to do so. 
Following his announcement, Merrill resigned from his position as a contributing 
editor to the New Masses magazine as well as resigning from the board ofdirectors 
of the Jefferson School, long associated with the Communist party.91 Despite 
Merrill's attempts to distance the union from charges of communism, the UOPWA, 
as well as the UPW A, battled attempts ofother anti-Communist CIO unions to raid 
their membership, as well as raids by the AFL's American Federation of 
Government Employees.92 
Beset by internal conflict within the CIO, the unions representing social 
workers faced new threats from the Truman Administration and a Republican­
controlled Congress. In March of 1947, President Truman issued an executive order 
establishing a federal loyalty oath program, requiring all federal employees to sign 
an oath that they did not belong to any subversive organizations as identified by the 
U.S. Attorney General. Coming on the heels of the UPWA's resistance to signing 
the Hatch Act of 1939, which prohibited public employees from engaging in political 
activities, the loyalty oath program would decimate union membership. The unions' 
refusal to sign provisions ofthe Hatch Act had already denied them federal 
protections of the right to collective bargaining, and they had struggled to maintain 
recognition by employers throughout the early 1940s. Following affirmation of the 
Hatch Act by the Supreme Court in a challenge brought by the UPWA, UOPWA and 
UPWA unions had only recently agreed to its provisions as the loyalty program was 
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created.93 Now, as the UPWA's leaders and members refused to sign loyalty oaths, 
or found themselves under investigation for suspected disloyalty, a wave of 
dismissals and resignations increasingly crippled the union's ability to represent 
federal workers. By the end of 1947, the impact of the loyalty program, coupled 
with raids by the AFL, found the UPW A considering the advantages of forming a 
separate union of federal employees outside of the UPWA.94 Compounding the 
difficulties of the UPW A and the UOPW A, the Republican-controlled Congress 
overrode President Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, requiring all 
union officers to sign an oath specifically denying membership in or affiliation with 
the Communist Party and banning strikes by federal employees.9s Once again, 
UPWA leaders refused to comply, were stripped of representation protection by the 
National Labor Relations Board, and found many companies and social agencies 
now refusing to recognize the union's right to represent employees and voiding 
contracts.96 
The social work unions of the UPWA came under particular attack in New 
York. Following passage of the federal Taft-Hartley Act, the New York state 
legislature passed legislation forbidding public employees from going on strike. 
Adding to the anti-union legislation, newspapers in New York City had attacked the 
UPWA for alleged communism and blamed its permissive policies for encouraging a 
rise in relief rolls in the city during 1946 and 1947. As newspapers published attacks 
on the morals and lack ofwork incentives among recipients, the UPWA responded 
with the distribution of thousands of leaflets describing the facts ofpoverty in the 
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city and sponsored demonstrations of support for maintaining and expanding relief 
benefits. While the union struggled with the city's Welfare Department to win a new 
contract, a rival organization, the Civil Service Forum, organized to condemn the 
leadership of the UPWA and woo away UPWA members disturbed by charges of 
communist control of the union.97 
Besieged within the CIO, and under attack by federal investigators, the 
unions representing social workers received their final blow during the 1948 and 
1949 national conventions of the CIO. As delegates to the 1948 CIO national 
convention gathered in Portland, Oregon, anti-Communist forces within the CIO, 
now under the leadership Walter Reuther, held sufficient power to call for the 
expUlsion of the left-led unions. Challenging CIO president Phil Murray, who had 
been reluctant to act upon the anti-Communist resolutions ofprevious conventions, 
Reuther warned, "You [Murray] are not going to be tolerated forever in this program 
of deliberate planned madness ofdestroying the American labor movement and 
sabotaging the basic policies of the CIO.,,98 Following Reuther's challenge, Murray 
now moved to the right, acknowledging communist domination of some unions. 
Murray now authorized the CIO's Executive Board to investigate unions suspected 
not specifically of communist influence but ofmisuse ofunion funds and negligence 
in carrying out union responsibilities. In authorizing the investigations, Murray cited 
the UOPWA as an example of such negligence, complaining the union had wasted 
funds and the time of the CIO Executive Board with complaints of raiding by other 
CIO unions.99 
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By the time of the 1949 CIO national convention in Cleveland, unions 
accused ofcommunist-domination such as the UOPWA and the UPWA were 
struggling for survival in the face ofrapidly declining membership as a result of state 
and federal anti-Communist investigations and internal raids by CIO and AFL rival 
unions. Now isolated within the labor movement, the unions were helpless to 
prevent their impending expulsions from the CIO. Delegates to the convention now 
passed resolutions barring members of the Communist Party from membership on 
the CIO's Executive Board and authorized the Executive Board to expel any affiliate 
union deemed by the Board to be acting in support of the program: of the Communist 
Party. The Convention then expelled the United Electrical and Radio Workers of 
America, which had boycotted the convention, and the Farm Equipment Workers 
Union on charges ofCommunist domination. Following the expUlsion, UOPWA 
president James Durkin proclaimed, "1 don't know what the hell will happen next," 
and the UOPW A director oforganization characterized the situation as "a bloody 
mess.,,100 
The answer to Durkin's lament came the day after the 1949 convention 
closed. The CIO Executive Board ordered expulsion hearings on the UOPWA, the 
UPWA, and eight other unions accused ofCommunist-domination. Beginning 
hearings in January, 1950, the Executive Board acted quickly, expelling all ten 
unions on February 15, 1950.101 In the final reports of the expUlsions, the Executive 
Board determined that the UOPW A " ... followed and continue to follow exactly, 
without deviation, the program of the Communist Party ...Never in the history of the 
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UOPWA has any policy ever been adopted which in any way runs counter to the 
policies ofthe Communist Party or to the interests of the Soviet Union ... ,,102 In a 
similar fashion, the Executive Board concluded that the UPWA had also followed 
the Communist Party line in the post-war period. Cognizant that the UPWA 
primarily consisted of federal employees, the Board took pains to note in its report 
that it " ...wishes to make crystal clear that its condemnation of that [UPWA] 
leadership, and of the union, does not necessarily reflect a condemnation ofeach 
individual member ...the jobs ofmany ofwhose members would be endangered by a 
fallacious translation ofthe Committee's findings as to the union leadership into a 
condemnation of each of its individual members.,,103 In its efforts to separate the 
loyalty ofthe UPWA's general membership from its leaders, the report specifically 
focused on the alleged Communist Party affiliation ofUPWA President Abram 
Flaxer and the union's secretary-treasurer, Eleanor Nelson. 104 
Expelled by the CIO, the UOPW A and the UPWA were now a mere 
semblance of their fonner selves. UOPW A membership, estimated in 1946 to be 
nearly 45,000, had dropped to only 12,000 by the time of their expulsion. The 
UPWA suffered similar devastating losses in membership, shrinking from a peak of 
nearly 80,000 members in 1947 to less than 2,500 by 1952.105 Stripped ofelO 
affiliation for alleged communist-domination, the unions were now attacked with 
fury by state and local anti-Communist and subversive activities committees. Purges 
ofunion members in public relief and welfare agencies occurred throughout the 
country in rapid succession during 1949 and 1950, including Detroit, Los Angeles, 
243 

New York City, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Washington State. t06 In 
Detroit, the city's mayor accused the UPWA locals ofharboring some 150 members 
of the Communist Party, and the city's Loyalty Commission launched a probe into 
city employee loyalty.t07 In Los Angeles, county and city loyalty oath requirements 
were used to investigate and purge UPW A members from public relief agencies and 
other city and county agencies. lOS In New York City, where the now remaining 
1,500 members of the UPWA made it the largest of the national union's locals 
representing social workers, a particularly bitter assault upon the union was 
unleashed by the city's Department ofWelfare. Between 1947 and 1950, successive 
commissioners of the Department ofWelfare attacked the UPW A as being 
dominated by communists. In 1949, Welfare Department commissioner Raymond 
Hilliard announced his detennination to " ...chase the Communists out of the 
Department" and began a concerted campaign to break the union's hold over 
department collective bargaining agreements. 109 Using such tactics as photographing 
union members seen participating in demonstrations or protests over relief policies, 
Hilliard subsequently dismissed union activists on charges of inefficiency and 
insubordination. Upon the UPWA's expulsion from the CIO, Hilliard refused to 
recognize the union and continued to purge the department ofUPWA members. By 
March, 1951 nearly 200 UPW A members had been fired by the Department of 
Welfare. IIO As the attacks on UPWA continued nationwide, the union finally 
disbanded in 1953 with a membership of only 2,500, now replaced by a new union in 
the CIO, the Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee. I II 
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SSEU locals in the UOPWA did not fare any better than those in the UPWA. 
SSEU membership, now concentrated in the Jewish social service agencies ofNew 
York and Los Angeles, were also challenged by rival unions, and most agencies 
refused to recognize SSEU bargaining rights or representation of employees. I 12 In a 
desperate attempt to maintain their membership, the UOPW A joined with three other 
unions expelled by the CIO to merge with the left-led and independent Distributive 
Workers Union, now renamed the Distributive, Processing and Office Workers 
Union of America (DPOW A). In the resulting merger, former UOPWA president 
J ames Durkin was named DPOW A secretary-treasurer. Claiming a membership of 
less than 8,000 at its founding convention, the DPOWA absorbed the few remaining 
members of the New York and Los Angeles SSEU locals, now numbering only 
hundreds. 113 Attacked by other unions and public officials as a communist­
dominated union, the DPOWA subsequently purged their leadership in 1953, 
e~pelling the last of the mostly Communist Party member social workers still in the 
union. 114 
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CHAPTER 7: 

CONCLUSIONS 
In the long run I think we represented what social work professed and 
also feared, social workers who weren't afraid to stand up for the 
people, the unemployed and the exploited. The rank and file was a 
lesson to social work that doing that was dangerous. People lost their 
jobs, we were called Communists and sometimes hauled offto jail. It 
scared them and I think they really gave up on it after that in a very 
basic way. I'm not saying that we were the golden age or anything 
like that, but look at what we've got now. That's the saddest thing. 
Not what happened to me and others, but what happened to social 
work. 1 ("Sarah," 1982) 
The expulsions of the UOPW A and the UPW A from the CIO marked the 
final demise of the rank and file movement in social work. During the turbulent 
years between 1946 and the unions' expulsions from the CIO in 1950, it also marked 
a drawing back of the AASW from its brief flirtations with the unions during World 
War II. As charges of comnlunist domination enveloped the unions representing 
social workers, the mainstream of the profession withdrew its associations with the 
rank and file unions. In the JCTU's final appearance at the 1950 NCSW, JCTU 
sessions drew few numbers and were challenged by a new organization, the 
Community and Social Agency Employees, which had replaced the SSEU in most of 
New York City's private Jewish social serve agencies.2 Following the CIO 
expulsions of the UOPWA and UPWA, the Executive Committee of the NCSW now 
refused to recognize the JCTU, citing the union expulsions and denying the JCTU a 
presence at the 1951 NCSW.3 As purges ofpublic relief workers occurred 
throughout the country, and federal and state subversive activities committees 
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questioned the loyalty of social work trade unionists, the response of the AASW was 
intensely circumspect. In a special issue on civil rights published in 1948 by the 
AASW's official publication, Social Work Journal, the politically cautious nature of 
the profession was clearly expressed: 
While this issue of the Social Work Journal has been in preparation 
the House Un-American Activities Committee has been 
investigating· Communist infiltration into key governmental 
positions. There is undeniable evidence that such infiltration has 
occurred. There is undeniable evidence, also, that communist 
political philosophy and practice are irreconcilable with 
democratic constitutional govemment.4 
While the AASW would express concerns over the tactics of the HUAC and loyalty 
oath programs, its 1949 policy statement on civil rights restricted AASW activities or 
public statements in defense ofcivil rights violations to only members of the 
organization.5 By 1951, the AASW's willingness to even oppose cuts in social 
welfare services was also almost non-existent as it refrained from comment on the 
firing ofNew Deal social worker Jane Hoey from the federal department ofHealth, 
Education and Welfare by the Eisenhower administration. Fired after protesting 
proposed cuts in federal social welfare programs, Hoey sought the assistance of the 
AASW. The AASW chose to demur, stating the AASW could not take action on any 
situation that involved " ... a particular person.,,6 The AASW became even more 
silent in its consideration of the merits of social workers' involvement in the labor 
movement. Following the expUlsions of the rank and file unions, the few articles 
that addressed social work participation in the labor movement published in Social 
Work Journal would question the ethical conflicts that arose between a profession 
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and participation in trade union activities. Typical of such sentiments, one article in 
1948 stated, "Unionism's endeavor to organize professional personnel by appeals to 
worker solidarity, when professionals regard themselves as a group set above the 
common herd, has been a tactic as self-defeating as it has been persistent.,,7 Indeed, 
the profession's tum from involvement in labor organizations was such that by 1954, 
the Social Work Yearbook would have only this to say: "The union movement in 
social work, which arose from the conditions ofthe depression of the 1930s, has 
been limited in extent and influence and is apparently confined to a few metropolitan 
areas."g 
The profession's relative silence during the anti-Communist hysteria of the 
late 1940s and the 1950s was of little comfort to its victims. As the internal cold war 
of the 1950s continued to investigate organizations and individuals considered 
subversive, many social workers who were prominent in the rank and file movement 
faced blacklists, subpoenas, and even jail. Some rank and file activists, such as 
Bertha Reynolds, Bronislaus Zukas, Max Bogner, and others all suffered from 
informal blacklists that followed them for years. Others would lose their jobs as 
their previous association with the rank and file movement and the progressive 
causes it espoused became the subject of loyalty investigations. Jacob Fisher, one 
time editor ofSocial Work Today and early rank and file union leader, was 
suspended from his job in the Social Security Administration in 1954 after being 
labeled a "security risk.,,9 Unable to find ajob in social work after his suspension, 
Fisher joined the staff ofa consulting firm until his retirement. With the exception 
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ofBertha Reynolds and a few other social workers, Fisher recalls that he was ignored 
in his plight by the mainstream profession. to Meyer Schreiber, a member of several 
organizations deemed subversive by the government, was labeled a "national 
security risk" following an investigation by the Federal Bureau QfInvestigation 
(FBI) ofhis background while an employee of the U.S. Children's Bureau in 1964. 
Schreiber recalls that the profession participated in providing information on him to 
the FBI: 
An inquiry [by the FBI] was made of the Columbia University 
School of Social Work, where I had graduated in February 1949. I 
was amazed at the ease with which information was given about 
me. In 1991, I wrote three letters to the school's dean and asked 
about the school's policy ofgiving out information to any source 
about graduates; no reply was received. Similarly I wrote to the 
Council on Social Work Education and did not receive a 
reply...The National Association ofSocial Workers was part of the 
investigation. A special FBI unit investigated the Chicago chapter 
and combed the chapter's records to learn if I had been involved in 
whatever the FBI defined as subversive activities in Chicago. 1I 
Margaret Wheeler, who lost her job as a social worker in Washington after being 
called before the HUAC in its investigation ofthe UPWA and refusing to answer 
committee questions, remembers: 
The professional association shunned me when I was going 
through the HUAC persecution. They refused to come to my side 
or even offer advice. They wanted to stay as far away from 
communists as possible. They didn't know if I was a communist 
or not. All they cared about was that the committee said I was. 
Most of them were cowards, nearly all of them.12 
Abram Flaxer, former president of the UPWA, was cited for contempt by the U.S. 
Congress after his refusal to answer questions ofhis affiliation with the Communist 
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Party before the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security. Subsequently 
tried and convicted, Flaxer's conviction was eventually overturned by the Supreme 
Court in 1958. 13 Flaxer recalls, "1 was an absolute anathema to the leaders in social 
work. They would have never dreamed of saying anything in my defense. I didn't 
expect them to and they sure never did.,,14 
The legacy that the rank and file movement has left for the profession of 
social work is, as can be expected, a mixed one. Perhaps like no other rebellion 
within the history of the profession's ranks, the movement best exemplifies the 
dualistic conflicts that have divided the profession since its inception. The historic 
tensions within the profession over the nature of its professional identity versus its 
relationship to labor unions and other forms oforganization, and its debates over the 
merits of social reform versus the advisability ofa technique-based practice, are well 
informed by a study of the rank and file movement. For members ofthe rank and 
file movement, affiliation and identity with organized labor and the social and 
political causes promoted by the union movement were not seen as an inherent 
conflict with their identity as social workers. Rather, many saw a clear identification 
with 'the workers movement, merged with the skills and specialized knowledge of the 
profession, as essential to the development of a truly democratic occupation fully 
imbued with the values ofsocial and economic justice. The debates of today within 
the profession over the balance between social reform activity and the performance 
of direct clinical services have almost studiously avoided the synthesis of these two 
as attempted by the rank and file. It is, perhaps, because of this avoidance that the 
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debate within the profession over its proper role and function so often has reduced 
itself to tired dogmas devoid ofany possible meaningful dialogue. 
The unions of the rank and file movement also demonstrated to many social 
workers that participation in trade unions was of immediate and long-lasting benefit. 
Rank and file unions were the first to establish standards ofworking conditions, 
salaries, and benefits in public and private agencies that were guaranteed through 
collective bargaining contracts. While the original unions created by social workers 
were destroyed in the hysteria ofMcCarthy ism and the Cold War, their impact on 
both the private and public sector have continued today, although considerably 
muted in terms ofpolitical content or social work identity. During the 1980s and 
1990s, while overall union membership has declined in the United States, it has 
grown within the public sector. IS As of 1993, nearly 25 percent of the over 400,000 
social workers in the labor force were members ofunions, mostly concentrated in the 
public sector in the AFL-CIO's Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and 
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.16 These 
unions have been highly successful in efforts to maintain or increase member salaries 
and benefits and have contributed to public agency improvement of standards of 
services to their clients. Equally important, as Milton Tambor points out, 
progressive social work ideas and organizations have been sustained largely within 
the context of the trade union movement.17 Whether in the actual workings of the 
unions or in the identification ofthe union movement and its historic concerns with 
the needs ofpoor and working people as expressed in the pages ofprogressive social 
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work journals such as the Journal ofSociology and Social Welfare and the Journal 
ofProgressive Human Services, the labor movement continues to represent social 
works' most outward expressions and fonns ofstruggle for social and economic 
justice. 
At the same time as the movement historically points out for our profession 
directions for progressive political action, the experiences of the movement have also 
served to mitigate against such progressive perspectives and actions. Lessons 
regarding the limits ofsocial reform, and the power of the state to contain and even 
destroy such efforts, were not lost on the profession as the rank and file unions were 
destroyed. As the political repression ofMcCarthy ism and the Cold War targeted 
social work unions, the profession stood largely aside, content to consolidate its 
professional organization and reorient its ranks to the relative safety of technique, 
bureaucracy, and political moderation. While temporarily shaken from its 
professional complacency by the radical social work movement of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the profession today continues to be wary ofasking too much or going 
too far for its clients. Indeed, the politics of fear as engendered in the times of the 
rank and file movement, are powerful modifiers ofboth individual and 
organizational behavior. It is perhaps too easy for the profession to lose sight of the 
positive lessons and victories of the rank and file movement, for the lessons of 
failure have been extreme. It has also been perhaps too easy for the profession to 
forget the contributions ofthose social workers who most suffered from their 
willingness to struggle for the rights ofpoor, unemployed and working people. Few 
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of those who were victims ofblacklists and congressional inquisitions are 
remembered today, and fewer still are honored for their courage and struggle. 
In these senses, a fuller explication of the history of the rank and file 
movement, its meaning within the historical context of the profession's development 
and the insights that the movement provides regarding the optimum form and 
function of the profession remain largely unexplored. In this regard, further 
examination of the movement's attempts to integrate social work practice theory and 
technique with politically liberatory theory and its practice is called for. In addition, 
further study into the actual internal workings of the social work trade unions is 
needed. Such study would further explain how the unions successfully reached out 
to social workers, established strategies and tactics for collective bargaining, and 
linked themselves with the broader industrial workers movement. Information on 
the role ofwomen and minorities in the rank and file movement is nearly non­
existent. Given that the unions representing the rank and file held higher proportions 
ofwomen and minorities than most other CIO unions of the time,explicating these 
important histories would help to fill a gap in both social work and labor history. 
Finally, it is clear that deeper examination of the relationship of the rank and file 
movement to the Communist Party and the political lines of the party is necessary. 
This need is particularly salient, as the charges of communist-domination that helped 
lead to the movement's ultimate destruction have continually and consistently been 
attributed to the few historical accounts of the movement as the reasons for its 
downfall and questionable relevance to the field today. In this regard, the tendency 
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of these accounts has been to accept the accusation of communist-domination made 
by the movement's accusers as evidence of such domination. Such incomplete logic 
has only served to further marginalize the historical relevance of the rank and file 
movement to the profession and dampen scholarly inquiry into that history. The 
historical record of the relationship of the movement to the Communist Party and the 
party's relative influence in the unions is far from complete, and that nascent history 
has been flawed by the lack of an incorporation of a comprehensive examination of 
the terms of inquiry regarding association, influence, and domination. Indeed, the 
continuing politics of anti-communism are still well represented within our 
profession's history of the movement, and until this condition is rectified, a 
comprehensive historical record of the rank and file will not be achieved. 
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Notes to Chapter 7 
1. 	 Interview by author with "Sarah," February 12, 1982. "Sarah" requested 
anonymity in her interview. A rank and file activist and union official in the 
mid-west, Sarah was one ofa handful ofsocial workers sentenced to prison for 
her refusal to cooperate with anti-Communist investigations in the 1950s. 
Despite receiving support from some ofher fonner colleagues, Sarah recalled 
that she was abandoned and shunned by most. Following her release from 
prison, Sarah left the field and later retired in Seattle, Washington. 
2. 	 Alexander, Organizing the professional social worker, p. 201. 
3. 	 Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
4. 	 "Opinion," Social Work Journal (October 1948), p. 139. 
5. 	 Leighninger, Social work: Searchfor identity, p. 193. 
6. 	 Ibid. 
7. 	 Herbert Northrup, "Collective bargaining by professional societies," Social Work 
Journal (October 1948), p. 168. 
8. 	 Quoted in Alexander, Organizing the professional social worker, p. 206. 
9. 	 Jacob Fisher, Security risk (Sarasota, FL: Piney Branch Press, 1986). 
10. Ibid. 
11. Meyer Schreiber, "Labeling a social worker a national security risk: A memoir," 
Social Work 40(5) (1995), p. 659. 
12. Interview by author with Margaret Wheeler, September 19, 1979. 
13. Beck, Contempt ofCongress, p. 234. 
14. Interview by author with Abram Flaxer, August 16, 1980. 
15. Milton Tambor, "Unions," in Richard Edwards (Ed.), Encyclopedia ofSociaI 
Work, 19th edition [CD-Rom Version] (Washington, D.C.: NASW Press, 1995), 
no page number. 
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July 28, 1980 
July 5, 1980 
August 12, 1980 
August 12, 1980 
January 1, 1980; March 30, 1980; July 18, 1980; 
August 28, 1980; February 12, 1981 
August 7, 1980 
June 17, 1980 
August 2, 1980 
September 25, 1979; October 2, 1979; August 9, 1980; 
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Clara Rabinowitz 
Mary Russak 
Marie Talbot 
VemeWeed 
George Wolfe 
Bronislaus Zukas 
Interviews 
Herbert Aptheker 
Julia Bames 
Eleanor Cohen 
Julia Davis 
Abram Flaxer 
Jacob Fisher 
Gus Hall 
Dorothy Healey 
Irene Hobbs 
Celia Katz 
Barbara Klein 
Rachel Levine 
Margaret Levy 
September 5, 1980 
August 12, 1980; September 1, 1980 
August 23, 1980 
October 9, 1979 
March 31, 1980; April 18, 1980; May 4, 1980 
April 12, 1980; May 15, 1980; June 29, 1980 
May 23, 1980; June 14, 1980; July 25, 1980; August 
11, 1980; August 28, 1980 
July 28, 1980 
January 14, 1981 
February 12, 1994 
March 17, 1996 
August 16, 1980 
Septerrlber 9, 1980; February 12, 1981 
November 12, 1983 
August 23, 1980; September 26, 1980 
February 13, 1981 
May 15, 1981 
August 19, 1980 
May 5,1986 
October 12, 1980; September 12,13, 1981 
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"Max" 
Leo Miller 
George Morris 
Clara Rabinowitz 
Mary Russak 
"Sarah" 
Marie Talbot 
Verne Weed 
Margaret Wheeler 
George Wolfe 
Bronislaus Zukas 
February 17, 1990 
April 16, 1997 
November 18, 1980 
November 24, 1980 
December 13, 1980 
February 2, 1982 
December 4, 1979 
July 21, 1980 
September 19, 1979 
July 3, 1980 
September 28, 1980; October 14, 1980 
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Appendix: Historical Research Method 
For the purposes of this study, the author employed what has generally been 
termed the historical-comparative research method. l Finding its roots in the work of 
Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx, the historical-comparative method, 
while containing within its rubric a broad array ofapproaches and specific 
techniques, places analytic emphasis on the understanding of an historical period or 
event within both the overarching flow ofhistory and the specific social and cultural 
context of the historic situation under study. In this fashion, historical-comparative 
research seeks to identify not only the objective facts of a historical period but to 
interpret the meaning of these facts within the cultural-historical context and their 
application for current social problems and discourse.2 
Two primary strategies were used in the collection of data: archival and oral 
history technique. Both strategies share a common feature of reliance upon primary 
sources as the target ofdata collection and subsequent analysis. While both 
strategies share a search for original sources, these sources differ in form and 
content. The former relies upon written primary sources of information (e.g., letters, 
diaries, official documents), while the latter relies upon the spoken word (oral 
recollections and memories) ofpersons who participated in the period ofhistory 
under study. 3 
While the uses and relative strengths and weaknesses of these and other 
strategies employed in this study are discussed in more detail below, it is important 
to make an observation on the shared implications of archival and oral history 
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method within an historical-comparative approach. Both methods of data collection 
share a common strength ofproviding the researcher direct access to the past; that is, 
the researcher's interpretations ofhistory are based on materials o/the time under 
study and hold the strongest potential for classification and verification.4 As opposed 
to substantive reliance on secondary information sources, in which the researcher is 
faced with disentangling another author's interpretation ofhistorical data, the 
researcher using primary data sources can base analyses and interpretations upon the 
actual words and records of the actors in the historical narrative. However, the 
strength of this direct connection with the past paradoxically reveals its weakness: 
the records of the past, be they written or oral, are at best fragmentary and limited by 
the context of their production. Primary sources reflect history in the making, not 
history as product. The use ofprimary data is bound by the intended or unintended 
distortions of their creators, the acts of their caretakers (be it archivists or the 
memory of the actor), and the physical and intellectual corrosives of time.S 
Accordingly, the comparison and triangulation ofmUltiple data sources took on 
heightened priority in this historical study. 
Use of Archives 
Generally speaking, archives refer to organized collections ofwritten 
documents pertaining to particular individuals, organizations, social movements or 
other historical events.6 Such collections can be contained in formal archive 
facilities organized and maintained by universities, unions, governmental 
institutions, or other organizations and commonly consist ofmaterials such as letters, 
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diaries, minutes ofmeetings, unpublished manuscripts, internal organizational 
documents, and other forms ofwritten records. Formal archives are usually 
available for use by the general public and researchers, although certain restrictions 
on the availability and use ofdocuments may be imposed based on the physical 
condition of the documents or the nature of the subject (e.g., access to classified 
government documents or proprietary documents ofbusinesses). A closely related 
source ofmaterials includes documents in the personal possession of individuals 
(either the subject ofinquiry or family members) and from whom permission must 
be sought for inspection and conditions for use arranged. 
In developing an archival search strategy, the author compiled a master list of 
names of individuals, organizations and social movements relevant to the rank and 
file movement in order to identify selection ofarchives and facilitate the subsequent 
identification and review ofother relevant collections. The development of this 
master list was accomplished through a standard literature review (e.g., periodical 
indexes, dissertation abstracts, biographical indexes). Sources derived from this 
master list were then used to cross-check with archive collections throughout the 
United States. 
The author conducted an extensive literature review that encompassed 
published primary source materials, secondary source publications, "fugitive" 
(unpublished) materials, and personal correspondence with participants in the rank 
and file movement. These references were categorized and cross-referenced across 
four major categories: (1) references directly concerned with the rank and file 
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movement; (2) references more generally pertaining to the historical development of 
the social work profession during the time under study; (3) references pertaining to 
the general labor movement of the time; and (4) references related to radical 
movements and organizations ofthe time (e.g., the Communist Party and the 
unemployed workers movement). 
Archival Techniques Employed 
Three primary strategies were employed in the archival research: chronology, 
networks and cohorts, and backstage perspectives and processes.' The use of. 
chronology refers to the organization ofmaterials into a timeline based on dates and 
events identified through the initial literature review. In addition to providing a basic 
temporal record of events, chronological organization allowed the author to identify 
changing roles or patterns ofbehavior by individuals and organizations to compare 
these chronologies in order to identify points ofconvergence or divergence. Equally 
important, the development and review ofa chronology allowed the author to more 
easily identify gaps in the timeline that required further investigation to complete the 
documentary record. 
Archival materials were also used to identify social networks of individual 
actors, institutions and organizations involved in the rank and file movement. By 
tracing the origins and routes of formal and informal communications (e.g., letters, 
memos, reports, meeting attendance records) the author developed a relatively dense 
matrix of individual and group linkages, influential relationships, and patterns or 
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individual and group participation and membership; all ofwhich assisted the author 
in the construction and interpretation of the historical materal. 8 
The third major strategy employed involved the discovery and analysis of 
underlying backstage motives ofhistorical actors (individuals or organizations) and 
the validity of their publicly expressed values, behaviors or beliefs.9 Based on 
Goffman'slO work on the differing nature of the private and public presentations of 
self (front stage vs. backstage), this strategy sought to identify points ofdivergence 
or convergence between these public and private motives and behaviors. This 
process of analysis involved the comparison ofdocuments or materials prepared for 
public consumption (e.g., reports, speeches, pamphlets) with documents intended by 
the actor to be private or limited in circulation (e.g., letters, diaries, notes) in order to 
ascertain the overt and covert motivations and intentions oforganizations and 
individuals. 11 
Use of oral/written history methodology 
Oral history interviews with participants in the rank and file movement were 
another important source ofdata for the proposed study. It should be noted that a 
variant ofthe oral history interview, the use ofcorrespondence and written interview 
schedules with subjects, is also germane to this study, and the general steps engaged 
in by the researcher to collect the data correspond with the oral history technique. 
Martin argues that oral history techniques are warranted or in fact desirable when 
several conditions face the researcher, including the lack ofwritten documentary 
evidence, the need to supplement or verify existing documentary evidence, and the 
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desire to capture participants' sense of the meaning of an historical event or era.12 In 
these senses, oral history interviews allow the researcher to directly communicate 
with participants of the event or subject ofinquiry to confirm or disconfinn 
previously published records of"fact", to explore details ofevents not previously 
known or understood, and to incorporate the recollected motives, feelings, and 
beliefs of interviewees into their analysis. Given the incomplete nature of archival 
data, the use ofthese interviews, oral and written, were essential to this study. 
The collection and incorporation of such data served to more fully complete 
the documentary record, and of equal import, exposed the author to the felt reality of 
the participants. Such exposures, be they through archival or oral history method, 
speak to the interpretive nature ofhistorical research; that is, history is the product of 
both the documentary past and the personal interests, convictions, and assumptions 
of the researcher. 13 
Following the guidelines ofMartin, the author used the following general 
steps in the collection oforal and written histories:14 
1. 	 Definition ofthe selected topics to be discussed with the interviewee(s). 
2. 	 Identification ofthe interview participants. This step involved the identification 
of and implementation ofa sampling strategy to obtain interview subjects. 
3. 	 Interviewing/data collection. 
4. 	 Transcribing and editing taped interviews. Interviews were transcribed into 
written narratives, providing margin space for notes, annotations and comments 
in analysis. 
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5. Analysis and interpretation ofthe data. This final step engaged the author in the 
coding, classification and verification oftranscript narrative. The data collected 
were compared and evaluated against other documentary evidence and 
interpreted within the context ofthe emerging historical narrative. 
In regard to the interview subjects, many were leaders of the national rank and file 
movement (including members of the National Coordinating Committee and major 
trade unions representing social workers). In addition, the author interviewed "rank 
and file" members engaged in local organizing and activity, as well as key members 
of the Communist Party who were closely affiliated with the organizational efforts of 
the movement. 
A purposive sampling method was used in the identification of interview 
subjects and entailed two strategies. The first strategy involved the identification and 
location of specific key surviving authorities in the rank and file movement through a 
review of the literature and documentary evidence. The second strategy involved a 
snowball approach to identifying and locating participants. This approach to 
sampling required the author to identify initial interview subjects who in turn 
identified additional subjects for the author. 15 While this sample cannot be said to be 
representative, it is important to note that the subjects contacted included a range of 
key union leaders and activists in various sections of the country. 
Analytic and interpretive issues of the methodological strategies 
Archival and oral/written interview method share a number ofcommon 
strengths and weaknesses, particularly in relation to the validity and reliability of 
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data obtained and the resulting interpretive issues/dilemmas inherent in historical 
research. Martin notes that within the context oforal history research, validity 
" ...defines the degree ofconfonnity between the reports of the event and the event 
itself, as recorded by other primary sources ..." and that reliability refers to the extent 
to which collected infonnation is consistent internally; that is, " ...does it tell the 
same story about the same event on a number ofdifferent occasions?,,16 In a similar 
discussion concerning archival research, Hill notes that researchers must pay close 
attention to the dynamics of"sedimentation" - the cumulative social and physical 
aspects by which documentation is included or excluded from collections, physically 
deteriorates or is destroyed over time, or is altered or fabricated. I7 
These issues of data reliability, validity and sedimentation pose numerous 
analytic and interpretive dilemmas for the researcher, as the ability to control the 
evidence is temporally beyond the reach of the researcher. In other words, the 
evidences ofhistory, be they written documents or spoken reminiscences, are created 
and maintained by individuals (living or dead) other than the researcher, and the 
decisions ofworth or unworthiness they place on the historical knowledge in their 
possession is solely theirs. 
The practical implications of this iterative process presented a number ofchallenges 
to data reliability and validity and the subsequent historical interpretations ofthe 
author. Infonnation, be it written or oral, can be subject to conscious or unconscious 
distortion or fabrication by their creators. Similarly, the social context and 
personal/ideological assumptions and biases of the author may have led to distorted 
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intetpretation of the data. I8 To deal with these threats, the historical method of this 
research required a constant sifting and resifting of the evidentiary sands through the 
process ofverification ofdata through triangulation with multiple primary sources, 
comparison of findings and intetpretations with secondary analyses conducted by 
other researchers, and the search for and falsification of alternative 
hypotheses/intetpretations.19 
Such methodological and intetpretive dilemmas are not unique to historical 
research and are in fact shared by the physical and other social sciences. The 
phenomena ofhistory occur in the same universe as the other sciences, and, hence, 
are subject to the same material conditions. But unlike many other scientific fields 
of inquiry, the variables ofhistory cannot be manipulated and replicated in a closed 
system; rather, the chain of causality is open for the intetpreter to utilize the insights 
of study and reflection to argue the merits ofa particular intetpretation. And 
ultimately, it is the audience to which the intetpretation ofhistory is given that must 
judge its usefulness, logic and validity. 
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